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Abstract 
GETTING OUT OF THE GHETTO: HARM REDUCTION, DRUG USER HEALTH AND 
THE  TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL POLICY IN NEW YORK 
 
by 
Rachel Faulkner-Gurstein 
 
Adviser: Prof. John Mollenkopf 
 
 
This dissertation is a qualitative study of the emergence and evolution of harm reduction 
drug policies in New York City. It examines harm reduction as a case of the 
institutionalization of a public health policy movement. Harm reduction seeks to treat the 
medical and social consequences of drug use without requiring abstinence. The dissertation 
examines the process by which harm reduction has managed, in the words of one 
informant, to “get out of the ghetto” and become increasingly integrated into New York’s 
public health establishment. Harm reduction has undergone three stages of 
institutionalization. It began as an activist policy movement. This was followed by a period 
of partial institutionalization, characterized by grant funding, organizational autonomy and 
limited state support. Finally, with harm reduction’s integration into Medicaid as well as 
the widespread adoption of naloxone overdose prevention strategies, it has assumed a 
mainstream position within the health system. This dissertation argues that 
institutionalization has changed harm reduction at the grassroots level and also 
contributed to wider changes in the design and delivery of public health in New York State. 
While some activists remain skeptical of what they see as harm reduction’s co-optation, the 
process has created new relationships between marginalized communities and the state, 
 v	  
and led to new forms of social and political inclusion for drug users. This research 
demonstrates the effectiveness of social movements as policy actors and provides a case 
study of progressive policy change during a period marked by the privatization and 
restructuring of social welfare provision. The harm reduction approach, pioneered by drug 
users and public health activists, is now being applied to the health system more broadly. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Harm Reduction in Context 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The story of harm reduction is fundamentally urban. It tells how some of society’s most 
marginalized, feared and vulnerable members, intravenous drug users, were able to join in 
a coalition of other actors to develop policies to address the deadly health risks that they 
face. In so doing, they initiated larger transformations in the way health systems deliver 
services to risky populations. Harm reduction arose in exactly those corners of the post-
industrial city that were described by outside observers as ungovernable wastelands—
places that were imagined as the targets of social policies, not their progenitors. What arose 
in these places constitutes the latest chapter in the long history of local health authorities 
acting in innovative ways, often at odds with national practices or norms, to address 
problems exacerbated by their urban settings.  
 
In his study of the historical geographies of public health in Seattle, Michael Brown notes, 
“For reasons that have not been entirely clear, those who conceptualize ‘urban politics’ 
rarely consider public-health departments as an interesting apparatus of the state.”1 To fill 
this lacuna, Brown urges historians, geographers and others to “frame public health as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Brown, “Public Health as Urban Politics, Urban Geography: Venereal Biopower in Seattle, 
1943-1983,” Urban Geography 30.1 (2009): 23. See also Jason Corburn, "Reconnecting with Our 
Roots American Urban Planning and Public Health in the Twenty-first Century." Urban affairs 
review 42.5 (2007): 688-713.; Rachel Slocum, “Commentary on ‘Public Health as Urban Politics, 
Urban Geography,” Urban Geography 30.1 (2009): 30-35; Roger Keil, “Urban Politics and Public 
Health: What’s Urban, What’s Politics?” Urban Geography 30.1 (2009): 36-39; Tim Brown and Craig 
Duncan, “Placing Geographies of Public Health,” Area 33.4 (2002): 361-369. 
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form of urban politics.”2 Indeed, scholars have located urban politics in topics ranging from 
the minutiae of urban housing markets to the placement of street furniture—while the 
knowledge, practices, and institutions of urban public health are typically regarded as 
apolitical infrastructure. This is partly due to the institutional separation of public health 
research from urban planning and urban studies research. And it is partly due to the efforts 
of public health practitioners themselves. Public health departments work hard to keep 
themselves out of the rough-and-tumble world of urban political conflict, even when 
pursuing deeply progressive and contested agendas on behalf of the largely poor and 
marginalized populations that they serve. 
 
To frame public health as a form of urban politics is to see public health as a central part of 
struggles over resources, space and belonging in the city. As much as municipal 
bureaucracies surrounding housing, crime, sanitation, neighborhoods and other spheres of 
urban governance have been the object and instrument of struggles to shape the modern 
city, so too have public health authorities been central to forming urban life. And in fact, 
public health actors have directly and indirectly acted upon issues like housing, crime and 
sanitation in the interest of population health and safety. Public health actors produce 
much of the basic knowledge and data—statistics about births, deaths and other crucial 
actuarial and demographic information—that forms the basis for a host of policy decisions. 
In a direct way, what we know about the city is derived from information gathered through 
the public health bureaucracy’s mandate to conduct population surveillance. Because of its 
unique epistemological, political and medical functions, public health is a privileged site for 
understanding agency, surveillance, exclusion, community, empowerment, and other 
central urban political questions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Brown, op. cit.: 1. 
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Much is at stake in understanding public health as a domain of urban politics. Whether or 
not public health should be seen as properly “political” is not merely an abstract question of 
disciplinary authority. Uncertainties surrounding its politics are part of the very 
phenomenon of urban public health itself. Throughout American urban history, whenever 
representatives of public health departments, doctors, medical scientists, activists and 
others have debated public health measures, they have tried to adjust the boundary 
between the political—where we use the language of values, ethics and power to debate 
both process and ultimate ends—and that which is considered “nonpolitical” or “apolitical” 
and thus treated merely as matters of efficiency in means not the appropriate ends.3 These 
tensions—between value rationality and instrumental rationality, between the medical 
establishment and drug user mutual aid, between pragmatism and radicalism—are at the 
heart of harm reduction, both as a social movement and shorthand for a whole set of public 
health policies.  
 
An important strand of contemporary analysis identifies harm reduction as part of the 
neoliberalization of social policy.4 Harm reduction, such scholars argue, shifts responsibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Nancy Krieger,  "The Making of Public Health Data: Paradigms, Politics, and Policy." Journal of 
Public Health Policy (1992): 412-427.; George Rosen,  A History of Public Health, Revised Ed. 
(Baltimore: MD, Johns Hopkins University  Press, 2015.); John Duffy, History of Public Health in 
New York City, 1625-1866, (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968.) 
4See for example Gordon Roe, “Harm Reduction as Paradigm: Is Better than Bad Good Enough? The 
Origins of Harm Reduction,” Critical Public Health, 15.3 (2005): 243-250.; Katherine McLean, “The 
Biopolitics of Needle Exchange in the United States. Critical public health,” 21.1 (2011): 71-79.; 
Donald Moore, “Governing Street-Based Injecting Drug Users: A Critique of Heroin Overdose 
Prevention in Australia,” Social Science & Medicine 59.7 (2004): 1547-1557.; Philippe Bourgois, 
“Disciplining Addictions: The Bio-Politics of Methadone and Heroin in the United States,” Culture, 
Medicine and Psychiatry, 24.2 (2000): 165-195.; Benedikt Fischer et al., "Drug Use, Risk and Urban 
Order: Examining Supervised Injection Sites (SISs) as ‘Governmentality’," International Journal of 
Drug Policy 15.5 (2004): 357-365; Tim Rhodes, "Risk Environments and Drug Harms: A Social 
Science for Harm Reduction Approach," International Journal of Drug Policy 20. 3 (2009): 193-201.; 
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for health and wellbeing from the state to the user, while developing new forms of discipline 
and surveillance that shape users’ subjectivities and bodies. While these critics make valid 
points, my analysis takes a different tack. As explained in chapter two, the adoption of 
harm reduction strategies as a central approach to public health also requires the 
decentralization and the de- and recomposition of policy bureaucracies. But this does not 
mean that adopting a harm reduction approach is equivalent to deregulation or 
privatization. Rather, we must analyze the relationships between users, activists, 
community organizations, medical actors, and different branches of the state to understand 
harm reduction in a more precise and nuanced way.  
 
This dissertation analyzes the politics of harm reduction in New York City between 1992 
and 2012. Harm reduction has its roots in outsider social movements and marginalized 
spaces, but it became mainstream public health policy in New York. Its techniques have 
moved from the immediate context of the politics of addiction to the larger landscapes of 
social policy. This study places harm reduction in the context of a longer transformation of 
the state. It examines how harm reduction managed, in the words of one of my informants, 
to “get out of the ghetto” and become central to the city’s public health bureaucracy. 
 
The relationships between the city’s public health bureaucracy and the activists and service 
organizations who comprise the harm reduction movement pushed the New York City 
public health system to transform the way they responded to drug use. The philosophy of 
harm reduction is everywhere in this new politics of addiction, although it sometimes takes 
the form of language about risk management or calls for evidence-based policy. Harm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Peter G. Miller, "A Critical Review of the Harm Minimization Ideology in Australia," Critical Public 
Health 11. 2 (2001): 167-178. 
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reduction would not have been mainstreamed without the city’s well-organized harm 
reduction movement, but many other parties played a role in the long-term transformations 
in social policy at the municipal, state and national levels. Despite their new position as the 
front line of a reconfigured public health state, New York’s harm reduction organizations 
still see themselves as laboring on the margins. They see the challenge as maintaining the 
liberatory, social justice, user-centered orientation of the early harm reduction movement 
while expanding their services and becoming an increasingly routine practice of the state. 
They are a case study in the struggle to implement progressive policies in a neoliberal era. 
 
As chapter two explains, harm reduction may fairly be called a neoliberal development 
within public health, taking the recent turn sometimes called the “new public health.”5 
Along with other neoliberal social policies, it touts a ‘common-sense,’ cost-efficient approach 
that calculates risk and emphasizes personal responsibility. It has been adopted as part of 
what Peck and Tickell call the “roll-out” of new forms of social control and surveillance over 
users as individuals and populations.6 It enables the state to discipline, punish, supervise, 
and manage deviant populations without addressing the underlying structural inequalities 
that deepen the negative consequences of drug use for already marginalized groups. 
  
But rather than subjecting harm reduction to readymade critique, this study argues that 
we can use it detect under-exploited opportunities for progressive change in a largely anti-
progressive era. What do pro-poor social policies look like today? What strategies should 
activists use to pursue politics that support marginalized social groups in an unequal era? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See, e.g., Alan Petersen and Deborah Lupton, The New Public Health: Health and Self in an Age of 
Risk (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996). 
6 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” Antipode 34.3 (2002): 380-404. 
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In a time of austerity and privatization, how can we extend public services to excluded 
groups? 
 
Harm reduction has a deeply transformative potential, stemming from its origins as a 
mutual aid movement among users. It mobilizes the language of human rights in relation to 
a marginalized group. Because it looks to users themselves as experts on drug use, it 
revalues the experience of marginality. It forges new coalitions between medical 
researchers, law enforcement, public health administrators and drug users activist groups 
in order to pursue progressive goals. By integrating drug users as users into political 
society, these new networks provide new avenues for participation, solidarity and 
citizenship. This dissertation will explore these political consequences of harm reduction, 
and show how they are connected to changing policy paradigms in New York. 
 
II. Harm reduction in New York City 
 
The streets and neighborhoods of New York City mark the battle lines of the war on drugs. 
Home to the nation’s largest concentration of drug users, the city has also been an epicenter 
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Nowhere have the drug war’s devastating consequences been 
more deeply felt. It is thus no surprise that the harm reduction movement for drug policy 
reform has become firmly established here, despite and because of New York’s struggles 
with rising rates of drug dependency and the myriad problems associated with drug use, 
like mass incarceration, HIV infection, and overdose deaths.  
 
New York is, of course, the most populous city in the U.S.. It is also among the country’s 
most unequal. These two factors have ensured that New York has a major national profile, 
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as well as major problems—and they have both contributed to New York’s outsize influence 
in the arena of urban policy. The nation’s most impoverished congressional district, the 
South Bronx, sits uncomfortably close to some of the most expensive real estate in the 
world. Mott Haven, the heart of the South Bronx and the location of my field sites, also has 
the dubious distinction of being the New York neighborhood with the highest rate of 
overdose death. 7  Patterns of economic inequality, health inequality and racialized 
residential segregation combine to make the city a mosaic of vastly different life chances.8 
 
The harm caused by drug use is on a different scale in New York than that of any other 
American city. New York has as many as 200,000 intravenous drugs users, the largest such 
population in the country.9 According to recent estimates, the city is home to over 117,000 
people living with HIV. Of those, about 16.3% have a history of injection drug use.10 Though 
still insufficient to meet demand, New York now boasts the largest syringe exchange 
network in the nation, annually delivering over three million clean needles to users in all 
five boroughs.11 The number of new HIV infections linked to injection declined sharply in 
recent years, thanks in part to the herculean efforts of syringe exchange programs and 
other AIDS and harm reduction service providers. New York City nevertheless remains a 
hotspot for new HIV infection, especially in high poverty neighborhoods in Brooklyn and 
the Bronx. Other direct consequences of intravenous drug use on the health of drug users 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 DOHMH, “Drugs in New York City: Misuse, Morbidity and Mortality Update,” Epi Data Tables, 
(2011). 
8 Merrill Singer, “AIDS and the Health Crisis of the US Urban Poor: The Perspective of Critical 
Medical Anthropology," Social Science & Medicine 39.7 (1994): 931-948. 
9 DOHMH, “HIV Risk and Prevalence Among New York City Injection Drug Users.” (2009). 
10 DOHMH, “New York City HIV/AIDS Annual Surveillance Statistics 2013,” (2013). 
11 Don C. Des Jarlais, et al., "HIV Incidence Among Injection Drug Users in New York City, 1990 to 
2002: Use of Serologic Test Algorithm to Assess Expansion of HIV Prevention Services." American 
Journal of Public Health 95.8 (2005): 1439-1444. 
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are overdose (discussed in chapter four), Hepatitis C, abscessed veins, and blood-born 
infection to name just a few.   
 
New York has long pioneered in the field of public health, making it well placed to address 
these challenges. Along with its distinctive approach to public housing, labor relations, and 
other aspects of municipal policy, the City has an advanced public health system.12 The 
historian Paul Starr argues: 
New York City was no microcosm of America. In many regions, particularly 
the South and the West, public health often barely reached the stage of 
sanitary reform, if it went that far. The underdevelopment of public health 
was the more characteristic pattern in the United States. The experience in 
New York is significant precisely because, as an exceptional case, it discloses 
some of the political constraints limiting public health at its boldest.13 
Much of the history of American public health has been written in New York. 14 
Understanding the limits and possibilities of public health history in this city can therefore 
teach us about the politics of public health policy more generally. 
 
The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) was originally 
founded in 1805 as the Board of Health. The DOHMH “is at once prototypical and unique,” 
in that it “operates with unusual autonomy from the rest of the state, enforcing a health 
code that supersedes state regulations in many areas.”15 From its early efforts at improving 
sanitation in the slums in order to control outbreaks of cholera16 to its latter-day campaigns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Joshua B. Freeman, Working Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II (New York, NY: 
New Press, 2001). 
13 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession 
and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1982): 185. 
14 See for example John Duffy, op. cit. 
15 James Colgrove, Epidemic City: The Politics of Public Health in New York (New York, NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2011): 7. 
16 Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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against cancer, cardiovascular disease, obesity, and diabetes—“the epidemics of the modern 
era”17—the health department has long been entangled not only with public health policy 
itself, but with housing, civil rights, municipal statistics and other aspects of urban 
administration. Public health in the city, as elsewhere, has wrestled with questions about 
what lies at the discipline’s core, where and how to intervene, and whom to prioritize. 
 
As a rule, public health’s purview, which is far-reaching and progressive, is in many ways 
ill matched to its powers, which tend to be limited and specific. Many of the health 
problems the DOHMH has had to deal with over the years—lead poisoning, tuberculosis, 
HIV to name but a few—have occurred as a consequence of, or been aggravated by, the 
social and economic status of their sufferers. One of the hallmarks of public health is a 
focus on population-level interventions aimed at the prevention of disease, not its cure. As 
such, the DOHMH has had to content itself with targeted programs like syringe exchange, 
rather than addressing the systemic factors—like poverty and racism—that contribute to 
drug use and continue to plague the city’s marginalized communities. Many within the 
health department recognize the limitations of their offerings and wish they could do more. 
 
Sanitation in water and sewage may have been the major object of early public health 
interventions, but substance use has always been an important target for public health 
advocates as well. New York has had a reputation as a magnet for drug users dating at 
least to the early twentieth century. And from well before the AIDS crisis, drug use was 
already being treated as a public health problem. Struggles taking place nationally over the 
definition of the problem of drug use—was it an aberrant behavior and thus a crime, or was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Thomas R. Frieden, et al., "Public Health in New York City, 2002-2007: Confronting Epidemics of 
the Modern Era," International Journal of Epidemiology 37.5 (2008): 966-977. 
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addiction a disease?—were crystalized in concurrent and seemingly contradictory 
developments taking place in New York City and State in the 1970s. Community-based 
methadone programs were first introduced by the DOHMH in 1970. Only three years later, 
the state introduced mandatory minimum sentencing for drug related offenses. As a drug 
policy that was created at the metropolitan scale, and one that allowed for users to continue 
certain forms of drug consumption, methadone can be seen as part of the pre-history of 
harm reduction. And yet New York State’s mandatory minimum sentencing was influenced 
by and gave credibility to the war on drugs declared by President Richard Nixon in 1971. 
The medical and the carceral models pioneered in New York would both be taken up and 
replicated across the country.  
 
New York was not always the first jurisdiction to adopt harm reduction measures. New 
Haven, Connecticut began syringe exchange a few years before New York, and Chicago, San 
Francisco and the state of New Mexico were pioneers in naloxone distribution. But New 
York’s size means that harm reduction has been institutionalized here at a uniquely large 
scale. The size of the population receiving services requires a well-developed infrastructure 
to be put in place, which has helped to move the services out of the periphery and into the 
mainstream. And despite often-vocal opposition, New York’s liberal political climate has 
been favorable to harm reduction measures, with activists finding supporters among state 
and city officials as well as elected members of the city council and the state assembly.  
 
The city’s adoption of harm reduction was far from straightforward. In his support for 
methadone maintenance therapy, Mayor John Lindsay established a pattern which 
continues to this day, where New York mayors would promote harm reduction policies 
through seemingly exceptional, irregular means: pilot studies, administrative experiments 
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and public-private partnerships.18 Methadone maintenance therapy, which began as a pilot 
study out of Beth Israel Hospital in 1968, expanded within a few years to be offered at 
outposts across the city.19  For Mayor Lindsay, methadone seemed to be an answer for a 
number of different problems. In an era of urban crisis, rising crime rates and major social 
conflict, methadone seemed like a way to reduce the criminal behaviors like theft, burglary 
and assault that were blamed on drug-addicted people. In a period of looming fiscal crisis, 
methadone was also a way for Mayor Lindsay to use the health department’s infrastructure 
of community-based health centers to tap into federal money connected to President 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society.20   
 
Harm reduction in New York had its first period of expansion in response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s, during the Koch and Dinkins administrations. 
In an effort to get a handle on the worsening AIDS crisis, senior officials at the DOHMH 
approached Mayor Koch with a proposal for a city-run syringe exchange program in 1985. 
Though personally in favor of the idea, syringe exchange failed to materialize at this time 
due to the political climate during the Koch administration.21 But in the face of the heaviest 
HIV casualties in the nation, the city’s public health establishment persisted in their efforts 
to implement syringe exchange and in November 1988 the first exchange was opened as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Samuel Roberts, “To Enter a Society which Really Doesn’t Want Them: The Making of 
Controversies During New York City’s Heroin Crisis, 1955-1975,” Paper presented to the New York 
University American History Workshop (3 April 2009). Arguably the tendency towards operating in 
a space of exception, policy-wise, is typical of harm reduction globally. 
19 Colgrove, op. cit., 59 
20 Ibid. 
21 For a discussion of intricacies of the coalition politics of the Koch administration, see John Hull 
Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the Koch Coalition in New York City 
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Specifically on the topic of Mayor Koch 
and syringe exchange, see Colgrove, op. cit.: 107-179. 
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research pilot out of the Manhattan headquarters of the DOHMH.22 For several reasons 
that chapter three will explain, the syringe exchange did not succeed in attracting the large 
volumes of drug users officials had anticipated. And when Dinkins defeated Koch in the 
mayoral election of 1989, one of his first acts as mayor was to shut down the exchange after 
only fourteen months in operation. Dinkins ignored the mounting public health consensus 
around the effectiveness of syringe exchange at curbing the spread of HIV. Instead, he 
deferred to the sensitivities of the political coalition that helped to put him in office, which 
included powerful members of the city’s Black establishment who were vocal opponents of 
syringe exchange.23  
 
Following the closure of the health department-run site, syringe exchange went 
underground. Activists continued to operate unsanctioned exchanges in neighborhoods with 
high levels of drug use. At the time, over 50% of injection drug users were HIV positive24 
and drug users had by this point in the epidemic overtaken gay men as the group with the 
most new HIV infections.25 For public health workers, this was a time of deep frustration 
with the political process. Many got involved in activism and civil disobedience alongside 
drug users and other allies, finding ways to support syringe exchange despite its illegal 
status. The situation came to a head with a test case brought by activists, which ended with 
a declaration that HIV constituted a public health emergency. In 1992 Mayor Dinkins 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 G. Alan Marlatt, et al., eds. Harm Reduction: Pragmatic Strategies for Managing High-Risk 
Behaviors (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2011): 224. 
23 Prominent members of New York City’s Black community came out forcefully in opposition of 
syringe exchange, with some linking its then pilot status to a longer history of medical 
experimentation on African American communities. Syringe exchange was widely condemned in the 
language of genocide. See Cathy J. Cohen, The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of 
Black Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
24 Don C. Des Jarlais, et al., "HIV Incidence Among Injection Drug Users in New York City, 1992-
1997: Evidence for a Declining Epidemic," American Journal of Public Health 90.3 (2000): 352. 
25 See DOHMH, “AIDS in New York City, 1981 – 2007,” (2008). 
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reversed his position on syringe exchange, overstepping state paraphernalia laws and 
finally legalizing syringe distribution within the city. While he removed this legal obstacle 
to syringe access, Dinkins did not go so far as to authorize city funding for it. Meanwhile, 
the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) responded by initiating a process 
whereby groups that had been conducting underground syringe exchange could apply for a 
waiver from state paraphernalia laws.26 
 
A pattern was thus established. Syringe exchange was legalized as a response to a public 
health emergency. But due to its highly controversial nature, it remained in a policy space 
of exception. This led to the establishment of a handful of harm reduction agencies that 
operated independently from the city. These organizations relied on grant funding from the 
New York State AIDS Institute, American Foundation for AIDS Research (AmFAR), MAC 
AIDS and a small handful of other private donors. The consequences of this ad hoc, partly 
private and partly public arrangement, can still be seen today.  
 
While the AIDS crisis persisted into the mid-1990s, syringe exchange remained in place. 
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, while no personal supporter of the harm reduction ethos 
nevertheless refrained from interfering with it. Not reliant upon or even eligible for city 
funding, agencies hobbled along and did the best they could within their limited budgets. 
But the exceptional nature of funding for syringe exchange also meant that agencies 
enjoyed some degree of autonomy. Unlike fully funded public clinics subject to uniform 
requirements, syringe exchange sites were able to develop specialized organizational 
identities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 W. Henry Lambright and Mark J. O'Gorman, “New York State's Response to AIDS: Evolution of 
an Advocacy Agency,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2.2 (1992): 175-198. 
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The second major expansion of harm reduction in New York came during the mayoralty of 
Michael Bloomberg. In general, Bloomberg made public health a major priority and 
signaled his seriousness on the matter by appointing Thomas Frieden,  “an innovative and 
sharp-elbowed health commissioner.”27 To deal with the continued risk of HIV infection 
among intravenous drug users, the administration promoted harm reduction policies 
directly through a vast expansion of the city’s syringe exchange program. The Bloomberg 
administration lobbied for a change in New York State law that legalized the sale of up to 
ten syringes at a time to customers through pharmacies and other authorized vendors such 
as medical professionals without a prescription, which facilitated syringe distribution by 
doctors in partnership with groups like Positive Health Project and the Lower East Side 
Harm Reduction.28 The administration also supported other harm reduction programs like 
the overdose reversal drug naloxone, discussed in chapter four. And it provided funds for 
Intravenous Drug User Health Alliance (IDUHA) and other user-activist groups. 
 
As alien as user-activist politics were to the persistently business-oriented Bloomberg 
brand,29 some aspects of harm reduction politics resonated strongly with the Bloomberg 
ethos.30 One of the Bloomberg administration’s central conceits was its commitment to 
pragmatic, data-driven policy. In press releases, campaign literature, and statements by 
the mayor, the administration advertised its self-conception as being “above politics,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Colgrove, op. cit.: 15. 
28 See New York State Department of Health’s website for information on the expanded syringe 
exchange demonstration project, available online at 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/aids/harm_reduction/needles_syringes/esap/update.htm 
29 On Bloomberg’s business-centric agenda, see Julian Brash, Bloomberg’s New York: Class and 
Governance in the Luxury City (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011). 
30 See Lawrence O. Gostin, “Bloomberg’s Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Meddling Nanny?” 
Hastings Center Report 43 (2013): 19-25. 
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dedicated to finding solutions in a practical manner “beyond ideology.” Whether or not such 
an assertion can be validated, the ambition towards policy beyond politics clearly shaped 
Bloomberg’s preference for technocratic, evidence-based government. In education policy, 
administration decisions emphasized testing and accountability. In environmental policy, 
the administration signaled its dedication to practical measures through the promotion of 
weatherization, tree planting, and the creation of open space and bike lanes. In health 
policy, the administration implemented initiatives like the indoor smoking ban, calorie 
counts on restaurant menus, and a ban on trans fats which were seen as small-step 
solutions to some of the city’s obesity and general health problems. These measures were 
simultaneously activist, paternalistic, progressive, elitist, and pragmatic—exemplary, in 
other words, of the contradictions of urban social policy today. Although it is cast as the 
ideological opposite of all things Bloomberg, in public health policy, the de Blasio 
administration has so far declined to repudiate the strategies of its predecessor. 
 
As subsequent chapters demonstrate, numerous actors and interests shape harm reduction 
in New York. These actors are organized into complex networks and hierarchies. There is a 
dimension to harm reduction that is top-down and initiated by the mayor, the governor, and 
public health bureaucracies at the city and state level; a meso-level of organizations that 
use harm reduction to preserve their position within the ecology of New York grant- and 
city-funded service providers; and a bottom-up dimension where harm reduction resembles 
a social movement. Harm reduction in New York simultaneously exists at each of these 
three levels. 
 
The mayoral administrations mentioned above pursued harm reduction for a range of 
ideological, fiscal, administrative and strategic reasons. Through appointments, official and 
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unofficial policy changes, public discourse and other mechanisms, mayors and their staff 
have been able to promote, or if they prefer, to obstruct harm reduction policies. But the 
city’s massive public health bureaucracy has an inertial force of its own that often outlasts 
mayoral changes. DOHMH and other agencies are sensitive to political context and are 
subject to executive authority. But they tend to be guided by logics that are more aligned 
with public health imperatives than with the calculations of electoral coalition building. 
Individuals within the public health bureaucracy have even at times pursued harm 
reduction strategies in ways that are at odds with official positions. 
 
What can be seen as the middle-level—where service providers connect upward to higher 
layers of bureaucratic power as well as downward to grassroots efforts—has been an 
important element of New York harm reduction as well. The city is home to many active 
community-based organizations (CBOs) that compete and cooperate for access to resources 
and influence.31 CBOs and elected representatives create long-term partnerships that shape 
particular fields of policy. By lobbying the city for more and particular kinds of harm 
reduction measures, organizing participants for pilot studies and other avenues for 
research and policy innovation, and most importantly, implementing the policies 
themselves, CBOs play a crucial role in the story of harm reduction in the city. These CBOs 
can be seen are the professionalized offshoots of 1980s- and 1990s-era social movements.32 
They have a permanence that social movement actors tend to lack. And they serve to link 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Nicole P. Marwell, Bargaining for Brooklyn: Community Organizations in the Entrepreneurial 
City (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
32 See Elisabeth S. Clemens and Debra C. Minkoff, "Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of 
Organizations in Social Movement Research," The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements 
(2004): 155-170; Margaret S. Kelley, et al., "Doing Syringe Exchange: Organizational Transformation 
and Volunteer Commitment." Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 34.3 (2005): 362-386. 
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grassroots efforts to urban regime politics.33 In the case of harm reduction, IDUHA, created 
in 2004, is a coalition of local syringe exchanges that compete with one another but also join 
forces to lobby City Council for increased overall funding. 
 
Finally, a grassroots-level of activist groups have supported harm reduction. Some, like 
Voices of Community Advocates and Leaders (VOCAL), are explicitly user-activist 
organizations. Others, like the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) or the Harm Reduction Coalition 
(HRC) are oriented primarily or entirely towards drug policy. But other social movements 
have also animated harm reduction. This dimension was especially important in the early 
years, when harm reduction drew strength from a variety of movements, including local 
representatives of national gay rights and AIDS-oriented groups like the AIDS Coalition to 
Unleash Power (ACT UP).34 As harm reduction in New York became institutionalized, it 
has lost some of its early activist zeal. Many of the original activists became 
professionalized and identify as advocates or health service providers. Others moved out of 
the scene altogether. But there are still plenty of members of the public health bureaucracy 
and social services organizations who see themselves as activists as well as professionals. 
 
As the following chapters explain, the field of harm reduction in New York has undergone a 
process of institutionalization that has brought changes to the organizational forms, the 
sources of funding and support, and the political ambit of harm reduction as a social 
movement. Institutionalization, is the process by which harm reduction became a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Mollenkopf op. cit.; William Sites, "The Limits of Urban Regime Theory New York City Under 
Koch, Dinkins, and Giuliani," Urban Affairs Review 32.4 (1997): 536-557; Clarence Nathan Stone, 
Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988 (Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1989). 
34 Howard Lune, Urban Action Networks: HIV/AIDS and Community Organizing in New York City 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Howard Lune and Hillary Oberstein, "Embedded 
Systems: The Case of HIV/AIDS Nonprofit Organizations in New York City," Voluntas: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 12.1 (2001): 17-33. 
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formalized, routinized, and generally accepted response to drug use.35 Table 1 details the 
stages that harm reduction has undergone in New York since its earliest days before it was 
legalized. 
 
Table 1. The institutionalization of harm reduction in New York 
 
Degree of 
institutionalization 
Funding 
sources 
Scope of 
action 
Organizational 
form 
Political 
orientation 
Low: activist 
organizing 
(before 1992) 
-Donations 
-Small 
grants 
-Syringe 
distribution 
-Community 
organizing 
-Direct-action 
protest 
-Protest 
movement 
-Demanding 
government 
response to AIDS 
crisis 
-Empower drug 
users 
Medium: partial 
institutionalization 
(1992 - 2014) 
-New York 
City and 
State grants 
-Private 
grants  
-Syringe 
access 
-HIV 
prevention 
and care 
services 
-Ancillary 
social services 
-Overdose 
reversal 
-Community- 
based 
organization 
-Treatment of 
marginalized people 
-Promoting 
professionalized 
harm reduction  
High: integration 
into Medicaid 
(2014 and after) 
-Share of 
resources 
budgeted for 
Medicaid 
-New York 
City and 
State grants 
-Private 
grants 
-Syringe 
access 
-HIV 
management 
-Overdose 
reversal 
-Drug user 
health 
-Participant 
organization in 
managed care 
network 
-Mainstreaming 
harm reduction 
-Broader policy 
change 
 
 
This table is a simplification of a complicated and uneven process. But it highlights the 
trajectory of harm reduction as a political movement and policy domain in New York. As it 
developed, harm reduction moved through the three stages of institutionalization described 
in the table. The bottom row describes harm reduction’s current, emerging state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ronald Weitzer, “The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and Institutionalization of a 
Moral Crusade,” Politics & Society 35.3 (2007): 458; William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest 
(Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1975). 
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New York’s turn to harm reduction has produced measurable successes. In the twenty years 
since the peak of the AIDS epidemic in the mid-1990s, the city saw HIV infection rates 
drop, due in part to the expansion of needle exchange programs, now numbering 17 across 
the five boroughs, and the dedication of harm reduction outreach workers throughout the 
city. But despite the decline in new infections in recent years, HIV is still spreading in New 
York City at three times the national rate,36 disproportionately affecting residents of poor 
neighborhoods in Brooklyn and the Bronx. The concern over the concentration of new HIV 
cases and AIDS-related deaths within the South Bronx was enough to push the DOHMH 
into introducing a new large-scale program that would see every Bronx resident tested for 
HIV, the most comprehensive testing program in the nation.37  
 
Syringe exchange represented, and continues to represent, the most visible success for the 
harm reduction movement in New York City. And it exemplifies the contradictions and 
paradoxes at the heart of the movement. Harm reduction has been a vehicle for user 
activism and a way to incorporate users as users into the city’s public health bureaucracy. 
But it has also been promoted by mayoral administrations that were more closely aligned 
with the business establishment or broken-windows-inspired policing agendas than 
community-based social movements.38 This tension within the movement can be the source 
of political opportunities: as the Rockefeller drug laws are being dismantled, harm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Sewell Chan, “H.I.V. is Spreading at Three Times the National Rate,” New York Times, 27 August 
2008. 
37 Anemona Hartocollis, “Push in Bronx for H.I.V. Test for All,” New York Times, 26 June 2008. 
38 For the Bloomberg administration there was no contradiction between promoting stop and frisk in 
policing and harm reduction in public health. In contrast, many activists see opposition to stop and 
frisk as naturally aligned with the harm reduction ethos. But for Bloomberg and similar politicians 
like Rahm Emanuel, there is no contradiction—they see both policies as non-political responses to 
evidence that is imagined as sovereign. 
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reductionists have the chance to promote their projects in the name of cost-cutting. The 
efficiencies exhibited by harm reduction, especially as a technique for reaching high-risk, 
high-cost populations, has attracted attention from New York State’s Medicaid Redesign 
Team, as I explain in chapter five. The question is whether harm reduction in the long run 
will empower the technocratic wing of the movement or its diverse community-based 
elements. 
 
III. Case and methods 
 
This study positions itself in line with the growing field of qualitative and ethnographic 
policy research. It examines the ways the movement to adopt harm reduction has 
transformed the public health policy of New York City and State. As such, harm reduction 
is a shorthand for the entirety of the non-abstinence-oriented approach to managing the 
consequences of drug use—not only the policies that embody this approach, but also the 
organizations, movements, networks, and larger culture that continue to promote and 
administer them. This definition suggests the political and ideological urgency of this task 
that motivates those within the organizations that pursue the harm reductionist policy 
agenda.  
 
The analysis of harm reduction presented here focuses on two areas. First, it provides an 
in-depth examination of the dynamics of the harm reduction policy domain. Much of what 
has been written about harm reduction in the U.S. context has focused only on its flagship 
intervention, syringe exchange, from a number of specific perspectives. They have tended 
either to be public health studies that narrowly evaluate syringe exchange as an 
intervention or broad histories of how syringe exchange came about in the context of 
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HIV/AIDS activism. Several histories chronicle the fractious time during which syringe 
exchange was born, amid the HIV/AIDS crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s.39 These 
studies frequently narrate the voices of participants within these organizations. Many of 
them have also placed gay rights activism in the center of the story, seeing harm reduction 
as an offshoot of that movement. My goal is not to object to these literatures, but to fill a 
gap within them. Relatively few social science analyses have examined harm reduction as a 
political project or as a policy domain with its own trajectory that is relatively distinct from 
AIDS and gay rights activism. Hence this study examines the political movements and 
organizational forms that made and continue to make harm reduction in New York. 
 
Second, this study analyzes how the harm reduction movement, defined as both policy and 
politics, has helped to reshape larger fields of health care delivery in New York City and 
State. Harm reduction directly changed a number of social policies. But its logic has also 
echoed throughout social policy more generally. It is a microcosm of the recent history of 
policy change and also as a stimulant for further policy changes. 
 
It is important to stress that this dissertation is a study of some of the professionls, 
activists, organizations, and practices that play a part in drug policy, not a study of drug 
users and their worlds. Since the 1950s, ethnographic research has explored many aspects 
of the ‘drug scene.’40 Intrepid researchers fanned out across the ‘ghettos’ of America’s major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic (New York, NY: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1987); Charles Perrow and Mauro F. Guillen, The AIDS Disaster: The Failure of 
Organizations in New York and the Nation (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990). 
40 Howard S. Becker, “Becoming a Marihuana User,” American Journal of Sociology 59.3 (1953): 235-
242; Harold Finestone, “Cats, Kicks, and Color,” Social Problems 5.1 (1957): 3-13; Alfred Ray 
Lindesmit, Addiction and Opiates (Oxford, UK: Aldine, 1968); Edward Preble and John J. Casey, 
“Taking Care of Business: The Heroin User’s Life on the Street,” Substance Use & Misuse 4.1 (1969): 
1-24; Alan G. Sutter, “The World of the Righteous Dope Fiend,” Issues in Criminology 2.2 (1966): 
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metropolitan centers to report back about the habits and practices of the drug using 
masses. This has produced a number of important works, some of which influenced policy. 
But the focus has almost entirely been on the distinctive subcultures of drug users or the 
unintended consequences of drug prohibition. In contrast, this study is more in line with 
ethnographies of the policy process that examine policymaking itself from an ethnographic 
perspective.41  
 
New York is the most appropriate case for this study not because it is representative of the 
rest of the country, but because it has always lead the country in designing and 
implementing new public health policies. It continues to serve as a model to the rest of the 
country. Because it has the largest network of syringe exchanges anywhere in the country 
and the highest concentration of injection drug users, the experiences of New York shed 
light on the possibilities and limitations of harm reduction. It is one of the most important 
centers of harm reduction innovation, and it demonstrates the need for continued harm 
reduction programs. Additionally, the DOHMH created the country’s first director of harm 
reduction within its Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Use Prevention, Care, and Treatment. So 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177-222; Bingham Dai, Opium Addiction in Chicago (Glen Ridge, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1970); Dan 
Waldorf, Careers in Dope (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 1973); Michael Agar, Ripping and Running: A 
Formal Ethnography of Urban Heroin Addicts (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1973); Don H. 
Zimmerman and D. Lawrence Wieder, “You Cant Help But Get Stoned: Notes on the Social 
Organization of Marijuana Smoking,” Social Problems 25.2 (1977): 198-207; Bill Hanson, et al., Life 
With Heroin: Voices from the Inner City (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985); James P. 
Spradley, You Owe Yourself a Drunk: An Ethnography of Urban Nomads (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1988); Philippe Bourgeois, In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the 
Sociology of Deviance (New York, NY: Free Press, 1997). 
41 Mara S. Sidney, Unfair Housing: How National Policy Shapes Community Action (Lawrence, 
KS: University Prress of Kansas, 2003); Alex Stevens, “Telling Policy Stories: An Ethnographic 
Study of the Use of Evidence in Policy-Making in the UK,” Journal of Social Policy 40.2 (2011): 237-
255; Dominique P. Béhague and Katerini T. Storeng, “Pragmatic Politics and Epistemological 
Diversity: The Contested and Authoritative Uses of Historical Evidence in the Safe Motherhood 
Initiative,” Evidence and Policy 9.1 (2013): 65-85. 
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harm reduction has been institutionalized here in a way that assures its continued 
existence and facilitates its further evolution.  
 
Harm reduction is now in its third decade in the city and many of the most contentious 
debates over harm reduction policy have been waged and won. Unlike most of the rest of 
the country, harm reduction measures like syringe exchange have become firmly embedded 
in the landscape of public health provision in the city and the state. New York is thus an 
ideal vantage point from which to observe harm reduction’s onward trajectory.  
 
Data for this study were gathered over a two-year period from January 2011 to December 
2012, using multiple qualitative methods. It is informed by participant observation and 
open-ended qualitative interviews. Participant observation took place at three syringe 
exchange agencies in the Bronx neighborhood of Mott Haven. The majority of my hours in 
the field were spent at an organization here named as South Bronx Harm Reduction 
(SoBroHR) where I volunteered once or twice a week for one year. I also spent several 
months volunteering at agencies called Harm Reduction Revolution (HRev) and the Harm 
Reduction Partnership (HRP) here. In accordance with Institutional Review Board protocol, 
names of the organizations have been changed to protect the agencies that shared sensitive 
operational information with me, as well as individual informants at these agencies who 
did not wish to be identified. Public figures are identified by name where appropriate and 
where permission has been given. 
 
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted with 37 agency staff and peer 
volunteers, employees of the DOHMH Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Use, Prevention, Care 
and Treatment, the NYSDOH AIDS Institute, and harm reduction advocates working at 
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three additional New York City-based harm reduction and drug policy advocacy 
organizations. In total, 40 interviews took place (3 people were interviewed twice). 
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours, with most lasting one hour. All but two 
interviews were recorded and the interviews were transcribed and coded before being 
analyzed. Interviewees were selected based on my emerging analysis of the harm reduction 
field. I sought to interview key figures at each organization, as well as other important 
actors identified by reputation and using well-established snowball sampling methods. 
 
In addition to the participant observation conducted at harm reduction agencies, my 
fieldwork included the larger harm reduction scene. This involved attending several 
meetings of the Intravenous Drug Users Health Alliance; attending a conference hosted by 
the AIDS Institute to commemorate twenty years of harm reduction; joining a daylong 
meeting also hosted by the AIDS Institute to inform harm reduction organizations about 
the upcoming changes to Medicaid; and participating in a direct action in Washington DC 
organized by several harm reduction agencies in protest of the re-imposition of the federal 
funding ban on syringe exchange. My fieldwork also included attending numerous overdose 
prevention training sessions as well as a observing training offered by the AIDS Institute 
for employees and volunteers at syringe exchanges. It was my intention, with these varied 
and various venues, to develop a sense of the harm reduction world in New York. As such, 
my ethnographic interest was not so much in micro-practices at the sub-agency level, but 
rather in the dynamics of interaction between differently situated actors.  
 
This study has a number of methodological limitations. One of them concerns the pace of 
change in the harm reduction scene. Describing a world as complex and fast moving as 
harm reduction in New York is exceedingly challenging. Over the course of my fieldwork I 
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watched agencies metamorphose from run-down syringe exchanges to gleaming full-service 
medical centers. Long-time allies and institution builders retired, taking with them their 
irretrievable, unreplicable experience and organizational memories. Some major figures 
died from drug overdose. And the federal ban on syringe exchange funding was reinstated 
only two years after it was first repealed. Meanwhile, a growing opioid overdose crisis that 
was first emerging shortly before my fieldwork began has now gripped the nation in what 
has been characterized as a full-blown epidemic.42 Any study of harm reduction policy 
would necessarily be a snapshot of a moment in time, and that is certainly true of this one. 
 
Another challenge is the breadth of the harm reduction field. It encompasses health 
commissioners and bureaucrats from the City and the State; elected officials and their 
staffs; directors of harm reduction agencies and their cadres of employees, volunteers and 
peers; academic public health researchers; policy entrepreneurs; non-governmental 
advocacy organization employees; activists, some of whom are affiliated with formal 
organizations, some of whom are not, operating at the local and national levels; and users 
with an interest in health and policy, as well as their families and friends. It obviously 
would not have been practical to speak with everyone. For the purposes of this study, my 
data gathering focused on the three groups mentioned above—DOHMH and NYSDOH 
bureaucrats, staff at harm reduction organizations, and members of advocacy groups. This 
corner of the field provided information about harm reduction as a whole. But inevitably my 
data includes more material from some parts of this field than others.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The Centers for Disease Control has reported an increase in heroin and prescription opiate as well 
as a four-fold increase in opiate deaths between 2002 and 2013. It has characterized this recent 
trend as an “epidemic.” Significantly, drug use has gone up across all age and income levels, meaning 
that opiate addiction is not a problem confined to the inner city. The broadening demographic of both 
prescription and illegal opiates is one of the reasons the peer administration of the overdose reversal 
drug naloxone has been relatively uncontroversial. This is discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
See CDC, “Today’s Heroin Epidemic: More People at Risk, Multiple Drugs Abused,” Vital Signs. 
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Due to the fast-changing and vast nature of harm reduction, my sample of informants is not 
a representative cross-section of actors. However, multiple qualitative methods enabled me 
to check the validity of my data to a high standard of confidence. Where possible, data 
gathered through fieldwork was crosschecked with published materials. As with all 
qualitative studies, the interpretation is my own, but I have done my best to make my 
assumptions clear and my interpretive reasoning transparent. 
 
IV. Chapter outline 
 
This chapter has introduced the major arguments and ideas and provided historical and 
political background to the present study. Chapter two examines harm reduction in the 
context of changing policy paradigms. Harm reduction is often associated with neoliberal 
forms of social policy. The chapter critically engages with this literature and argues that 
invoking neoliberalism can obscure the ways activists and policymakers work to influence 
and implement policy change. 
 
Chapter three examines the development of syringe exchange in New York. It analyzes the 
relationships between harm reduction activists and the public health bureaucracy, arguing 
that the way in which syringe exchange was authorized through a waiver of state 
paraphernalia laws caused harm reduction to become partially institutionalized. Partial 
institutionalization was beneficial to harm reduction agencies as it allowed them to 
maintain autonomy while also influencing policy. But it also contributed to a close tie to 
HIV/AIDS and a precarious situation where harm reduction agencies were reliant on grant 
funding. 
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Chapter four analyzes the city’s use of the overdose reversal drug naloxone, a major 
emerging harm reduction strategy. In provides the first social-scientific analysis of 
naloxone, arguing that the success of overdose prevention programs depends not only on 
the chemical properties of naloxone, but on the social strategies launched by users, clinical 
personnel, public health workers, and others in the harm reduction movement. Naloxone’s 
diffusion throughout the public health system required the adoption of peer administration 
and lay training. It creates new alliances between drug users and medical professionals, as 
expertise and authority are extended into the worlds of users themselves. The social 
networks of the users become new kinds of targets for public health interventions. In a 
fashion typical of harm reduction, all of this occurs in a legal space of exception, with 
regulations and laws being rewritten after the fact to take into account new practices. 
Naloxone is an example of harm reduction’s evolution into new areas of health practice, 
reaching new populations not historically connected to syringe exchange or the harm 
reduction movement.  
 
Chapter five analyzes harm reduction’s incorporation into Medicaid. At the time of my 
research, harm reduction services were poised to become reimbursable through Medicaid. 
At the same time, the harm reduction model of service delivery had been flagged by the 
Medicaid Redesign Team involved in a wider process of Medicaid reform as a strategy to 
emulate throughout the system. Harm reduction has thus become a mainstream practice, 
and a mainstream policy ideology. While some activists are skeptical of this process, many 
in the harm reduction field embrace the opportunity presented by Medicaid. The example of 
harm reduction’s incorporation into Medicaid and managed care demonstrates the 
complexities of social policy in an era of privatization. 
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The dissertation concludes with chapter six. It recaps the major findings and arguments of 
the dissertation. And it shows how the case of harm reduction in New York can help us 
understand the politics of new public health policies and the unforeseen political 
opportunities in the era of neoliberal, evidence-based, increasingly technocratic policy.  
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Chapter 2. 
Contesting Harm Reduction 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the meanings of “harm reduction” and “neoliberalism,” and explains 
the connection between the two. Many scholars have connected the emergence of harm 
reduction to the neoliberalization of social policy and constructed a critique upon that basis. 
My argument dissents from the perspective. While the emergence of harm reduction drug 
policies is indeed inseparable from those social policy trends that others have characterized 
as neoliberal, the diffusion of harm reduction demonstrates the potential for progressive 
policy change in the contemporary era. It is not inherently problematic, as the neoliberal 
label might suggest. The restructuring of the welfare state has paradoxically created an 
opportunity for expanding services to drug users, a category of citizen that in previous eras 
was largely excluded from receiving state benefits. 
 
There are clearly many reasons to be skeptical of the concept of neoliberalism. Certainly, 
analysts of social policy should avoid reifying it as a causal force. But if used to describe 
specific trends within policymaking rather than as an epithet, the term can still hold 
analytic meaning. Furthermore, ignoring the concept altogether would mean ignoring much 
of the literature on the political developments that constitute the context of the growth of 
harm reduction. And it would mean ignoring some major debates within the harm 
reduction movement itself. The challenge for analysts of harm reduction, then, is to develop 
a position regarding its relationship with the neoliberalism debate that captures their 
essential connections without creating a caricature of either. 
 30	  
 
Harm reduction programs fundamentally place the responsibility for health and welfare on 
service recipients, rather than on the state. Such programs assume the existence of 
individualized citizens committed to self-improvement. They mobilize decentralized, 
distributed social networks as policy tools. And their promoters present harm reduction 
policies as apolitical measures rooted in evidence and data rather than ideology. In short, 
harm reduction is a prime example of what we talk about when we talk about 
neoliberalism. 
 
But that is not the end of the story. Harm reduction in fact illustrates the complexity of 
contemporary social policy, in that it is simultaneously neoliberal and progressive. 
Wherever it has been adopted, harm reduction was promoted by social movements that 
knew how to effectively position themselves within states and municipalities undergoing 
budget cuts, privatization, and ideological reconfiguration. But it also reflects these changes 
and depends upon them. Harm reduction should therefore cause us to reexamine many of 
our assumptions about the political possibilities in the contemporary era. 
 
II. Defining harm reduction 
 
The concept of harm reduction refers, in the first instance, to policies and programs that do 
not expect drug users to abstain.1 Rather than attempting to eliminate their drug use, it 
seeks to reduce the individual and collective harms that drug use can cause. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 G. Alan Marlatt, et al., eds. Harm Reduction: Pragmatic Strategies for Managing High-Risk 
Behaviors (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2011); Don C. Des Jarlais, "Harm Reduction: A 
Framework for Incorporating Science into Drug Policy," American Journal of Public Health 85.1 
(1995): 10-12 
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harm reduction has never been focused on the personal freedom to use drugs. Rather, it has 
been about transforming the ways in which contemporary social, legal and political systems 
treat drug users, seeing them as “deserving of caring and life rather than punishment and 
death.”2 Harm reduction is both a public health strategy and a dimension of drug policy, 
though drug policy is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes regulation, enforcement, 
treatment, and prevention. Far from being a static and prescriptive program, harm 
reduction is fluid, reactive and evolving. It emerged by molding itself to the contours of the 
social, legal and political institutions and practices that continue to sustain the war on 
drugs, offering targeted interventions to lessen some of the more harmful effects of this 
still-ongoing “war.” 
 
Harm reduction exists alongside and is shaped by this other approach to drug policy but 
includes distinct goals and strategies. It should not be seen as a replacement for 
enforcement, but rather as an addition and corrective to it. And harm reduction does not 
entail decriminalization. Although many harm reduction advocates do support 
decriminalization and legalization, they are distinct actions with different rationales, 
strategies, and bases for support. Simply put, decriminalization focuses on legal responses, 
while harm reduction is a public health measure to reduce the negative side-effects of 
taking drugs. Harm reduction strategies thus exist alongside the criminalized status quo, 
responding to its consequences by ameliorating its outcomes. 
 
Typically, front-line workers such as nurses, doctors, and other public health service 
providers develop harm reduction strategies. For them, drug use is a practical problem. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Dan Small et al., “The Establishment of North America’s First State Sanctioned Supervised 
Injection Facility: A Case Study in Culture Change,” International Journal of Drug Policy 17 (2006): 
74. 
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They encourage and promote input from members of the target population3, with the idea 
that interventions are most likely to succeed when they are demanded by and created in 
partnership with the people affected.  
 
While many political approaches to drug use have attempted to reduce harmful 
consequences, activists in the Netherlands first explicitly used the language of “harm 
reduction” in the 1980s in response to the escalating HIV/AIDS crisis among intravenous 
drug users. They departed sharply from the punitive model of drug policy, which at that 
point was still nearly universal. Dutch harm reductionists formulated a core set of 
principles that are still central to harm reduction today. They saw themselves as pursuing 
a “pragmatic philosophy and embrace[d] a public health view of drug problems”4 that was 
rooted in a “common sense” approach to social policy. Harm reduction supporters argued 
that they were “willing to meet the individual on his or her own terms—to ‘meet you where 
you are’ rather than ‘where you should be.’”5 They felt that “reducing the stigma associated 
with problems of addiction” would lessen the barriers for social and political participation, 
thus minimizing “anti-social” behavior and allowing for greater ease of access to potentially 
life-saving services.6  
 
The idea that public health interventions should target drug users to not only curb the 
spread of disease but also improve the condition of users’ lives subsequently gained 
popularity throughout Western Europe, Australia, Canada and in some limited capacities, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for 
Politics and Policy," American Political Science Review 87.02 (1993): 334-347. 
4 G. Alan Marlatt, “Harm Reduction Around the World,” Harm Reduction: Pragmatic Strategies for 
Managing High-Risk Behaviours, G. Alan Marlatt, ed.  (New York: Guilford Press, 1998): 31  
5 Ibid.: 55. 
6 Ibid. 
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the United States. In the U.S., the first organized syringe exchange program began 
operations in Tacoma, Washington in 1988, though the informal practice of distributing 
sterile injection equipment to drug users is older.7 New York State authorized syringe 
exchange in 1992, the Harm Reduction Coalition—a national service and advocacy 
organization—was founded in 1993, and by the late 1990 select health departments and 
AIDS service organizations across the country were offering syringe exchange. As detailed 
in chapter three, the expansion and diffusion of harm reduction, specifically syringe 
exchange, tracked the onset of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
solidifying its association with the struggles and upheavals that HIV brought to the world 
of medicine and public health.8 
Harm reduction is not only a public health project. It is also a “health-based social 
movement,” pursued by activists.9 Health-based social movements draw on the contentious 
tactics and rhetoric of social movements in order to shape public health policy and wider 
debates about health and social justice. As a social movement, it reflects a broader critique 
of centralized, bureaucratic urban social policy, also represented by the movement for 
community control of schools, housing and other institutions.10 
 
The health social movement side of harm reduction seeks to act upon the place of drug 
users within the health system in a broader way than just changing policy. Activists have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 James A. Inciardi and Lana D. Harrison, eds., Harm Reduction: National and International 
Perspectives (New York, NY: Sage Publications, 1999). 
8 Ronald Bayer and Gerald M. Oppenheimer, AIDS Doctors: Voices from the Epidemic: An Oral 
History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002); Ronald Bayer, "Public Health Policy and the 
AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV Exceptionalism?" New England Journal of Medicine 324.21 (1991): 
1500-1504; Steven Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge 
(Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1996). 
9 Robert H. Keefe et al., "From the Bottom Up: Tracing the Impact of Four Health-Based Social 
Movements on Health and Social Policies," Journal of Health & Social Policy 21.3 (2006): 55-69. 
10 James DeFilippis, Unmaking Goliath: Community Control in the Face of Global Capital (New 
York: Routledge, 2004). 
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sought to change the relationship between drug users and the state, to make drug users 
more active producers, and less stigmatized consumers, of health services. As Henman et 
al. put it, due to harm reduction efforts, “it will be difficult in the future to treat IDUs 
simply as the passive objects of state intervention.”11 In most contexts, activists have 
explicitly sought to move drug users beyond this politically passive condition. 
 
Harm reduction, especially in its early years, was promoted by drug user unions, like the 
Junkiebond in the Netherlands and the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU) 
in Vancouver, Canada, which practice harm reduction as a form of mutual aid.12 Drug user 
unions also pushed state agencies to incorporate users as legitimate political participants, 
rather than as feared, stigmatized outcasts. They exemplify the bottom-up side of harm 
reduction, which has often been in tension with the movement’s more top-down 
practitioners in public health and medical institutions. 
 
In many cities, harm reductionists formed coalitions composed of reformers, user activists, 
health care providers and local politicians. The strategies they promoted—syringe 
exchange, supervised injection, distribution of overdose reversal drugs, and prescription 
heroin for hardcore users, among others—had rapid and dramatic effects. Studies of harm 
reduction interventions conducted over the past twenty years in an array of venues have 
demonstrated a substantial decrease in HIV transmission rates,13 a decrease in overdose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Anthony R. Henman et al. "Injection Drug Users as Social Actors: A Stigmatized Community's 
Participation in the Syringe Exchange Programmes of New York City," Aids Care 10.4 (1998): 397. 
12 Kerr et al., “Harm Reduction by a ‘User-Run’ Organization: A Case Study of the Vancouver Area 
Network of Drug Users (VANDU),” International Journal of Drug Policy 17.2 (2006): 61-69. 
13 There has been a wealth of medical and epidemiological literature produced that has established 
the by now global consensus that harm reduction strategies like syringe exchange contribute to 
reducing HIV transmission rates among intravenous drug users. A few examples are Don C. Des 
Jarlais, et al., “HIV Incidence Among Injecting Drug Users in New York City Syringe-Exchange 
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deaths,14 and a decrease in public drug use,15 with no evidence that these “permissive” 
policies have led to increases in drug use, or “drug tourism,” as was feared. 
 
Harm reduction is both a set of programs, and a philosophy that guides the development of 
ever-evolving responses to the harmful consequences of the war on drugs. As a philosophy, 
it is relatively consistent across space and time. But harm reduction strategies are, by 
design, constantly evolving to meet the needs of specific populations. These needs will vary 
depending on health care regimes (private insurance vs. single-payer),16 law enforcement 
strategies (mandatory sentencing vs. treatment-oriented diversion programs), 17  drug 
preferences and availability,18 the particular contexts of racialized oppression (medical 
experimentation on African American communities in the United States: 19  the 
marginalization and dispossession of Aboriginal people in Canada20), gendered behaviors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Programmes,” The Lancet 348.9033 (1996): 987-991; Susan F. Hurley, et al., "Effectiveness of 
Needle-Exchange Programmes for Prevention of HIV Infection," The Lancet 349.9068 (1997): 1797-
1800; Don C. Des Jarlais, et al., "HIV Incidence Among Injection Drug Users in New York City, 1990 
to 2002: Use of Serologic Test Algorithm to Assess Expansion of HIV Prevention Services," American 
Journal of Public Health 95.8 (2005): 1439-1444. 
14 Sandro Galea, et al., "Provision of Naloxone to Injection Drug Users as an Overdose Prevention 
Strategy: Early Evidence from a Pilot Study in New York City," Addictive Behaviors 31.5 (2006): 
907-912; Sarz Maxwell, et al., "Prescribing Naloxone to Actively Injecting Heroin Users: A Program 
to Reduce Heroin Overdose Deaths," Journal of Addictive Diseases 25.3 (2006): 89-96; Thomas Kerr, 
et al., "Drug-Related Overdoses within a Medically Supervised Safer Injection Facility," 
International Journal of Drug Policy 17.5 (2006): 436-441. 
15 Evan Wood, et al., "Changes in Public Order After the Opening of a Medically Supervised Safer 
Injecting Facility for Illicit Injection Drug Users," Canadian Medical Association Journal 171.7 
(2004): 731-734.  
16 Ellen Benoit, "Not Just a Matter of Criminal Justice: States, Institutions, and North American 
Drug Policy," Sociological Forum 18.2 (2003): 269 – 294. 
17 Jonathan Cohen and Joanne Csete, "As Strong as the Weakest Pillar: Harm Reduction, Law 
Enforcement and Human Rights," International Journal of Drug Policy 17.2 (2006): 101-103. 
18 Don Weatherburn et al., "Supply Control and Harm Reduction: Lessons from the Australian 
Heroin ‘Drought’," Addiction 98.1 (2003): 83-91. 
19 James H. Jones, Bad Blood (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1993). 
20 Victoria Smye et al., "Harm Reduction, Methadone Maintenance Treatment and the Root Causes 
of Health and Social Inequities: An Intersectional Lens in the Canadian Context," Harm Reduction 
Journal 8.1 (2011): 17. 
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(for example, women are more likely than men to be injected by someone else21), and so on. 
For all these reasons, harm reduction is not one unified set of practices, but should be seen 
as an ideological orientation that seeks out strategies that will intervene at the level of the 
user in ways that will produce improved health outcomes for users, and by extension, the 
wider community. 
Despite the many locations, applications, and potentials of harm reduction, in many 
settings it came to be synonymous with syringe exchange. And indeed, syringe exchange is 
undoubtedly the most common and well-known harm reduction intervention. As chapter 
three will discuss in more detail, early efforts to introduce syringe exchange into hard-hit 
urban areas like New York City, an epicenter of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United 
States, served as a lightning rod for protest, focusing both the activists and the public 
health bureaucracy’s energy and attention on convincing a skeptical public and political 
establishment of its necessity. Syringe exchange was prototypical, although as chapter four 
will explain, newer innovations like overdose reversal programs are continuing this work 
and bringing it new populations. 
 
Programs like syringe exchange have modest, measurable goals. But those promoting harm 
reduction always sought bigger ends than simply a targeted HIV prevention strategy. In 
contrast to mainstream American policy’s focus on punishment and abstinence, they 
wanted to promote an alternative politics of addiction. They are a political movement, 
appealing to notions of rights and social justice, every bit as much as a policy movement 
advocating pragmatism and incremental, achievable change. Much debate within the world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Lucy Platt et al., "Impact of Gender and Sex Work on Sexual and Injecting Risk Behaviors and 
their Association with HIV Positivity Among Injecting Drug Users in an HIV Epidemic in Togliatti 
City, Russian Federation," Sexually Transmitted Diseases 32.10 (2005): 605-612. 
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of harm reduction has centered on this internal tension in goals. Some commentators 
lament that harm reduction has strayed from its origins as a grassroots users’ movement, 
claiming that a narrow focus on the outcomes of specific interventions like syringe exchange 
distract from the larger mission of social, political and economic justice for drug users.22 
Others point to the fact that harm reduction has always emphasized a value-neutral 
pragmatism that can be seen as a deeply political stance in a world where drug use and 
drug users are subjected to heavy moral condemnation.23 Helen Keane argues that: 
In a context where drugs are predominantly identified as bad (or even evil) 
and drug use as pathological, a view that drug use is neither right nor wrong 
is not neutral, but is itself a committed and critical standpoint.24  
 
At issue is the existence and placement of a boundary between the political and the 
medical. Some harm reduction supporters believe the medical is the political. 
 
These debates have not been confined to academic circles. During my fieldwork, countless 
harm reduction service providers and members of the public health bureaucracy articulated 
versions of these positions. Whether or not syringe exchange was “political” became an 
enduring source of controversy in public discourse—and the accusation of “being political” 
has become a way to contest harm reduction itself. Edward Jurith, acting director of the 
Office of National Drug Control policy, wrote to the New York Times on October 9th, 2001: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Katherine McLean, "Needle Exchange and the Geography of Survival in the South Bronx," 
International Journal of Drug Policy 23.4 (2012): 295-302.; Andrew D. Hathaway, "Shortcomings of 
Harm Reduction: Toward a Morally Invested Drug Reform Strategy," International Journal of Drug 
Policy 12.2 (2001): 125-137.; Nadine Ezard, "Public Health, Human Rights and the Harm Reduction 
Paradigm: From Risk Reduction to Vulnerability Reduction," International Journal of Drug Policy 
12.3 (2001): 207-219.; Christopher B. R. Smith, "Harm Reduction as Anarchist Practice: A User's 
Guide to Capitalism and Addiction in North America," Critical Public Health 22.2 (2012): 209-221. 
23 John Strang, “Drug Use and Harm Reduction: Responding to the Challenge,” pp 3-20 in Nick 
Heather, et al., eds., Psychoactive Drugs and Harm Reduction: From Faith to Science (New York: 
Rutledge, 1993). 
24 Helen Keane, "Critiques of Harm Reduction, Morality and the Promise of Human Rights," 
International Journal of Drug Policy 14.3 (2003): 228. 
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‘Harm reduction’ is a political movement, not sound policy based on science. 
Far from reducing harm, its advocates promote policies that lead to increased 
usage rates and a false sense of security…. At best, harm reduction is an 
approach that concedes drug abuse prevention is impossible.25 
 
In response, Robert Sharpe, program officer for the Lindesmith Center Drug Policy 
Foundation, wrote: 
Edward H. Jurith… mischaracterizes harm reduction as a political 
movement. Harm reduction is a public-health alternative to the highly 
politicized drug war that acknowledges that both drug use and drug 
enforcement have the potential to cause harm…. Harm-reduction 
proponents tend to be medical professionals who put public health ahead of 
political correctness…. The ‘zero tolerance’ approach favored by drug war 
profiteers is simply not cost-effective.26 
 
Jurith and Sharpe here both seem to be saying that ‘good’ policy should not be political, and 
they imply that we should dismiss policies based on ‘politics.’ But when policy becomes 
evidence-based, evidence becomes politicized. Whether harm reduction is purely a 
pragmatic, evidence-based practice or a self-consciously activist political movement remains 
an enduring question both for practitioners and analysts of harm reduction. While this 
divide has particular resonance within harm reduction, it characterizes policymaking in the 
present time. It is impossible to divorce policy from politics either in theory or practice. 27 
Many questions that are essentially contested are nonetheless being removed from the 
political fray and debated in the supposedly apolitical, technocratic language of evidence.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Edward H. Jurith, “‘Harm Reduction’ Is Deceptive,” Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 9 
October 2001. 
26 Robert Sharpe, “Harm Reduction as Alternative,” Letter to the Editor, New York Times, 16 
October 2001. 
27 See Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (New York, NY: 
Norton, 1997). 
28 See W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” pp 167-198 in Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society (Harrison & Sons: 1955). Gallie’s notion of essential contestedness refers to a degree of 
inescapable difference and indeterminacy that is deeply at odds with the evidence-based policy ideal.  
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New York’s former mayor Michael Bloomberg most exemplifies this process, as a great 
champion of harm reduction.29 
 
Harm reduction policies have met with more resistance in the United States than in either 
Europe or Canada. The drug policy climate in the U.S. has long been dominated by a zero-
tolerance, war on drugs mentality that “establishes an absolute dichotomy between no 
(zero) use and any use whatsoever.”30 In effect, this labels all:  
drug use as equally criminal (or sick), and fails to distinguish between lighter 
and heavier drug use or degrees of harmful use.31  
 
This perspective justifies harsh mandatory sentencing laws that, for example, send first 
time offenders sent away for twelve years on charges of selling small amounts of drugs to 
undercover officers.32  
 
To a large extent, drug policy reform has been hobbled in the U.S. by a moralistic discourse 
which, on the one hand, constructs drug use as a personal failing, and on the other hand, 
sees it as the result of predatory supply-side of producers and dealers. This dominant 
narrative is translated into policies that seek either to “cure” the addict by requiring 
abstinence-based treatment or, failing that, to punish petty dealers with excessive prison 
sentences. In either case, American drug policy and law maintains as its objective a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 In response to a flap about pamphlets published by the health department that critics claimed 
gave instructions on how to inject and thus normalized drug use, Mayor Bloomberg said “I would 
certainly not recommend to anyone that they use hard drugs or soft drugs. But our health 
department does have an interest in if you're going to do certain things to get you to do it as 
healthily as you possibly can.” Quoted in Trish LaMonte, “New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
Defends Pamphlet for Heroin Users.” Syracuse.com, 6 January 2010.  
30 Marlatt, op. cit., 51. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See, for example, the story of Louis Carasquillo in Jake Mooney, “A Retrieved Reformation for an 
Addict,” New York Times, 27 February 2009. 
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completely drug-free society.33 In this sense, American drug policy is oriented towards a 
future aspirational condition, one that diverges greatly from actual social practices today. 
This orientation is sharply at odds with harm reduction’s more modest goals and more 
realistic temporality, where the goal is to reduce harm in the present so that users can live 
to seek treatment in the future. These totalistic, zero-tolerance and abstinence-oriented 
policies have had dramatic consequences, and not in the ways intended: most notably, they 
contribute to sky-rocketing incarceration rates which have linked up with more pervasive 
projects for the control and criminalization of large segments of American urban life,34 
without delivering sought-after reductions in drug use and addiction.35 This has led many 
commentators to characterize the war on drugs as an abject failure.36 
 
In addition to moralistic policy regimes, drug policy reformers in the U.S. have also had to 
contend with a fractious political system that unevenly distributes authority between cities, 
states and the federal government in the realm of criminal drug laws and health policy. 
This uneven policy landscape complicates the availability of harm reductionist measures 
like syringe exchange and the legal purchasing of sterile injection equipment in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Unless, of course, those drug are legally prescribed. The American appetite for prescription 
narcotics is insatiable. See Boji Huang, et al., “Prevalence, Correlates, and Comorbidity of 
Nonmedical Prescription Drug Use and Drug Use Disorders in the United States: Results of the 
National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions,” Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 
67.7 (2006): 1062-1073.; Wilson M. Compton and Nora D. Volkow, "Abuse of Prescription Drugs and 
the Risk of Addiction," Drug and Alcohol Dependence 83 (2006): S4-S7. 
34 See Loïc Wacquant, Prisons of Poverty (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing 
California, (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2006).  
35 See also the ONDCP Policy Fact Sheet on Drug Trends, available online at 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/druguse/drugusetrends.pdf. The 
percentage of persons 12 and over reporting illicit drug use in the past year declined from 17.5% in 
1979 to 10.6% in 1998, but has since been on the rise, inching back up to 12.6% in 2001. The data 
suggest that while there has been some fluctuation over the past 30 years, drug use patterns have 
been more or less stable at around 12% of the population. This estimate is conservative; other 
accounts put the figure at closer to 20%.  
36 See Jimmy Carter, "Call Off the Global Drug War," New York Times, 16 June 2011. 
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pharmacies. National drug policy has traditionally been shaped by abstract, moralistic 
debates, leading to federal drug laws and punitive prohibition.37 Actual drug users have a 
more visible presence in political debates at smaller scales. Federal policymakers represent 
users as abstract threats—prison inmates, predators, addicts. At the municipal scale, users 
are constituents, neighbors, patients, and consumers of social services.38 More pragmatic 
policies and innovations have tended to emerge at the municipal level. It is not that local 
politicians are immune to the temptation towards moral grandstanding. It is that there is a 
scalar asymmetry with social problems like drug use, with the legislation being national 
and the impacts being local. Thus even a mayor as dedicated to “tough on crime” rhetoric 
like Rudolph Giuliani grudgingly allowed needle exchange programs to expand in response 
to the HIV/AIDS crisis in New York City, which peaked at the beginning of his first term in 
office.39 
 
Harm reduction emerged as a reaction and corrective to the war on drugs. Whether in its 
politicized or institutionalized forms, it has come to represent a “paradigm shift”40 in 
dealing with the problems associated with drug use. Social policies, however, do not evolve 
in isolation from larger political developments. Public health’s embrace of harm reduction 
principles coincides with a more general retooling of social policy. The question is whether 
harm reduction swims with or against the tide of this new era in policymaking.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Matthew B. Robinson and Renee G. Scherlen, Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics: A 
Critical Analysis of Claims Made by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2014). 
38 Alex Wodak, "All Drug Politics is Local," International Journal of Drug Policy 17.2 (2006): 83-84. 
39 Daliah Heller and Denise Paone, "Access to Sterile Syringes for Injecting Drug Users in New York 
City: Politics and Perception (1984-2010)," Substance Use & Misuse 46.2-3 (2011): 140-149. 
40 Patt Denning and Jeannie Little, Practicing Harm Reduction Psychotherapy: An Alternative 
Approach to Addictions (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2011). 
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III. Debating neoliberalism 
 
Numerous scholars associate harm reduction with a broad tendency in politics and policy 
known as neoliberalism. The concept of neoliberalism has been at the center of recent 
scholarly debates. For some, it is the key term for understanding the shape of contemporary 
state actions in general. For others, it is a phantom, too expansive to be meaningful and 
lacking explanatory power. Neoliberalism is used here as a term to describe an era in the 
history of the state and policy, with the understanding that the neoliberal era is far less 
monolithic and far more complex—functionally, politically and normatively—than it is 
sometimes imagined to be. 
 
There are definitely limitations to the usage of this term, and critics of the neoliberalism 
frame have important arguments to make. However, the idea of neoliberalism still usefully 
highlight changing state forms and policy paradigms. When neoliberalism is understood not 
as a monolithic movement or causal force but instead as a period in a longer history of state 
formation, the term can help scholars and activists point to salient features of 
contemporary politics and policymaking. But as I shall explain, this requires a more 
nuanced perspective, one that recognizes the conflicting currents and progressive potentials 
within the wide field of struggle that characterizes neoliberal policy practices. 
 
There are two basic approaches to theorizing neoliberalism: one focused on political 
economy, and one focused on biopolitics. The political-economic perspective can be found in 
the work of theorists like David Harvey, who writes that 
neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
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institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, 
free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.41 
 
Neoliberalism here is in essence a form of market fundamentalism. A similar perspective 
can be found in some work by Pierre Bourdieu, who stresses the view of neoliberalism as 
fundamentally the pursuit of a “utopia of a pure and perfect market” which thus 
foregrounds a “programme of the methodical destruction of collectives.”42 In this view, 
neoliberalism is rooted in the thought of Friedrich Hayek and other orthodox neoclassical 
economists and pursued paradigmatically by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. It is 
seen as a fundamentally subtractive project involving the removal of the state from an ever-
larger set of policy domains, and as a set of policy prescriptions that inevitably privilege 
competition over social protection, individualism over social bonds, and market actors over 
state capacity.  The paradigmatic neoliberal social policy in this view is privatization, 
combined with a strong penal component aimed at punishing, surveilling and controlling 
actors that are thought to be hostile to market logic or troubling for their smooth 
operation.43 
 
While the historic link between neoliberal policy actors, Austrian economics and 
Thatcherite/Reaganite politics is well established, a more convincing account of 
neoliberalism stresses its complex, contradictory nature. Peck and Tickell, for example, 
argue that there is not one “neoliberal” doctrine but rather a process of state restructuring 
that they call neoliberalization. They argue, “The process of neoliberalization…is neither 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005): 3-
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42 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Essence of Neoliberalism,” Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1998:  3. 
43 Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1996). 
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monolithic in form nor universal in effect.”44 The 1980s era of Reagan and Thatcher was 
only one moment in a history of neoliberal state transformation—what Peck and Tickell call 
“roll-back” neoliberalism characterized by the dismantling (or roll-back) of the welfare 
state. Whereas the 1990s saw the rise of something much more relevant for the current 
study: “roll-out” neoliberalism, where new forms of “proactive statecraft” engender new 
forms of regulation, control and service provision.45 Rather than aiming to destroy society, 
neoliberal policies often assume the existence of strong social bonds and try to build upon 
them. 
 
Perhaps the most succinct definition of neoliberalism was supplied by Loïc Wacquant in a 
recent debate.  Citing Jamie Peck’s argument that “neoliberalism has always been an open-
ended, plural and adaptable project,” Wacquant argues that  
it nonetheless has an institutional core that makes it distinct and 
recognizable. This core consists of an articulation of state, market, and 
citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto 
the third. So all three of these institutions must be brought into our 
analytic ambit.46 
 
It is not that neoliberalism must mean subtracting the state and letting the market take its 
place. Rather, it means the reformation of these institutions in ways that are less state-
centric compared to the Fordist-Keynesian state, but not overdetermined by any particular 
market actor. 
 
Neoliberalism, for theorists like Peck, Tickell, Wacquant, Brenner and Jessop, is an 
internally contradictory moment in policy-making that includes the formation of new 	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political subjects and new policy paradigms. Other scholars, writing from post-structuralist 
or Foucault-influenced perspectives, have taken this argument even further. Building on 
Foucauldian conceptions of biopolitics and governmentality that has been central to many 
critical studies of public health and harm reduction, Rose argues that “advanced liberalism” 
entails a “politics of life itself”: “Since the 18th century, political power has no longer been 
exercised through the stark choice of allowing life or giving death… Politics now addresses 
the vital processes of human existence: the size and quality of the population… health and 
disease; birth and death.”47 The state, so this argument goes, increasingly involves itself 
with the maintenance and regulation of life.  
 
This might sound somewhat detached from the political-economic conception of 
neoliberalism, and it is indeed distinct in its concern. The link between the two is the 
concept of the individualized and individualistic subject. Rose and Miller also associate 
neoliberalism with the process that they call “responsibilization,” where risk, responsibility 
and rights are shifted from collective to individual actors.48 Other scholars have identified 
responsibilization with the rise of a more general “individual responsibility framework.”49 
Larner argues that neoliberalism involves “a particular politics of self in which we are all 
encouraged to ‘work on ourselves’ in a range of domains.”50 This emphasis on individualized 
political subjects has come full circle, and now neoliberalism embraces social norm 
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formation, social network theory and a whole range of techniques that are premised on 
utilizing, rather than destroying, social bonds.51 
 
There have long been voices claiming that neoliberalism is a chaotic concept. Some, like 
Clive Barnett, are skeptical of the usefulness of the concept at all, questioning “whether 
neo-liberalism is a coherent, ambitious programme of rule; and whether it does aim to 
extend itself by bringing into existence fully-formed neo-liberal subjects.”52 Other scholars 
also ask whether there is any essential characteristic that unites all “neoliberal” policies in 
general.53 This stance also questions what these authors see as the simplistic normative 
politics of the critical literature:  
Theories of ‘neoliberalism’ are unable to recognize the emergence of new and 
innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical 
imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism 
and collectivism, the private and the public.54  
 
While these skeptics make a number of important points about the dangers of positing 
neoliberalism as a causal force, there is no reason why all accounts of neoliberalism—as a 
field of struggle or era in the history of state formation and policymaking—must take the 
monolithic form these authors are criticizing.  
 
What is most interesting in these skeptical authors is their argument about the unforeseen 
progressive potential that could emerge from some actors in the neoliberal field. James 
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Ferguson, for example, has noted “the surprising affinity of some aspects of what we call 
‘neoliberalism’ with certain forms of progressive politics.”55 Ferguson argues: 
to say that certain political initiatives and programs borrow from the 
neoliberal bag of tricks doesn’t mean that these political projects are in 
league with the ideological project of neoliberalism…only that they 
appropriate certain characteristic neoliberal ‘moves.’ These moves are 
recognizable enough to look ’neoliberal,’ but they can, I suggest, be used 
for quite different purposes than that term usually implies.56 
 
He sees a proposal for universal basic income in South Africa as one example of a policy 
that uses neoliberal “moves” for ends that are—unquestionably, though not simplistically—
“pro-poor.” 
  
If neoliberal social policies are in fact not monolithic but instead subject to the same 
contestations and contradictions of all forms of policymaking, then the possibility of 
neoliberal policy tools being used for progressive ends is always present. Ferguson notes 
that for a variety of reasons, these policies are likely to prominently feature “those hard-to-
categorize urban improvisers who have for so long been relegated to the margins both of 
society, and of social analysis.”57 Harm reduction, in my views, is one of these policies that, 
through the work of dedicated urban activists and public health professionals, has much to 
teach about the progressive possibilities and complexities of policy in a neoliberal era. 
 
IV. Harm reduction and the limits of critique 
 
Public health in the neoliberal era tends to have a number of characteristics. It emphasizes 
individual responsibility over collective provision. It uses the tools and language of markets, 	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seeing patients as clients and understanding health care as a service. It emphasizes choice 
and consumer sovereignty rather than centralized authority. While it typically means the 
reduction of public responsibility, it does not conceive of individuals as free-floating atoms. 
Instead, it seeks to leverage the social networks within which contemporary health subjects 
are embedded in order to achieve objectives and outcomes determined by the state, often in 
partnership with the targets of these policies.58 
 
Public health during the neoliberal era is sometimes called the “new public health.”59 In 
this telling, the old public health was focused on “controlling filth, odor and contagion,”60 on 
maintaining order and reacting against infectious disease. In contrast, the new public 
health is focused on behavior—on responsibility, lifestyle, self-control. It is proactive, 
oriented towards managing chronic conditions and syndromes within populations. If the old 
public health developed fighting cholera, tuberculosis, typhoid and other illnesses of 
industrial society, the new public health is geared towards combating heart disease, 
diabetes, obesity, and addiction—the illnesses of late capitalism.  
 
The old public health was shaped by the political currents of the Progressive Era. Social 
reformers used the tools of the state to pursue a moralistic agenda and ameliorate the 
conditions of the urban poor. For Progressive Era reformers, moral concerns were fused 
with concerns about disease and social order. The new public health is similarly a product 
of its time in its post-ideological, pragmatic approaches to managing health through the 	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calculation of risk. It enables the state to discipline, punish, supervise, and manage deviant 
populations without addressing the underlying structural inequalities which may lead to 
the harmful outcomes of drug use in the first place. Progressive Era reformers were 
concerned with transforming the environment to produce healthier, more virtuous citizens. 
Today’s progressive public health workers also seek to produce healthier citizens. But their 
moral project is less about reforming the character of the poor and more about affirming 
their individualism, autonomy and responsibility. 
 
Bruce Alexander has described addiction as one of the major health problems of 
contemporary global capitalism.61 It is not surprising, then, that many social scientific 
analyses of the contemporary growth of harm reduction have identified it with the new 
public health, and neoliberal policy more generally.62 And when neoliberalism is invoked in 
these analyses, it is usually to say that harm reduction has been colonized, coopted or even 
“gentrified.”63 According to Gordon Roe, harm reduction’s institutionalization is a betrayal 
of its original intention to disrupt the social and political marginalization of drug users. 
Instead, harm reduction has been captured by public health technocrats committed to 
applying the tools and tactics of neoliberalism to better manage a hard to reach and “risky” 
population. He argues, “what began as a ‘bottom-up’ movement became ‘top-down’ policy.”64 
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Roe’s position is perhaps among the most strident in its critique of what he sees as a “newly 
mainstreamed” and “medicalized” harm reduction.65 In his characterization of the adoption 
of harm reduction by public health authorities he draws on theorists heavily influenced by 
Foucault, like Mitchell Dean, Nickolas Rose, Colin Gordon and others, to underline the 
various ways in which the institutionalized harm reduction project is compatible with 
neoliberal trends. Quoting Mitchell Dean, he writes: 
Harm reduction is an excellent illustration of a technology of agency, through 
which ‘populations that manifest high risk or are composed of individuals 
deemed at risk’ become the target of programmes ‘to transform their status, 
to make them active citizens capable, as individuals and communities, of 
managing their own risk.’66 
 
In a similar vein, Peter Miller characterizes harm reduction as “a safety net, not a strategy, 
representing a convergence of economic rationalism and social policy.”67  
 
Scholars working in the Foucauldian theoretical tradition tend to see harm reduction as a 
biopolitical project. Philippe Bourgois, for example, sees some forms of harm reduction as a 
bio-medicalized way of disciplining and punishing the bodies of heroin users by disabling 
the experience of pleasure they might derive from the use of illicit substances.68 Other 
scholars, like Katherine McLean and Benedikt Fischer, associate harm reduction with the 
disciplining and punishing of contemporary subjects.69 Under neoliberalism, health becomes 
the subject’s own individual responsibility, rather than that of the state. Drug users are 
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compelled to use the techniques of self-surveillance and self-control towards the end of 
masking social conflict in post-welfarist spaces. 
 
As influential as the Foucauldian critique of harm reduction has been, it may have outlived 
its usefulness. Foucault’s political theory does not lend itself very well to formulating a 
positive politics, so the element of mutual aid within harm reduction is bound to register as 
an example of neoliberal “care of the self.” But labeling it as such limits any deeper 
consideration of the full empirical and normative significance of harm reduction as policy. 
Foucault’s inability to understand autonomy and self-help as anything other than the 
effects of controlling, external power limit the usefulness of Foucauldian thought for 
understanding harm reduction. When applied to harm reduction, concepts such as 
governmentality and discipline will always yield the same negative conclusions, thus 
limiting our engagement with harm reduction rather than broadening it. 
 
Most critics of harm reduction’s neoliberal program are quick to affirm the positive benefits 
that harm reduction policies have brought to the lives of drug users. But for some, those 
benefits are dismissed either as a result of compromises to true harm reduction or as no 
real benefit at all. Roe writes “by ameliorating their worst effects, harm reduction simply 
relieves the institutions of prohibition and abstinence-based treatment of responsibility for 
those harms.”70 By reducing harm but not changing the conditions that enable it, Roe 
argues, harm reduction in its institutionalized form actually enables an unjust situation to 
persist. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Roe, op. cit.: 247. 
 52	  
But the nostalgia for a pure, radical, user-activist led harm reduction movement ignores the 
fact that the movement has always sought to change public health policy. It has always 
sought to become integrated into the state. Harm reduction activists have had many 
connections to other movements and projects, but it has fundamentally been a movement 
about public health. It may have begun as an act of protest, relying on classic social 
movement strategies like direct action, civil disobedience, and community organizing. But 
wherever harm reduction has emerged it has always linked up with health departments, 
medical researchers and social service organizations. The goal has always been to push the 
state to expand at a time of contraction, to include drug users within the reach of state 
services. In this, harm reduction has been remarkably successful. 
 
The literature on cooptation describes how social movements lose their radical edge as the 
state incorporates their demands into policy.71 Roe makes a similar argument about harm 
reduction. For him, as it institutionalized, it became content with making the system more 
efficient rather than overturning it. But harm reduction activists who were distributing 
needles in the streets always sought state support for their action. They always wanted the 
state to assume responsibility for the wellbeing of citizens that were excluded. It is not that 
an earlier anti-statist movement became coopted. Rather, cooperating with the state was 
always one of its goals. As chapter three discusses, harm reduction organizations in New 
York managed to achieve a level of cooperation with the state that allowed them to 
maintain their organizational autonomy while influencing policy at higher and higher 
scales.  	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It is true that in many ways harm reduction is prototypically neoliberal. But for a number 
of reasons, this should not justify dismissing it. For one, harm reduction is a movement that 
seeks the inclusion of a group—drug users—that was actively excluded from the welfare 
state in its classic postwar form.72 Drug users, for example, were often barred from public 
housing, and classed among the “undeserving poor” that were not included in the state’s 
social net. As well, harm reduction clearly clashes with other policies—especially the profit-
led expansion of the carceral state—that are also identified with the neoliberal moment. 
Rather than seeing this as cause to dismiss harm reduction, it should cause scholars to pay 
more attention to the conflicts and contradictions within putatively neoliberal social policy. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Harm reduction is a contested, internally inconsistent and evolving public health 
movement. In its concern with ameliorating the conditions of life of drug users, it resembles 
earlier efforts to address social problems through health interventions. And like earlier 
movements, it is inextricably and inescapably a product of its time. 
 
Harm reduction’s time is the neoliberal era. Many critics of harm reduction have focused on 
this point, rather than on the success or failure of harm reducing policies achieving their 
objectives. Indeed, there is near unanimous consensus on the dramatic decline of HIV due 
to syringe exchange. Other harm reduction strategies have been similarly successful. Harm 
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reduction’s poststructuralist critics miss the fact that it represents a major form of progress 
in drug policy, one that faces challenges but which continues to make strides. 
 
There is thus a strange disconnect between debates in the social science literature about 
harm reduction and popular debates about it. The left wing social science literature is 
focused on the extent to which harm reduction represents new modes of discipline and 
governmentality. But harm reduction’s real opponents in the public domain are 
conservatives who think it presents a moral hazard. In fact, in their anti-welfarist stances, 
there is arguably more overlap between the Foucauldian critique and the conservative 
position than the former would generally admit. In general, the overall normative and 
political ends of the Foucauldian position are unclear, as they are in the specific case of 
harm reduction.73  
 
It is not that scholars are wrong to associate harm reduction with neoliberalism. Rather, 
they are wrong to leave the argument there. The challenge is to use the concept of 
neoliberalism to historicize changing drug policies—and to use the case of harm reduction 
to bring the complexities of contemporary policy into sharper relief. Critical policy scholars 
obviously are under no obligation to support contemporary trends in policymaking, and it is 
not my intention to do so here. But we should do justice to those movements which are 
successfully achieving policy change. This does not mean affirming neoliberal policies. It 
means developing a critical stance that can recognize the opportunities for change that do 
exist in the contemporary era.  
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Chapter 3. 
The Institutional Evolution of Syringe Exchange 
  
I.  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the evolution of the syringe exchange program (SEP) in New York 
City. Syringe exchange is arguably the iconic example of the harm reduction movement—
for many people, harm reduction is synonymous with syringe exchange. And indeed, most of 
today’s multiservice, professionalized harm reduction organizations started life offering a 
single, illegal service, with volunteers exchanging dirty needles for clean ones out of 
backpacks on street corners, in shooting galleries or SROs. Informal organizations that 
were disconnected from the official public health system became integrated within it, in the 
process transforming both the harm reduction project in New York as well as the approach 
to drug user health. How and why this transformation happened, and the policy 
transformation that accompanied it, is the subject of this chapter. 
 
Syringe exchange has come a long way since it became legal in New York State twenty-
three years ago. Many of the originally clandestine groups have grown and matured, 
expanding the range of services they offer. These informal, improvisatory organizations 
became much more bureaucratic, in the process replacing an ethos of direct action with 
formal accounting. Folding tables in church basements have evolved into multi-story health 
hubs. Staffs have professionalized and budgets have ballooned. At the same time, syringe 
access has expanded as regulations have loosened and new mainstream venues have been 
added to extend the reach of activist-founded SEPs. 
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Not only have SEPs undergone organizational change; the relationship between syringe 
exchange and the state has also radically shifted. City and State public health departments 
have embraced syringe exchange and harm reduction more generally, finding ways to 
develop and expand harm reduction programs in the face of a hostile political climate. 
Harm reduction organizations that began as illegal syringe exchanges in the late 1980s 
have a presence today in the institutional landscape of New York City social service 
provision that is unlikely to fade away. 
 
And yet the institutionalization of syringe exchange, and the incorporation of harm 
reduction into the state, has so far only been partial. The ban on federal funding for syringe 
exchange still stands. And both New York City and State to this day allow the operation of 
syringe exchange through temporary, exceptional measures. If SEPs today are part of the 
contemporary public health state, they are also marginalized within it. Understanding this 
ambiguous insider-outsider status is crucial for understanding why SEPs operate as they 
do today and their hopes for the future. 
 
That future is likely to see an acceleration of the historic trend towards greater integration 
with the state. At the time of my fieldwork, SEPs were at a crossroads. Since their 
inception, they have traditionally relied upon funding sources tied to HIV prevention and 
care. But these sources are drying up, reflecting the diminishing urgency of HIV as a public 
health emergency—thanks in no small part to the consistent successes of syringe exchange. 
These organizations, which began as outsider activists confronting the state for their failure 
to value the lives of drug users, now find themselves in close partnerships with the state. 
They are likely to continue becoming closer still, altering the services they offer and 
becoming more integrated with mainstream social service provision.   
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But this not simply a story of cooptation. My point is not to critique harm reduction for 
straying from its roots. Rather, my goal is to to understand the causes and consequences of 
the process of institutionalization and bureaucratization that is shaping all of the syringe 
exchange programs in New York. Some people in the harm reduction field do see the 
increasing formalization of harm reduction as a problem. But many if not most others see a 
move towards the state and the transformation into bigger and more formal organizations 
as the only viable way forward for harm reduction—even as they remain concerned about 
maintaining harm reduction’s social justice orientation. My goal is to understand how these 
tensions are worked out within these organizations themselves and within the larger field 
of which they are a part. 
 
This is a point that is not well represented in the social science literature on harm 
reduction. Some scholars, as chapter two explained, have criticized the medicalization and 
neoliberalization of the harm reduction movement. But this does not adequately capture 
the fears of people working in the field. Most of my informants welcome the stability that 
formalization and bureaucratization have brought. They see the restructuring of public 
health as potentially opening some important opportunities for harm reduction 
organizations. They do not want to avoid medicalization or incorporation into the neoliberal 
health system. Rather, they are unsure about how to maintain some of the characteristics—
low threshold, anonymity, a community-based character, the peer-to-peer structure, etc.—
that were central to harm reduction’s success while also becoming more integrated into the 
state. The future of harm reduction depends upon how these organizations respond to the 
new public health context. 
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II. Syringe exchange as outsider organizations 
 
A number of developments in the 1980s decisively shaped the field of harm reduction in 
New York City in ways that are still felt today. The mainstream response to the HIV/AIDS 
crisis placed drug user activists outside of the main policy circuits, which at the grassroots 
level were dominated by the relatively less marginalized gay community. This was the “pre-
waiver” era, before the state issued a waiver to exempt SEPs from drug paraphernalia laws. 
Syringe exchanges were underground, illegal operations. They were largely informal 
organizations that were not integrated into the official public health system and operated 
at very small scales. But their exclusion from the city bureaucracy led to the flowering of an 
organizational multiculture1 where activists formulated a social-justice-oriented identity 
that still shapes expectations and norms for actors in the field today.  
 
In this era, harm reduction referenced a political sensibility much broader than today’s 
version. In an atmosphere where drug users were severely stigmatized outcasts, conducting 
sound public health in a highly politically charged climate was itself an act of political 
resistance. As the product of poorly funded and loosely organized groups, harm reduction 
had a self-consciously radical perspective. Some activists are openly nostalgic for these 
more explicitly politicized days. But this was a consequence of the exclusion of drug users 
and their advocates from the public health establishment—just as the subsequent 
medicalization of harm reduction, and the bureaucratization of harm reduction 
organizations, was a consequence of their integration into the public health system.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cf. the idea of “monoculture” or “monocropping” in organizational studies: Michael McQuarrie, 
“Community Organizations in the Foreclosure Crisis: The Failure of Neoliberal Civil Society,” 
Politics and Society 41.1 (2013): 73-101; Peter Evans, “Development as Institutional Change: The 
Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation,” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 38.4 (2004): 30–52. 
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The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced the first official case of AIDS in the USA 
in 1981. Chroniclers of the disease use this date as the starting point of the epidemic, 
though cases were known to have occurred both among gay men and injection drug users 
(IDUs) before this time.2 One retrospective study estimates that by 1980, 50% of injecting 
drug users were likely already infected with the virus,3 and IDUs composed more than a 
quarter of diagnosed AIDS cases in New York City by 1982.4 Despite drug users being 
among the first cohort of patients diagnosed with the disease, prevention activities among 
this population were slow to mobilize. This is notable especially in comparison to the early 
grassroots organizing within the gay community that produced the Gay Men’s Health Crisis 
(GMHC) in 1981 during the early days of the epidemic. Colgrove notes that  
the public image of AIDS as a ‘gay disease’ would persist for years, cemented 
by the initial MMWR [Morbidity and Mortality Weekly] reports and the early 
mobilization by gay rights activists, but this perception was always illusory.5  
 
As a consequence of the rapid and effective mobilization within the gay community, 
organizations oriented towards the needs of gay men led both the advocacy and social 
service responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. All levels of government came under fire for 
not acting fast enough to address the growing crisis in New York City and elsewhere.6 
Governor Mario Cuomo responded to pressure from a well-organized, well-resourced and 
politically well-connected gay community by authorizing the founding of the AIDS Institute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Charles Perrow and Mauro F. Guillén, The AIDS Disaster: The Failure of Organizations in New 
York and the Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
3 Don C. Des Jarlais, et al., "HIV-1 Infection Among Intravenous Drug Users in Manhattan, New 
York City, From 1977 Through 1987." Journal of the American Medical Association 261.7 (1989): 
1008-1012. 
4 Bruce F. Berg, Healing Gotham: New York City’s Public Health Policies for the Twenty-First 
Century (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univeristy Press, 2015). 
5 James Colgrove, Epidemic City: The Politics of Public Health in New York (New York, NY: Russell 
Sage, 2011): 160. 
6 Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic (New York, NY: 
St. Martins Press, 1987); Perrow and Guillén, op. cit. 
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within the New York State Department of Health in 1983. The first director of the AIDS 
Institute, Mel Rosen, had previously been the chief administrator of the GMHC, and the 
early years of the Institute can be characterized as focused almost exclusively on HIV/AIDS 
among gay men. “Many of those who joined the institute were gay men in the health field 
for whom the mission of the agency was literally a matter of life or death. […] It is fair to 
say that in the early life of the institute the staff consisted of a group of zealots.”7 VC, the 
founding director of Harm Reduction Partnership (HRP), herself an early activist and 
pioneer of syringe exchange in New York City, told me that “the infrastructure was being 
built for gay men and gay men's health.” This meant that emerging strategies like syringe 
exchange that mainly concerned IDUs—who were disproportionately poor people of color—
lacked vocal champions in the rush to produce a policy response to a new disease that had 
no cure. 
 
The failure to get in front of the crisis during the first wave of HIV/AIDS prevention work 
was soon to have devastating consequences. While in absolute terms gay men outnumbered 
IDUs, proportionate to their population, users of injection drugs were becoming far more 
likely to contract HIV. 1984 saw the development of the HIV antibody test which confirmed 
that the numbers of HIV positive IDUs in New York City had been drastically 
underestimated. According to the CDC, there were less than 1,500 AIDS cases among IDUs 
in the USA in 1984. But a study conducted among injection drug users in New York found 
that up to 60% of New York City’s injecting drug users were HIV positive, representing over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 W. Henry Lambright and Mark J. O'Gorman, “New York State's Response to AIDS: Evolution of an 
Advocacy Agency” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART 2.2 (1992): 175-
198; 184. 
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100,000 people.8 By 1985, the CDC was reporting a 500% increase in HIV infection rates 
among IDUs nationwide. And New York City, with the highest concentration of HIV-
positive IDUs in the country, was the epicenter of the epidemic.9 Prevention messages were 
rapidly diffusing through the well-organized networks of gay men in cities like New York 
and San Francisco, and broad public awareness campaigns emphasizing the importance of 
safe sex were targeted at the wider public. Despite the growing awareness of the severity of 
HIV/AIDS prevalence among IDUs, no equivalent messaging highlighting the dangers of 
needle sharing was produced for this population at the time. Piecemeal attempts at 
prevention emphasizing bleach distribution lacked official support, and the health and 
safety of this particular intervention was uncertain.   
 
Drug users were not only left out of prevention and treatment efforts, they were also 
increasingly criminalized and socially ostracized. At this time, the “War on Drugs” was 
ramping up. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act was passed by Congress in 1984, when 
Reagan extended and doubled down on Nixon’s tough-on-crime policies. The act reinforced 
the view of drug use as a criminal pathology, rather than an illness. The law created longer 
sentences for drug-related offenses and deep cuts to drug treatment, education and 
prevention. In New York State, drug users continued to face the harsh sentencing regime 
introduced by Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1973. Added to this, New York State was one 
of nine states that prohibited the sale of syringes in pharmacies or the possession of 
hypodermic needles without a prescription. And it was one of 44 states with paraphernalia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Don C. Des Jarlais, et al., "Continuity and Change Within an HIV Epidemic: Injecting Drug Users 
in New York City, 1984 Through 1992." Journal of the American Medical Association 271.2 (1994): 
121-127. 
9 Ann M. Hardy, et al., "The Incidence Rate of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Selected 
Populations," Journal of the American Medical Association 253.2 (1985): 215-220. 
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laws that imposed criminal penalties on the possession or distribution of needles.10 All of 
this occurred against the backdrop of New York City’s continued fiscal crisis, which had 
decimated the city’s once robust public health department, hobbling their ability to mount 
an effective response to the growing number of health concerns among New York City’s 
most vulnerable residents.11 
 
Drug users did not initially form advocacy groups around syringe exchange or other harm 
reduction measures in part because of their extremely marginal social status. Though gay 
men suffered from the prejudice and moral approbation of politicians and the wider public, 
being gay was not illegal but in fact supplied a positive identity that helped to consolidate a 
highly effective social movement.12 Many drug users, on the other hand, came from poor 
communities facing racism, discrimination and other injustices. And they were frequently 
viewed with suspicion and hatred within these communities; a sign appearing in Harlem at 
this time asked, “When will all the junkies die so the rest of us can go on living?”13 The 
illegal nature of drug use in an increasingly militaristic anti-drug climate meant that they 
were pushed even further to the margins, hidden from sight, ignored by government and 
private charities. As one analyst put it, “efforts to implement syringe exchange forced us to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Daliah Heller and Denise Paone. "Access to Sterile Syringes for Injecting Drug Users in New York 
City: Politics and Perception (1984-2010)." Substance Use & Misuse 46.2-3 (2011): 140-149. 
11 In addition to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, tuberculosis was experiencing a comeback in the mid-
1980s, especially among New York City’s homeless population. The link between tuberculosis, 
homelessness and HIV is discussed in Karen Brudney and Jay Dobkin, "Resurgent Tuberculosis in 
New York City: Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Homelessness, and the Decline of Tuberculosis 
Control Programs." American Review of Respiratory Disease 144.4 (1991): 745-749. 
12 Steven Epstein. Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1996). 
13 Warwick Anderson, “The New York Needle Trial: The Politics of Public Health in the Age of 
AIDS,” American Journal of Public Health 81.11 (1991): 1506 – 1517; 1512. 
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confront our commitment to the welfare of a subpopulation defined principally by their 
association with a criminal activity.”14 
 
The Health Omnibus Program Extension (HOPE) Act, passed by Congress in 1988, 
cemented the marginalization of IDUs from the federal response to the HIV/AIDS crisis. 
The purpose of the HOPE Act was to provide federal funds for HIV research, prevention, 
testing and education. The law is remarkable in that it set the stage for major federal 
investment in combating HIV/AIDS, a disease still at this time associated with stigmatized 
populations. But it also explicitly prohibited any of the funds to “provide individuals with 
hypodermic needles or syringes so that such individuals may use illegal drugs, unless the 
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service determines that a demonstration needle 
exchange program would be effective in reducing drug abuse and the risk that the public 
will become infected with the etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome.”15 
This language enshrined into law one of the major obstacles to expansion of harm reduction 
to this very day: the federal ban on funding for syringe exchange.16 
 
Two years later, Congress passed the more extensive Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS 
Resources Emergency Act, which greatly increased the level of federal investment in HIV 
research, prevention and care. The Ryan White Act forms the bedrock of all HIV/AIDS 
programs in the country. The law’s original formula distributed most of the funds directly 
to cities, as urban centers were the hardest hit. The Ryan White Act also included a 
provision aimed specifically at giving states the option of providing Medicaid for people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Howard Lune, Urban Action Networks: HIV/AIDS and Community Organizing in New York City 
(New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007): 84. 
15 HOPE Act, 1988. 
16 The ban was lifted briefly in 2009 only to be reinstated in 2011. 
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with HIV. But it included no measures intended specifically to prevent infection from 
injection, despite the mounting international and domestic evidence that syringe exchange 
was effective at stemming the spread of HIV among IDUs.  
 
This major AIDS infrastructure that was erected in the early 1990s came to represent 
public expenditure at the federal, state and city level in the tens of billions of dollars. But 
IDUs, who by the time these laws were passed were the most vulnerable to new infection, 
were left out almost entirely. The federal ban prohibited any federal funds being spent on 
syringe exchange.  Indeed, consequences of this early institution building are evident today. 
GN, an employee of the DOHMH whom I interviewed, told me: 
GN: The Bureau of HIV has huge muscle, compared to our bureau. The 
Bureau of HIV is huge and really well funded, they have over 200 staff. And 
it's like so disproportionate to the number of people living with HIV in the 
city. Compared to the Bureau of Alcohol and Drug use where we have 20, 25 
people. And if you put that in proportion to the number of people who are 
problematic drug users in this city, it's so disproportionate. And that's 
because of a lot of different reasons, because of historical advocacy, drug 
users don't have as good advocates. 
 
This is the legacy of an administrative and strategic separation between the city’s response 
to HIV and its strategy for dealing with the health of drug users.  
 
This is not to belittle the herculean efforts undertaken by committed gay men and their 
allies, who struggled against an often hostile and ignorant public. Without their activism, 
the toll of the AIDS crisis would have been far higher, and subsequent organizing drew on 
the groundwork laid by these activists. But syringe exchange activists did feel left out of the 
initial governmental responses to the crisis, which, they argued, were created exclusively 
with the epidemic’s most visible victims in mind. This sense of exclusion was significant in 
shaping the culture of syringe exchange. It heightened their self-conception as outsiders 
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who needed to engage in direct action in response to a government complacent in the face of 
an emergency. The slowness of the city’s response heightened this sense as well. While the 
government did eventually mobilize around HIV/AIDS prevention and care, an IDU specific 
intervention, syringe exchange, was first authorized fully eleven years after the first cases 
of HIV/AIDS were diagnosed among drug users.  
 
Syringe exchange was not only absent from the state response to the AIDS crisis. Even 
within activist circles, syringe exchange was a contentious and divisive issue, laying bare 
the disparate demographics of the disease. GL, an interviewee who had participated in the 
early days of syringe exchange, was a member of the well-known group AIDS Coalition to 
Unleash Power, widely known as ACT UP.  
GL: What I would say was true of ACT UP was it was speaking for a queer 
body, a white queer body. And my very first meetings, the issues of race were 
right out on the table. People of color were speaking up. Women were 
speaking up. All the people who weren't included in this image were speaking 
up and the white men were continually going, "Why are you always making 
an issue out of this? We're not marginalizing anything. I'M DYING!!!! And 
YOU'RE NOT DYING!!!! So shut up!” 
 
Here GL describes an organization whose attention grabbing, direct action political tactics 
were underwritten by a sense of do-or-die desperation that members felt at the time. 
Though drug users were present in ACT UP, their voices tended to be marginalized.  
GL: There were drugs users in ACT UP. There were active drugs users in 
ACT UP. But by and large, the identity of needle exchange was a recovery 
identity. But that was very, very present in ACT UP. That was the heart that 
could be worn on one's sleeve in the face of all this, "I am dying," and sort of 
have equal standing, in terms of all of this sort of like repentance: “Oh, I 
know, because I'm an addict” … But needle exchange was voted down three 
times before it was accepted. Three times. But eventually it did gain the 
momentum that it needed and that's when the needle exchange eight were 
arrested and all this stuff happened. It was done in a very constructive way, 
but at that point, the only legitimate dialogue that could occur on the floor of 
ACT UP was one in which it was framed as, for instance, dead addicts don't 
recover. 
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The struggle to translate common health risk into concrete political projects is a challenge 
faced by many “health social movements.”17 As GL explains in the interview excerpt above, 
ACT-UP was divided between different identities and interests of gay men and drug users. 
What, after all, did they have in common other than a shared vulnerability to a deadly 
disease?  
 
Drug user exclusion from mainstream responses to the epidemic was not a given. Outside 
the U.S., drug user groups had been successful in developing state-supported strategies to 
address the growing HIV/AIDS crisis. The earliest instances of harm reduction brought 
together drug user unions like the Junkiebond in the Netherlands and the Vancouver Area 
Network of Drug Users (VANDU) in Canada with their respective local and national health 
systems to develop and implement syringe exchange programs that helped these places, 
and indeed most of Europe, avoid the scale of the HIV/AIDS crisis that New York faced. In 
these places, drug users enjoyed some semblance of citizenship rights. Their specific needs 
were acknowledged by the health system, to which they had a right to inclusion as citizens. 
In the largely private and increasingly anti-drug U.S. context, drug users had no such 
expectations. 
 
People within New York City’s Department of Health were paying attention to the 
successes of syringe exchange in Canada, Europe and Australia, including the 
Commissioner of Health David Sencer. In 1985 he approached mayor Koch with a proposal 
to initiate a network of syringe exchanges in the city. According to Colgrove, the mayor 
initially rejected the idea but quickly changed his mind. In an interview, Sencer told 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Phil Brown, et al., “Embodied Health Movements: New Approaches to Social Movements in 
Health,” Sociology of Health & Illness 26.1 (2004): 50 – 80. 
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Colgrove that “although the mayor was still doubtful about the efficacy of the approach and 
its political feasibility, he was open to floating a trial balloon.”18 Sencer drafted a proposal 
which Koch circulated to officials and journalists to gauge public sentiment and political 
reaction to the plan. Opposition came from all quarters and within a month, Koch had 
dropped the idea of a city-run syringe exchange as a “political nonstarter.” 
 
Meanwhile, awareness was spreading among the IDU population about the risks of needle 
sharing. Opponents of syringe exchange claimed that not only would giving drug users 
clean needles encourage them to use more, but that users were in any event fixated on their 
addiction and unwilling or unable to change their destructive behavior. Special Assistant 
District Attorney for Narcotics Sterling Johnson “scoffed at the notion that ‘slaves of 
addiction’ in a ‘narcotic-induced stupor’ cared about using clean syringes or could be taught 
to do so.” 19  A widely cited study conducted by Des Jarlais, Friedman and Hopkins 
conclusively discredited this view and demonstrated that in fact drug users had already 
started changing their behavior to protect themselves from infection. They found demand 
for sterile injecting equipment among users, the sale of “resealed” syringes, and drug 
dealers peddling clean syringes by telling their customers to “get the good needles, don’t get 
the bad AIDS.”20 Their study also suggested that a major hurdle to using clean syringes was 
their lack of availability, constrained by the broader legal environment.  
 
While the prevention efforts were beginning to bear fruit among gay men who had seen the 
number of new infections level off, the same could not be said for drug users and by 1988, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Colgrove, op. cit.: 163. 
19 Colgrove, op. cit.: 164. 
20 Don C. Des Jarlais, et al., "Risk Reduction for the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Among 
Intravenous Drug Users," Annals of Internal Medicine 103.5 (1985): 755-759. 
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“newly diagnosed cases of the disease among drug users in New York City outnumbered 
those among gay men for the first time.”21 As Heller and Paone point out, “IDUs had no 
existing organizational structures and few advocates for the cause.” 22 The most visible 
group at the time advocating on behalf of drug users was the Association for Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT). Founded in 1980 to provide counseling to drug users, 
ADAPT had “a history of working within the system and institutional ties to city 
government.”23 ADAPT received limited city funds to provide education and safer injecting 
supplies like bleach kits and “cookers” to drug users, though crucially these supplies did not 
include sterile syringes.24  
 
Groups like ADAPT increasingly pressured the city to establish a syringe exchange. And 
many in the Health Department, including then-Commissioner Dr. Stephen Joseph, were 
openly supportive of the idea. With Mayor Koch’s approval, Commissioner Joseph tried 
again to begin syringe exchange in New York City. By this time SEPs had been tried in 
other cities around the U.S., including Tacoma, Washington and New Haven, Connecticut. 
But the New York State Health Commissioner David Axelrod, whose agreement was 
necessary, was seen to be stalling, claiming that more evidence was needed to substantiate 
the effectiveness of the intervention. Axelrod eventually agreed to allow the program to 
proceed on the condition that it be conducted as a research study.25 “In New York City a 
pilot needle exchange scheme, in order to have even a remote chance of acceptance, was 
packaged from the start as a controlled clinical trial, as a scientific experiment.”26 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Colgrove, op. cit.: 160. 
22 Heller and Paone, op. cit.: 142. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Colgrove, op. cit.: 195. 
25 Anderson, op. cit. 
26 Anderson, op. cit.: 1507. 
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would not be the last time that a harm reduction strategy was introduced under the legal 
status of a pilot study. 
 
Progress on setting up the research study was slow and syringe exchange advocates wanted 
to push the city to move faster. ADAPT announced their intention to begin syringe 
distribution, in direct contravention to paraphernalia laws. As Yoland Serrano, ADAPT’s 
director, said, “Something has to be done now. Someone has to take the initiative to 
challenge the state in the name of public health.”27 This seems to have spurred the 
government to action as the syringe exchange trial was finally approved six weeks later. 
The plan originally called for four community-based exchanges in district health centers 
spread across the city in high-need neighborhoods. But due to strong opposition from a 
broad alliance that included community board members, City Councilors, state legislators, 
U.S. Congress members, the NYPD, and representatives of various neighborhoods and 
ethnic communities, the plan was drastically scaled back to only one site. 
 
The syringe exchange was finally opened in 1988 in the downtown headquarters of the New 
York City Department of Health. Only drug users on waiting lists for a place in a treatment 
program were eligible to participate. Additionally, users were required to carry an ID card 
with a photo and a fingerprint, and subject themselves to regular blood tests and medical 
screenings. The syringe exchange faced other barriers owing to its hours of operation and to 
its location, far away from areas drug users typically frequented, and around the corner 
from the headquarters of the NYPD. One of my informants, YH, a New York State AIDS 
Institute employee, describes visiting the site at the time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Quoted in Anderson, op. cit.: 1509. 
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YH: I came to visit the New York City syringe exchange when they were 
giving out one syringe to a drug user in a canister and the syringe exchange 
was located in the lobby of the same building where the police station was. 
What amazed me was they had two clients who came and got this little tin 
with the one syringe in it. And it was clearly absurd, but you get your foot in 
the door in any way you can. 
 
In the end, despite great anticipation, the program limped along for 14 months and only 
served a paltry 294 drug users28 before being shuttered in 1990, after the election of David 
Dinkins. 29  Drug users were again left to their own devices to prevent HIV infection. 
 
The closing of the syringe exchange trial precipitated a surge in activist activity. Linking up 
with ACT UP, syringe exchange activists began distributing clean needles illegally, 
concentrating efforts in the Bronx, Harlem and the Lower East Side.30 These groups would 
eventually become waivered syringe exchange programs. Many activists at this time were 
active or former drug users or the friends or loved ones of users. Many had personally 
experienced the tragic consequences of the epidemic, having seen family members and 
friends die after contracting HIV through intravenous drug use. Harm reduction combined 
personal, pragmatic and political motives. Other activists were committed public health 
workers and researchers who felt they could not sit idly by while AIDS ran unchecked 
through communities that were already facing many other social and economic struggles.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Lee M. Kochems, et al., “The Transition from Underground to Legal Syringe Exchange: The New 
York City Experience.” AIDS Education and Prevention 8.6 (1996): 471 – 489. 
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African-American establishment. David Dinkins selected Woodrow Myers to be the city’s first 
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considered needle exchange ‘shortsighted and wrong. It absolved the government of the bigger 
problem, which was figuring out what to do about drug abuse.” See Colgrove, op. cit.: 195 
30 Kochems et al., op. cit.: 473 
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After many years of sidelining the plight of drug users, the AIDS activist community 
decided to take on the cause of syringe exchange. In 1991 ACT UP staged the arrest of eight 
activists in order to force a test case on the legal necessity of syringe exchange. The 
activists were successful and the judged ruled in favor, concluding that the AIDS epidemic 
among injection drug users constituted a public health emergency. The judge in the case 
explained her verdict by offering:  
The distinction, in broadest terms, during this age of the AIDS crisis, is death 
by using dirty needles versus drug addiction by using clean needles. The 
defendants' actions sought to avoid the greater harm.31  
 
In essence, the judge echoed the rationale of harm reduction in her decision, clearing the 
way for policy change. 
 
Syringe exchange supporters at the time tended to base their claims on appeals to social 
justice. This was the period that saw the creation of harm reduction principles such as the 
revalorization of user experiences, respect for users’ lives, non-judgment and ‘meeting 
people where they are.’ RN, former ACT-UP activist and founder of a major New York 
syringe exchange, said describing syringe exchange activism of the time: 
RN: Harm reduction from that point of view is a revolutionary thing. You 
actually want to turn society upside down because society is unequal and 
unjust. But that's a really big thing. So what's the next best thing you can do? 
Hand out needles to someone because that could change their lives right 
there and then. But ultimately, that's what we want to go for, is a complete 
reordering of society.  But we do it through different means, I guess. 
 
At the same time, many early syringe exchange activists in New York recognized that their 
efforts needed to be scaled up in order to be effective.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ronald Sullivan, “Needle-Exchangers had Right to Break Law, Judge Rules.” New York Times. 26 
June 1991. 
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EL: Harm reduction in this sense, needle exchange is a fucking band-aid, and 
we were providing services the state was not. And the state should have been 
providing these services and someone had to step up to the plate, and that’s 
what we did. 
 
For RN, EL and others, the distribution of sterile syringes to prevent HIV transmission was 
both a pragmatic matter and an important ethical commitment. When some activists 
criticize what they see as the overly medicalized harm reduction of today, it is this pre-
waiver-era conception of harm reduction as a social justice movement that they use as a 
benchmark. 
 
The essential characteristic of syringe exchange in the 1980s was that it emerged outside of 
both the state bureaucracy and the mainstream activist response to the AIDS crisis. The 
syringe access infrastructure was late in developing in the history of the AIDS epidemic 
and was not initially embraced either by the government or by activists. As a result of this 
marginalized position, SEPs were relatively amateurish, but also relatively radical. All of 
this was set to change. 
 
Why did they not stay that way? Why would activists, some of them ardent critics of the 
public health establishment, seek to become integrated with the state in the first place? RN 
explains the issue was one of scale: 
RN: One of the arguments I used to have is when we were underground, we 
had limitations, we had limits on what we could afford to do and what we 
couldn't afford to do. When we first started we only gave out twelve syringes 
per person, because we didn't have anymore. Then we got funding, you could 
give out more. And so the complaint was, well I liked it better when I knew 
everyone. Well, you know what, you weren't having a public health impact 
when you knew everyone. When you could know every single person you saw 
by first name and their families, then you weren't having a public health 
impact. So by becoming institutionalized to a degree, you then have an actual 
real public health impact as opposed to just an impact on individual's lives. 
And that's what you need to do if you are going to reverse a problem. And we 
did. In New York City we did reverse the epidemic.  
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Syringe exchange during the underground days was limited in terms of impact. To jump 
scale, SEPs needed to become institutionalized. This was difficult if not impossible, given 
laws against distribution of drug paraphernalia. Either official policy had to change, or 
some other legal maneuver needed to be found.  
 
III. The partial institutionalization of syringe exchange: waivering 
 
The modern history of syringe exchange in New York began with the legal mechanism 
known as ‘the waiver.’ In 1992, the New York State Department of Health authorized the 
conduct of syringe exchange statewide. Rather than changing the law, the state declared a 
public health emergency and introduced a system whereby SEPs, hitherto operating 
illegally, could apply for a waiver exempting themselves and their participants from laws 
governing the possession of drug paraphernalia. Initially brought in as a one-year 
emergency measure following the 1991 court decision, the waiver system was later 
extended and made permanent.  
 
The waiver system, along with the grant funding structure that accompanies it, typifies the 
‘partial institutionalization’ of syringe exchange. This is the process by which SEPs have 
become institutionalized as part of the state bureaucracy, and as such become formal, 
legally-sanctioned organizations, rather than the loose, legally questionable groups that 
they had been in the past. But this process has only proceeded up to a point. Because of the 
political unpopularity of harm reduction measures, syringe exchange still exists in a state 
of exception. 
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Partial institutionalization, in this sense, can be seen as typical of harm reduction policies 
more generally. 32 In the New York context, it has been the defining feature of SEPs. It 
initiated and formalized the relationship between the activists, now running syringe 
exchange programs, and the state, in the form of the New York State Department of 
Health’s AIDS Institute. It is the precondition of the ambivalent inside-outsider status that 
has come to define syringe exchange in New York. It has allowed them to become sources of 
policy innovation while still maintaining some of the legitimacy and stability that 
legalization and institutionalization provides. But it has also forced SEPs to abandon some 
of their activist identity and the social justice-orientation of their outsider days. And 
according to some, it has restricted their organizational autonomy. 
 
The waiver allowed syringe exchange agencies in New York City to exist in a hostile 
political environment. Both the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations registered their 
opposition to syringe exchange, and neither mayor allocated them any city resources. While 
not technically blocking their ability to operate, neither mayor did anything to promote or 
facilitate syringe exchange in the city. For the first ten years of syringe exchange, the 
DOHMH had no direct relationship with SEPs, preferring instead to let the state handle 
the funding and overseeing of these politically unpopular organizations. 
 
Members of the New York State Department of Health AIDS Institute took the lead in 
drafting the regulations for syringe exchange. AL, a long time employee of the New York 
State Department of Health, remembers how this came about: 
AL: So we had to figure out how to do it, cause we were not going to get 
legislative action to authorized these programs. It just wasn’t going to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 A similar situation, for example, holds regarding InSite in Vancouver, which began operations in a 
waivered state of exception. It remains the only safer injection site in Canada. 
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happen. So what we had to do was search through public health law to find 
the authority to respond to the public health epidemic. And respond to the 
science. And use that basic authority in public health law to adopt emergency 
rules and regulations. 
 
Bypassing “legislative action,” the AIDS Institute instead found the authority to initiate 
syringe exchange through its ability to use public health law to adopt emergency measures 
to address the HIV crisis among IDUs. This had the desired effect of creating the legal 
context for syringe exchange without needing to rely of the lengthy and uncertain 
legislative process.  
 
Though waivering did legitimize syringe exchange, some activists were critical of the way it 
took place. GL, a former ACT UP activist involved in syringe exchange, commented: 
GL: So the way needle exchange is legal in New York State—technically it's a 
crime for syringes to exist, and it's a crime for people to have them. Unless 
the public health law, Section 3381 of the public health law, designates you 
as a class of people who may lawfully possess syringes. The public health law 
doesn't say what constitutes unlawful possession. It says what constitutes 
lawful possession and all other possession is de facto, unlawful. Who can 
possess syringes includes doctors and nurses and pharmacists and people 
with prescriptions and as of 1992, the health commissioner, according to the 
public health law, according to his or her wisdom, may also designate other 
classes of people who may lawfully possess syringes. And that is what 
happened in 1992… The law was not rewritten to say, "Now all syringe 
possession is lawful." The law was written to say, "The health commissioner 
has exercised her authority to designate people who operate syringe exchange 
programs and people who receive syringes from syringe exchange programs 
as lawfully entitled to possess their syringes.” But syringe exchange, itself, is 
still very locked in around the idea that in order to receive authorization you 
have to demonstrate certain things. And one of those things that you have to 
demonstrate, although it doesn't actually say it in writing, the state's still 
very, very clear that for some reason you can't just give syringes to people 
who don't have them.  
 
As GL explains, syringe exchange was never legalized in any straightforward way. The 
waiver system did not fundamentally bring about a change in the status quo.  
GL: We have, to this day, the fact that needle exchange is this elaborate 
capitulation to the authority of the war on drugs. In virtually every aspect of 
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its configuration, the war on drugs still has the upper hand, in terms of how 
to define public health in the presence of drug use. 
 
The declaration of a public health emergency around HIV/AIDS among injectors did not 
translate into a wider reevaluation of the social and legal structures that contributed to the 
creation of this emergency. Public health bureaucrats within both the City and State public 
health departments saw the waiver as a victory. It was a practical, expedient way to 
circumvent the political system and allow for the implementation of a desperately needed 
public health intervention. But activists were never fully satisfied with the way syringe 
exchange under the waiver was rolled out. As RN put it: 
RN: It's a political tool, that's all it is.  Needle exchange itself is a strategy. It 
was an expedient phrase to quell the nervousness of politicians to say 
exchange. The theory being you take one in and you give one out. That's not 
even good public health.  
 
For RN and GL, syringe exchange is a compromise. By not pursuing a change in the 
criminal law, the underlying problem of the criminalization of drug users with all the 
deleterious consequences this entails remained unchanged. That syringe exchange depends 
upon a waiver, rather than a change in official policy, only underscores its unfinished 
nature. 
 
Internally, the process of formalization presented many challenges. Almost overnight, 
syringe exchange was transformed from an act of civil disobedience to a regularized and 
regulated public health service. Activists who had been motivated to act by a sense of 
outrage and desperation found themselves needing to redirect their energies to more 
mundane tasks such as bookkeeping and contract deliverables reporting. As Heller and 
Paone note,  
many activists who had played central roles in the underground programs 
had to re-orient themselves to an altered environment, from clandestine 
operations where they were sometimes harassed by authorities yet otherwise 
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autonomous in their operations, to programs sanctioned and funded, and 
thus regulated, by the government.33 
 
Before the waiver  
SEPs operated as what a few long-term SEP volunteers referred to as ‘self-
regulating’ organizations. Their ability to distribute syringes was dependent 
of available supply. Organizational issues were decided among SEP activists 
by consensus when possible and majority rule when necessary.34  
 
After the waiver, more hierarchical management structures were put in place to satisfy the 
requirements laid out by the State’s regulatory framework. As VC, founding director of 
HRP told me, “Once you start negotiating with the state, you find yourself getting pacified, 
coopted.” Underground groups were now trying to build organizations around syringe 
exchange, attempting on the one hand to keep the oppositional spirit of harm reduction 
while simultaneously instituting systems that would make them transparent and 
accountable to the state.  
 
The waiver creates the context for a particular relationship between activists and the state. 
Despite the legacy of the underground era, the relationship between activists and the state 
is not typically oppositional or always confrontational. Lambright and O’Gorman describe 
the AIDS Institute as a “bureaucratic advocacy organization” which places “the 
bureaucratic organization at the center of policymaking, rather than at its periphery.”35 
Employees of the AIDS Institute, as well as employees of the DOHMH, identify with the 
message of the harm reduction movement and many of them identified as activists working 
within the state to bring about change. There is of course a long history of public health 
workers being more progressive and radical than the prevailing political temperament of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Heller and Paone, op. cit.: 143 
34 Kochems et al, op. cit.: 475 
35 Lambright and O’Gorman, op. cit.: 176 
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their times.36 Harm reduction is an example of this—people in the bureaucracy moving 
government policy in a direction in which politicians are not yet prepared to go. 
 
Though some state employees told me they personally identify with the harm reduction 
movement, the state public health apparatus is also subject to political and legal 
imperatives that structure its action in the harm reduction field. AIDS Institute contract 
managers oversee the programs and enforce adherence to regulations. The regulations 
which govern syringe exchange were written with political palatability in mind. AL, a long-
time employee of the AIDS Institute, explains: 
AL: It was in 1991 when we issued the emergency regulations. And I think 
the regulations have not changed; they are the same today. And there are 
certain things there that might need revision at some point. But one of the 
things that the regulations did, although there are strict things, like there 
have to be a number of syringes provided, syringes had to be a returned. But 
the way that they are written it's more like, well there have to be policies and 
procedures for it. Policies and procedures for this, policy and procedures for 
the intake, policies and procedures do not have to go through a regulatory 
process, per se. So you could make changes in policies and procedures.  So 
that is a document that we have, policies and procedures, that we provide to 
the agencies.  
 
On the one hand, AL acknowledges that there are some “strict things” like the number of 
syringes SEPs are able to provide their participants, and that syringes “had to be returned”, 
requirements which come directly from the wider political concern that SEPs would flood 
the streets with needles and that the increased availability of needles would lead to more 
drug use. On the other hand she says that the way to get around these strict regulations is 
by the manipulation of policies and procedures that do not have to go through the 
regulatory process.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 George Rosen, A History of Public Health, revised ed. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015): 
106-168. 
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This strategy—exploiting the space between the politically determined regulations and the 
more malleable policies and procedures meant to operationalize these regulations—has 
been at the core of the relationship between the state and the SEPs and has formed the 
basis of the field of harm reduction in New York. 
AL: It gave flexibility to the programs, because programs didn't have to look 
alike.  Many of them do, others don't. It gives programs flexibility. We revised 
policies and procedures about three years ago, to open up in certain areas 
that programs were asking us, well: If we only provide let's say 50 syringes to 
this person, but this person is injecting four or five times a day, and if this 
person can only come to the exchange once a month, we are not providing for 
this person.  So that was open. Programs can now provide more syringes at 
every transaction than ever before.  
 
The “flexibility” afforded the agencies meant that they “didn’t have to look alike.” For some, 
incomplete institutionalization meant an extension of the organizational and political 
autonomy that accompanied syringe exchange’s underground years. RN, an activist 
involved in underground exchange who then went on the serve as director of one of the first 
waivered programs described the early post-waiver period as a “golden era where you had 
some funding, but limited funding.” According to RN, the limited funding of the immediate 
post-waiver period allowed the agencies to regularize their core service while continuing to 
operate with the inclusive ethos of the underground days. 
RN: And because no one knew really what harm reduction was, we made it 
up, we invented it, to a degree. We invented what we were supposed to do. So 
the programs were much more inclined to be social in aspect at times, we had 
poetry readings and stuff like that and we created community. The approach 
was much more inclusive in some ways of the participants of the programs, 
the drug users were integrated into programs as people providing services. 
 
They did not have the same degree of organizational autonomy as they did during the pre-
waiver era. But agencies could maintain their own personalities and what some 
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interviewees referred to as “brands” of harm reduction service delivery in keeping with 
their activist roots.37  
 
As well, this space for negotiation created a channel through which agencies were able to 
affect policy change. The AIDS Institute is in some ways a “captive regulator” in the sense 
that its employees do not act as a watchdog for the politically determined public interest, 
which they understand for the most part to be unenlightened and counterproductive. NN, 
an employee with the New York City Public Health department who had been active during 
syringe exchange’s early days articulates this sentiment: 
NN: We have bent the law—never broken it! But I’m a person that knows 
that there are laws that need to be broken sometimes. And we in public 
health can’t be timid about breaking laws that need to be broken. We have to 
be forceful in our convictions, and do the right thing, regardless of who works 
against us. Because we know what we are obliged to do is to save lives. We 
don’t have to be politicians, we’re not running for office, we’re not running 
popularity contests. 
 
Public health workers are obliged to “do the right thing,” even if this requires bending the 
law to achieve the desired public health goal. Not beholden to the vagaries of public opinion, 
they try as much as possible to facilitate the legitimation of SEP practices that sometimes 
push the envelope or run afoul of the official rules. YH, a contract manager at the AIDS 
Institute, reflects on this relationship: 
YH: If you just have people who are rule followers, and I mean we in 
government are rule followers, but you also have to understand that things 
are so dynamic here and the programs are dealing with people on the street 
and changing forces on the street, and they are recognizing and getting it 
first hand. We go out and see the programs and monitor the programs and 
see what's going on, but it's not the same as that day-to-day interaction with 
people where you really start to see things changing on the ground. And so 
we get informed by that, and we try to be responsive to that, and not just say, 
"Oh, here's the rule and we have to follow it to the T, no matter what." 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This individuation would become one of the most often cited objections to harm reduction’s 
incorporation into Medicaid, as discussed in chapter five. 
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The state provides the boundaries of what is doable within the limits of the legal and 
political framework. But in many ways, the allegiances of state employees are to the 
programs, and to a larger feeling of connection to a public health mission. While the waiver 
represents the failure of the state to fully endorse and legalize syringe exchange, the 
strategy’s incomplete institutionalization also provides an avenue for policy innovation. 
 
An early and oft-cited example of the willingness of the state to work around the 
preferences of the agencies is the repeal of the initial requirement that all syringes 
distributed by programs be tagged, in order to track return rates. Programs balked at the 
onerous, labor-intensive practice and the state acquiesced by removing the requirement.38 
Over the years, there have been other instances when programs have directly challenged 
state regulations, and the AIDS Institute has generally responded by adjusting the policies 
and procedures to reflect the practices and preferences of the programs. Even the “strict” 
requirements limiting the number of syringes given to participants was circumvented by 
the introduction of “contingency contracting” which GL describes as: 
GL: The state's magnificent capitulation to the stupidity of one for one. They 
said, “Here, we'll come up with reasons and ways you can beat one for one, 
but one for one is still technically the principle.” 
 
Just as the waiver allowed syringe exchange to take place without a change in the law, the 
regulation stipulating one for one exchange remained unchanged but a work-around was 
found.  
 
The flexibility that resulted from the incomplete institutionalization of syringe exchange 
enabled a number of important innovations. The most interesting is the transformation of 
the illegal practice of secondary exchange into the formalized—and celebrated—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Heller and Paone op. cit. discuss this example, as did several of my informants. 
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intervention of Peer Delivered Syringe Exchange (PDSE). The regulations governing 
syringe exchange do not allow for secondary distribution, as the waiver stipulates that only 
those drug users officially registered with a syringe exchange program may legally possess 
syringes. But it was widely known, if not directly acknowledged, that registered syringe 
exchange participants would provide needles to friends and family who were not enrolled at 
an SEP, and this was in fact a desirable practice from a public health perspective. 
According to GL, the state knew for years that secondary exchange was happening. 
GL: Then I'm supposed to assume that this guy or woman gets off 1,000 times 
a day, because clearly they don't. Secondary exchange was against the rules 
back then, completely. The state very blandly chose not to look very hard at 
the numbers. 
 
A handful of SEP participants were responsible for extremely large volumes of exchange.  
As long as the syringes going out were accounted for, the state chose to ignore it.  I asked 
AL about this: 
R: Did PDSE formalize secondary exchange? 
AL: We don't use that word. 
R: Why? 
AL: Because it's not secondary exchange. Secondary exchange is against the 
law. The law interprets secondary exchange as the sale—and regulations do 
not allow you as the participant of the program, to sell. And even if you are 
furnishing it is considered a sale. So for us it's not secondary distribution. For 
us, it's—these are peer-to-peer individuals that are part of a program. […] We 
had thought about peer delivery a long time ago. But at the beginning we had 
to write this concept in a way that didn't bring questioning. So it took us a 
couple of years to be able to get there, plus we did a pilot first. 
Allowing drug users to directly “furnish” syringes to their peers is a practice as old as 
syringe exchange itself. But official sanction is more recent and comes directly from the 
demands made by SEPs for the formalization of this model of syringe access. As AL points 
out, secondary exchange was and remains illegal. But the PDSE model was allowed to 
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develop by deputizing certain users as employees of the syringe exchanges, thereby getting 
around the regulations. 
 
PDSE could have only arisen in an organizational field marked by partial integration with 
the state. SEPs could act as laboratories for new public health strategies because there was 
a space for negotiation between the representatives of the official bureaucracy and the 
“street-level bureaucrats”39  who directly oversaw syringe exchange and became policy 
entrepreneurs in their own right. 
GL: But I would say, you know, PDSE is very, very benign. Contingency 
contracting was very, very benign. And these were the attempts of the state 
to respond to what we, as activists, were saying on the ground. I'm not going 
to gainsay that they were attempting to respond, but that was the dynamic. 
We would denounce and they would try and rearrange. 
 
In their willingness to include the demands of the activists, the state effectively 
incorporated active drug users into the policymaking process in a way not done before.  
 
In this way, the harm reduction philosophy has become increasingly important to public 
health practices without any official change in stated policy. New York State, which had 
been a pioneer in punitive drug control measures, was now, in the form of the AIDS 
Institute, supporting policy aimed at ‘meeting the user where they are’ and including users 
in the design of services to encourage their feelings of ownership, responsibility and self-
sufficiency. The specific relationship between the AIDS Institute and the SEPs allowed for 
this innovation. It is not only a shift in terms of the philosophy underlying social policy but 
also a change in the way policy is made. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service, 2nd ed. 
(New York, NY: Russell Sage, 2010 [1980]). 
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Syringe exchanges see it as part of their mission to “let the participant’s voice be heard,” 
and for some, the informal policy change process represented by PDSE is a more effective 
way for this to happen than the formal arrangements for it. One of the requirements under 
the waiver for SEPs is that they have a participant advisory board (PAB) composed of users 
who participate in syringe exchange.40 As user autonomy is part of the philosophy of harm 
reduction, most agencies take this requirement very seriously.41 PABs allow agencies to 
monitor the uptake of various services and solicit the opinions and suggestions of service 
users. These then get transmitted to the AIDS Institute in a variety of ways, leading to 
shifts in policy to better reflect the “things changing on the ground,” as YH explains above. 
But some SEP participants and employees see the PABs as paying “lip service” to the idea 
of participant decision-making. In contrast, the informal process of quietly adjusting policy 
to align it with actual practices, as with PDSE, is a direct way in which user experience 
translates into policy change. 
 
IV. The partial institutionalization of syringe exchange: grant funding 
 
The other component of syringe exchange’s partial institutionalization was its uncertain 
and ad hoc funding structure. Rather than funding syringe exchange through standard 
budget allocation, SEPs are funded through a system of special grants. This has had several 
consequences for SEPs. The first is that organizations have adjusted their goals in line with 
those of grantees. In most cases this has meant moving ever closer to AIDS service 
provision rather than an ability to focus on drug user health more broadly. And this has, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 NYSDOH AIDS Institute, “Policies and Procedures: Syringe Exchange Programs,” (2009): 24.  
41 Anthony R. Henman, et al. “Injection Drug Users as Social Actors: A Stigmatized Community's 
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according to some SEP supporters, restricted their autonomy. The other consequence is that 
organizations have had to compete for the limited funding available, which has prevented 
deeper cooperation among SEPs at the political level. 
 
Most of the grants supporting syringe exchange originate with the federal government, 
though SEPs are also reliant on private donors, such as the American Foundation for AIDS 
Research (AmFAR), which pays for syringes as well as program evaluation. The system by 
which syringe exchange is supported and funded is immensely complicated and varies 
greatly across the country.42 The federal Ryan White and CDC money awarded to New York 
City for HIV/AIDS prevention was passed through to the State government via the AIDS 
Institute, which oversaw the dispersal of funds to the agencies. Because the ban on using 
federal funds for syringe exchange remains in place, SEPs use federal dollars to pay for 
what are called “wrap around” services like risk reduction counseling, case management 
and other programs tied almost exclusively to HIV prevention. As MI explains: 
MI: And if you look at the federal funding closely, there’s a lot of federal 
dollars that go into overall HIV prevention—HIV testing and case 
management and all that stuff that provides that kind of integrated service 
model for people who inject drugs. Even if the federal dollars isn’t being used 
on syringe exchange, all that other stuff can sort of support and wrap around 
that. 
 
These contracts include a certain percentage of funds that can be spent on organization 
overhead, which allow SEPs to cobble together enough funds to be able to provide services 
not directly covered by their contracts. Dahlia Heller, former director of an important New 
York SEP, describes how the agency grew from a small, barely legal operation with no 
physical space to an established organization with a swelling budget, expanding physical 
footprint, and growing roster of services to offer program participants.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Don C. Des Jarlais, et al., "Public Funding of US Syringe Exchange Programs," Journal of Urban 
Health 81.1 (2004): 118-121. 
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DH: We got mental health money, but it was Ryan White money so we could 
only serve HIV positive people. I knew that of course, but we needed any 
mental health money cause we needed the money to be able to do mental 
health services. So then I went and hustled a private foundation that was 
interested in doing mental health services and got them to match it, or 
partially match it, so I was able to creatively share time across contracts and 
be able to see HIV negative people, and so we weren’t stuck. 
 
These wrap around services required the agencies have the appropriate staff to deliver the 
services, which in most cases meant employing social workers or other staff with 
professional degrees. It is widely known that CDC would like to directly support SEPs but 
are blocked from doing so by the federal ban, which would take an act of Congress to 
overturn.  
 
While it can be a source of freedom and facilitate some forms of policy innovation, grant 
funding comes with its own challenges. Being grant funded is always, as Heller put it, a 
hustle. Many of my interviewees saw the grant funding system itself as both precarious and 
burdensome.  
RN: Up until fairly recently, it's been harder. You struggle to keep the doors 
open. There was never, not that this has necessarily affected the programs, 
but there was never a budget line in the State Department of Health budget 
for syringe exchange. It was always left over money each year. So 
theoretically it could have all crashed and crumbled at any time. It didn't, 
and the Health Department has been really amazingly supportive. They 
always had to be really amazingly creative as people—we've been really lucky 
with the health department, that we had the same staff there as twenty 
years ago, because they looked out for the programs. 
 
Organizations must cobble together a series of small contracts to keep their doors open, 
continually reapply for funding, and rely on the willing cooperation of employees at the 
Health Department to ensure their continued operation. This in itself presents 
organizational challenges. An employee of the DOHMH observed: 
GN: It's ridiculous. The way that a lot of these agencies survive is by piecing 
together like twenty different tiny little contracts and each of those has their 
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own reporting systems and reporting schedules and data management 
requirements. So it's a nightmare, it's a total nightmare. 
 
Relying on grants from multiple sources has exacerbated the administrative burden on 
small agencies, requiring them to devote ever-larger shares of their resources to 
professional staffing, which has pulled agencies away from the early days of user 
involvement. 
 
For other informants, the grant funding system functions to restrict the autonomy of SEPs. 
They are forced, as one informant told me, to “follow the money.” Most of the funding 
available to harm reduction organizations for the first twenty years of their post-waiver 
existence was tied to HIV prevention. This led to the drift in the direction of being an AIDS 
service organization, rather than emphasizing either medical or political concerns specific 
to drug users. NL, a researcher, social worker, board member of HRev and drug user 
activist who was active in the early post-waiver syringe exchange movement, told me:  
NL: My initial ideas about harm reduction, I didn’t say the word HIV. And I 
didn’t say the word needle exchange. It was a much, much broader idea about 
how to approach drug use and people who use drugs. The quote-unquote 
harm reduction movement was completely driven by the HIV epidemic. If 
there was no HIV, there would be no harm reduction. It was a fucking crisis. 
It was a serious, serious health crisis among the most disadvantaged and 
oppressed and the response which was an underground, political, activist 
response was right on. But, what has happened is that it was impossible to 
extricate harm reduction from HIV in those days because harm reduction was 
all about HIV prevention and it was funded entirely by HIV prevention 
funds. It’s more nuanced than that, obviously but HIV prevention and HIV 
incidents and HIV prevalence were the gold standard outcomes that would 
justify taking this approach to drug use, which more or less meant needle 
exchange in the United States, in New York City. 
 
For NL, the structure of grant funding strongly shaped syringe exchange as a strategy and 
the harm reduction movement in New York. 
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This was a particular problem in the early days of the waiver, when HIV/AIDS—and not 
issues specific to drug users—dominated the available funding. PR, director of HRev, a 
Bronx SEP, expresses frustration with the HIV focus of syringe exchanges and harm 
reduction. HRev was among the first three waivered programs in New York City, a direct 
offshoot of ACT UP activism, which explicitly had HIV/AIDS at the heart of their activism.  
PR: The HIV epidemic is what allowed syringe exchange and a harm 
reduction approach to kind of take hold. That was the doorway and that's 
where the money was. And so I think harm reduction in New York—it's 
interesting because you've got a very supportive state government, a very 
supportive city government. You've got money behind it. So you take this 
very grassroots, very activist led, very user-led movement, I guess for lack of 
a better word. And you institutionalize it, because now there is all this 
money, now there is all these structures, now there is all this compliance and 
administration and you become part of the machine. The money that's out 
there is HIV, so the programming is going to be coming out of these pots. 
Now that doesn't mean that the organizations are only doing HIV work. They 
are spinning whatever they are spinning, so that they can get this money to 
do this work that they are doing. That being said, to a certain extent, HIV 
kind of becomes the predominant force there.… 
 
PR: And so I think what happens slowly over time is that if you are thinking 
about the heart of these organizations, the heart of the organization moves 
from being about drug users and drug user health overall and then it pivots 
so the heart of the organization becomes HIV. Because people are putting 
their programming together around the money instead of going after the 
money and having the programs lead. 
 
Over time, she claims, organizations “pivot” towards the money, which has all been tied to 
HIV prevention, and away from the original “heart” of the organization, which was drug 
user health. 
 
For other informants, concerns about being forced to pivot away from original 
organizational goals dovetail with fears of co-optation and the enforcement of an official 
line. The state, they argue, has at times acted in ways that the programs have perceived as 
punitive and arbitrary. SEP employees have complained about the imposition of rules like 
one-for-one exchange and of audits, for example. State employees explain this as needing to 
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respond to, and in some instances preempt, the hostile political climate, thus protecting the 
programs from wider scrutiny. But as one SEP program director told me:  
VC: I like AL [the long-time employee of the AIDS Institute]. I’ve known her 
for years. But if she is told to do something against our agency, she might do 
it with a tear in her eye, but she’ll do it. She doesn’t work for us, she’s The 
Man. 
 
For VC, while those who work for state agencies are colleagues and possibly comrades, they 
also represent “The Man,” the establishment, which has never fully and openly endorsed 
harm reduction. RN voices similar concerns: 
RN: But then you had this period where that expansion that took place from 
1989 through 1995 petered out. What you began to see then is this slowing 
down of new programs, but a gradual taking over, not taking over, but health 
departments began to look at this as a thing to do. So you begin to develop 
those programs developed by health departments or overseen by health 
departments, regulated by health departments. So then you begin to see a 
regular funding stream that comes in and you have the regulations which 
define what you do and how you do it. But you also have the funding stream 
that begins to define what actual services you are going to deliver. And that 
began to eat away at some of the creative elements that were there at the 
beginning. And they changed the nature of it to a degree, it became another 
service. 
 
The dependable funding stream is welcome, but it “begins to define” the SEPs and to 
determine their direction. For NL, when SEPs became grant-funded by the AIDS Institute, 
they become “arms of the state,” and thus subject to the limitations of state- and federal-
level drug policy:  
NL: My experience is that these agencies tend…I mean it’s complicated but, 
broad over-generalization, tend to function more as arms of the state. And 
have a very difficult time thinking out of the box the state’s agenda imposes 
on them. And that social justice, like really investing in this idea of social 
justice, even within the world of harm reduction and job opportunities and 
employability, investing in participants, designing programs and systems to 
build participant skills and knowledge and functioning and employability and 
those sorts of things—have really been unfortunately absent. So it’s sort of 
turned into this Band-Aid. Harm reduction has done a terrible job of 
addressing the structural, and it’s so outside of a lot of agencies’ radar. Partly 
because the structural is incredibly difficult to impact, but I don’t even think 
that the majority of agencies conceptualize things in that way. Some of these 
services are designed to be Band-Aid solutions. The services come from the 
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funding, the funding comes from the state level to the federal level. And 
nobody’s interested in social change. Nobody’s interested in taking on the 
issue of the criminalization of drug use, none of the funders are. 
 
For VC, NL and others, grant funding prevents SEPs from being able to address the user-
specific issues that they would like to address. In this way, the move away from drug-user-
oriented social movement towards bureaucratic social service provider was encouraged by 
the grant funding system. 
 
Grant funding also structures the larger field of interaction between different syringe 
exchange agencies. Under the competitive dynamic that took hold with grant funding, 
organizations found themselves competing with one another for the limited grant dollars 
available, militating against the formation of a broader sense of solidarity among various 
syringe exchanges. As RN puts it, “There is collaboration but there is also competition.” 
Over the years, SEPs in New York have made various attempts at organizing collectively to 
advocate for syringe exchange in the city. The most recent attempt has been the 
Intravenous Drug Use Health Alliance (IDUHA). 
DH: In the late ‘90s there was HRCNY—Harm Reduction Care Network of 
New York. Prior to HRCNY there was NYNEN—the New York Needle 
Exchange Network. The programs have always tried to organize themselves 
in this city. IDUHA is just the latest form, and the longest standing. 
 
But many informants expressed skepticism that IDUHA would overcome the competitive 
dynamic between SEPs. Agencies operate independently one from the other. There is not a 
high degree of transparency or cooperation. Their relationships with each other, mediated 
by IDUHA, is characterized by competition for scarce resources. IDUHA is often described 
in disparaging terms as a “trade organization,” not a true political coalition. EO, the 
executive director of SoBroHR, does not have any interest in partnering with other 
agencies. He says: 
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EO: IDUHA is not a coalition, IDUHA is a trade group. Any time that you 
form in order to protect funding, that's a trade group, not a coalition.  
 
Through IDUHA and other measures, SEPs support each other in some capacities, but EO 
says that he would never disclose or share financial information.  
EO: Let's say we work together and VC tells me she's going to move so in 
those days you are going to see an influx. We are working together, 
partnering. Like I consider VC a true partner, but we have zero business 
relationship. And I don't know if we need one. I don't think VC knows if we 
need one. 
 
They are, in this sense, classic CBOs struggling to maintain their existence in a difficult 
funding environment, concerned centrally with their own survival. 
GN: It's like high school, in a lot of ways. These programs have been around 
for a long time and there are personalities. But I think at the heart of it is 
just they are competing for scarce resources. None of them are funded to the 
degree that they should be compared to other types of HIV prevention. 
Because of the federal ban, because of the climate in which we live, all of 
these programs need more money and so they are forced to compete. And it's 
a sucky situation. 
 
As GN notes, “competing for scarce resources” undermines solidarity between SEPs, and is 
exacerbated by the federal ban and hence reliance on discretionary grant funding from New 
York City and State and a handful of other smaller private sources. Many wish that 
IDUHA could do more, could be a more effective lobby group, but it has so far failed to 
materialize.  
NL: So essentially IDUHA is a coalition of agencies that do some sort or form 
of syringe distribution that advocate… for a couple million dollars every year. 
R: Which is distributed evenly among the agencies? 
NL: No, and that’s been a huge… there was especially in the beginning an 
element of secrecy among IDUHA, around who could be allowed in the room. 
R: Why do you think that is? 
NL: Because it was all about the money. And they wanted that money, and 
they didn’t want anybody else. The more people in the room, the less money 
their organizations got.  So it was very sort of secretive, and very… not open. 
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It’s just interesting to me that they’re called the Injection Drug Users Health 
Alliance and there was nobody at the table who is an injection drug user. 
There was no community. They were the community, and it was all executive 
directors, who defined themselves as the community. 
This experience suggests that competition between SEPs can have the effect of 
subordinating the user-centricity of harm reduction to the goal of organizational 
maintenance.  
 
Partial institutionalization has thus been a mixed blessing for SEPs. It has provided 
legitimacy, funding and legal sanction. But it has also forced SEPs to alter their mission 
and compete with one another, with the effect of preventing the emergence of collaboration 
across the syringe exchange field.  
 
V. The urban politics of syringe exchange 
 
Despite being in the city and of the city, for ten years SEPs were not supported by the City. 
That is not to say that employees of the DOHMH didn’t quietly work in the interest of harm 
reduction, but rather that the New York City government could not and did not openly 
endorse syringe exchange. This meant that for the first ten years of the waiver system, 
SEPs pursued changes in policy at the State level, pushing against the boundaries of the 
regulations and taking advantage of the flexibility afforded by the pro-harm reduction 
employees at the AIDS Institute. All this was to change, however, with the election of 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2001. He took up the challenge of tackling public health in the 
city as no mayor in recent history had. Though a contested and polarizing figure for many 
self-identified progressives, Bloomberg’s brand of technocratic, data-driven city 
management undoubtedly offered unprecedented opportunities for harm reduction 
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advocates, many of whom had felt that despite their many successes, they were still 
laboring in the margins. 
 
Syringe exchange during the Dinkins and Giuliani years took place despite the City. 
Giuliani especially was a dedicated practitioner of a deeply moralizing, conservative politics 
of addiction, centered on concerns about moral hazard and the need to stigmatize drug use. 
Heller and Paone characterize this period as “oppositional,” pointing out that the 
“difficulties inherent in mediating a relationship between those engaged in ‘illegal’ behavior 
and the government authorities were further compounded by a law enforcement policy 
actively challenging the activities of syringe exchange programs.”43 Giuliani, a conservative, 
Republican mayor, became known for his particularly harsh brand of ‘tough on crime’ 
politics and broken windows policing.44 This translated into increased crackdowns on 
syringe exchange participants and the targeting of SEPs for law enforcement actions. NL, 
an employee of SoBroHR during the Giuliani years recalled: 
NL: So if you had the card you were allowed to have syringes on you, and if 
you didn’t have the card then you weren’t legally allowed to possess them. 
But what was happening is that people were getting arrested. People with 
cards were getting arrested and charged with possession of a controlled 
substance in the 7th degree. But it was people who had used syringes and 
were getting charged—and were legitimate exchangers—were getting 
charged with possession of a controlled substance because of the residue in 
the barrel of the syringe. So there was this conflict. And I think the conflict 
still exists between the public health law and the criminal law. That was 
leading people who were on the one hand doing things that were funded by 
the state and then on the other hand the state was arresting them for what 
the state said was ok. So it was just this ridiculous situation where two 
different institutions within the state bureaucracy were completely 
contradicting each other. 
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This point was echoed by Daliah Heller, the former assistant commissioner for the Bureau 
of Alcohol and Drug Use Prevention, Care and Treatment, who told me: 
DH: In the same city, we’ll have with the one hand the health department 
supporting an initiative, and with another hand, the police department 
interfering with it or screwing it up because they’re confiscating syringes, or 
the homeless shelter being like, you can’t come in here with those. 
 
While syringe exchange was made legal by the State, the City still found ways to make life 
harder for SEP participants. 
 
The partial institutionalization and uneven adoption of harm reduction led to a certain 
element of policy incoherence, in that what was supported by one branch of the government 
was undermined by others. This is typical of harm reduction policies generally. As Philippe 
Bourgois notes, discussing the Canadian context, “The left arm of the state attempts to 
soften the repression of the right arm via inconsistently administered high-tech health and 
social services.”45 In this context, the divide between City and State exacerbated this 
incoherence. The New York State Department of Health was working with and listening to 
drug users, coaxing them into actively participating in the state project of disease reduction 
through their use of sterile needles. The New York City Police Department, for their part, 
was continuing to stop, frisk and arrest users for these same behaviors. This policy 
incoherence hampered the operation of SEPs and prevented the expansion of other harm 
reduction policies and programs. This had public health consequences, as “police stops were 
associated with a decreased likelihood of consistent SEP use.”46  
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After so many years on the defensive, harm reduction advocates in New York City were 
hopeful when Bloomberg was elected. As Heller remembers: 
DH: So Bloomberg was elected, and it became pretty clear early on that his 
administration was willing to talk to the community. Which was a completely 
different experience from Giuliani.  
 
As a consequence of Bloomberg’s election, two significant events changed the prospects of 
SEPs in the city. The first is that in 2001, New York City Council decided for the first time 
to fund syringe exchange. The second is the appointment of Tom Frieden as Health 
Comissioner. The early 2000s were heady days for harm reduction activists, when city 
government finally opened its doors to them. Activists welcomed the prospect of further 
institutionalization and integration into health and social service provision, which they 
hoped would consolidate SEPs’ position as the vanguard of a new wave of pragmatic, non-
ideological public health action in the city. 
 
Because of the opposition to syringe exchange by Mayor Dinkins and then Mayor Giuliani, 
the DOHMH did not have any direct involvement with SEPs in the city until 2001 when the 
City Council first allocated discretionary funds to support syringe exchange. According to 
Heller: 
DH: There was no City Council money, ever. So the City Council money was 
the first City money to ever go to needle exchange. 
 
As noted, most of the money that was available to SEPs has been tied to HIV prevention, 
treatment and care. When the City began funding SEPs, it was also under the auspices of 
HIV prevention.  
DH: There was a group that was formed called NYCOCHAC—New York City 
Communities of Color HIV AIDS coalition—and a staff member from [one 
SEP] and a staff member from [another nearby SEP] were going to the 
meetings regularly to represent syringe exchange, with the goal of 
representing the issue there. The idea of NYCOCHAC was, we need City 
Council discretionary money to address in a more effective way, HIV 
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prevention in communities of color in New York City… We were basically 
able to rally up all this support and we did council visits, us and [the other 
SEP] along with NYCOCHAC, and we got money for needle exchange. We 
were trying to get all the other programs to come to this meeting, and they 
were like ppft, you’re crazy, we’re never going to get city council money for 
needle exchange. And then it happened! And it was very clear, it was on the 
slate. So we got the money and it went to all the programs. So the next year 
the other programs were like, oh we’re going to get involved in this and 
NYCOCHAC was like ok, wait a minute. At that time there were like 10 
programs or something, and they were like we can’t suddenly have this bum 
rush of the needle exchanges dominating these meetings. We were like, well 
we haven’t done this before, we’ve been like the political bastard step-
children of everything, we don’t know how to go talk to politicians who are 
supportive of us, we can’t even imagine that this is happening!  
 
In joining forces with NYCOCHAC, syringe exchange activists were able to link their 
campaign to a larger politics of racialized health inequality. Although HIV rates in the city 
overall had been declining, poor communities of color still suffered from the highest 
incidence of new infections in the city. The SEPs were able to secure funding by linking 
harm reduction to this issue. Doing so also allowed them to participate in the city’s politics 
in new ways.  
 
City council funding brought SEPs into direct relationship with the health department. One 
of Bloomberg’s first and arguably most important appointments was Tom Frieden as 
Health Commissioner. Frieden, a strong proponent of evidence-based approaches to public 
health problems, was widely credited with effectively managing the tuberculosis outbreak 
in New York during the 1990s while he was an employee of the health department.47 
During this time he worked with members of the harm reduction community, as TB 
treatment adherence among homeless drug users was especially difficult to monitor and 
enforce. This contact created a familiarity and mutual respect between Frieden and harm 
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reduction activists. Dahlia Heller, then the executive director of a major Bronx SEP, recalls 
approaching Frieden for his support for city funding for syringe exchange: 
DH: We went and started harassing Tom Frieden, in a nice way, we went and 
met with him, and he was like you know, I really agree, needle exchange 
makes perfect sense. And we were like, wow! Ok great! So then we went and 
made up a mock budget and we were like this is how much it would cost, so 
why don’t you just fund us all! The city could fund us! And basically what 
happened was the deal was that he would, I mean he wanted to make sure 
that the city had actively done something before they just gave out money to 
all the existing programs, so then they worked and started the Queens 
program.  
 
Harm reduction activists found in Frieden an ally and an advocate who, crucially, had the 
ear and the trust of the Mayor. This direct access to political influence was a new 
experience for these activists who had previously been, in Heller’s words, the “political 
bastard step-children of everything.“ For the first time since the waiver, harm reduction 
practitioners would not need to rely on influencing obliging bureaucrats into molding the 
application of state-determine regulations. They would now have a hand in crafting policy 
directly. 
 
Early in his tenure as Health Commissioner, Frieden oversaw a major restructuring of the 
Health Department. Until 2001, there was a separate Department of Mental Hygiene, 
Mental Retardation and Alcoholism that was merged with the Department of Health as a 
ballot initiative in the same election that brought Bloomberg into office. With this merger, 
the Department of Alcoholism, which oversaw drug treatment contracts, was brought into a 
unified New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. This reorganization also 
saw the creation of the Harm Reduction Unit, to which Daliah Heller was recruited as 
director. 
DH: But harm reduction was in the HIV bureau, they created the structure of 
the harm reduction job over in the HIV bureau, and the syringe exchange 
money was running through the HIV bureau. Frieden reorganized [the 
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Health Department] and created this Bureau of Alcohol and Drugs, then 
appointed somebody from there assistant commissioner and that guy called 
me up and said look I’m going to be assistant commissioner of this bureau 
and I want you to come over and run all the initiatives. Program and policy 
initiatives. And I said ok, but I’ll only do it if I can bring harm reduction with 
me, cause harm reduction belongs with drugs stuff, not with HIV stuff. 
 
When Heller came to the department from her role as executive director of a SEP, she 
insisted on moving the harm reduction unit out of HIV, where it had been housed, to the 
newly created Bureau of Alcohol and Drug use. She brought an activist sensibility to her job 
and set about transforming the way health services were conceived of and delivered to drug 
users. 
 
With Bloomberg’s reorganization and the appointment of Heller, syringe exchange in New 
York City was finally supported by an agency with the specific mission of addressing drug 
user health. GN, who works for the DOHMH, was very clear about this: 
GN: [The New York City Department of Health is] totally, totally in 
agreement [with harm reduction]. I mean, that's why syringe exchange in the 
health department is not housed in the Bureau of HIV. It's housed in the 
Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Use, because we see it as not just the needle 
preventing a case of HIV, it's part of a broader set of services that address the 
health needs of people who use drugs, and that includes a whole bunch of 
stuff. That's one of the big selling points of syringe exchange, when they go to 
city council every year to ask for money is, we're not just giving out syringes, 
we're providing health education, we're connecting people to care. I mean, the 
whole referrals and linkages to treatment for chronic diseases, to suppressing 
viral load is huge in terms of the epidemic and that means getting people to 
their doctor and getting them to keep taking their medications and that 
means getting people stable in their housing situations and that means 
getting people out of violent households and there's all this kind of stuff. 
 
Syringe exchange had begun life as an underground movement, and subsequently 
developed on the margins of HIV prevention. With Bloomberg, syringe exchange was finally 
embraced by the city’s public health system. Harm reduction’s assimilation into official City 
public health policy has been hugely important for its further institutionalization. One of 
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the key consequences has been the expansion of harm reduction from its niche within HIV 
prevention towards reshaping services focused on drug user health. Heller told me: 
DH: Everybody knew why it was in HIV. It was because advocacy for needle 
exchange grew out of the HIV epidemic. But Frieden was very clear that 
syringe exchange was about a lot more than giving people needles. It was 
about engagement, it was a gateway to treatment, and blah, blah, blah. He 
understood all of that. It was natural. It was a continuum of services for 
people who use drugs, it made a lot of sense. In a world where you’re 
operating more on public health principles, it’s the way you would think to 
organize things. Instead of on history and politics. 
 
The “history and politics” Heller alludes to is the story of how and why harm reduction 
came to be so closely associated with HIV. Without the HIV epidemic, there would be no 
syringe exchange, and there would be no harm reduction. While the epidemic has been 
brought under control, drug users continue to face serious barriers to their health and 
wellness. These new problems, exacerbated by socioeconomic inequalities, cannot be solved 
by the distribution of clean needles. This is the new turn in harm reduction services in New 
York. 
 
As a result of this shift away from an exclusive focus on HIV, the influence of the State-
level AIDS Institute is waning as City-level agencies are becoming more important. This 
has happened as the City has begun taking back the Ryan White and CDC contracts it had 
once ‘passed through” to the State. The City now had direct relationships with SEPs and 
began taking on the management role that the State has until recently preformed. The 
transfer of contracts was more than a bureaucratic transaction. It was the process by which 
syringe exchange was expanded into a fuller harm reduction project. 
GN: Another pot of money came from the CDC, was awarded to New York 
City, and New York City chose to use it to fund syringe exchange programs, 
this prevention money. And this was at the very beginning of syringe 
exchange, and at that time New York City Department of Health had no 
existing contracts with syringe exchange programs in New York City and no 
relationships whatsoever. The State, however, was funding syringe 
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exchange programs. So what the City did at that time when they won the 
money from the CDC and decided that they wanted the money to go to 
SEPs, administratively they decided to pass that money over to the State 
Department of Health, to just add it to what they were already doing to 
fund the syringe exchange programs, just to make it administratively 
easier. So that's been going on for the last many, many years, even though 
in the last few years we've started now doing our own contracting with 
syringe exchange programs. So this has been talked about for a while, ever 
since we started doing that we were like well it doesn't really make sense to 
be passing that money over to the state anymore. Now that we have all of 
the processes in place, we don't need to keep passing it over to them, we can 
keep it ourselves. … And we are taking back many of those contracts with 
the idea of like, by holding those contracts, we can have the power to infuse 
the philosophy that we want in them and that is a harm reduction 
philosophy. 
 
The process of New York City “taking back” contracts was as an opportunity to “infuse 
the… harm reduction philosophy” into policy and promote a broader definition of drug user 
health.  
GN: One way that you could show that we at the health department support 
syringe exchange as something broader than HIV prevention, is the way we 
structured their contracts. So all of the syringe exchange programs hold 
contracts with us and they are all deliverable-based contracts. And only one 
of the five deliverables is handing out syringes. One of them is prescribing 
naxolone, one of them is all about hepatitis, so prevention, education, 
getting people into care and that sort of thing. One is about broader health 
care access issues, escorting people to their medical appointments, getting 
them primary care physicians, et cetera. And then the last one is just 
education on a number of different topics related to drug user health. 
 
The DOHMH is pushing harm reduction away from being a specialized program for HIV 
prevention towards a broader incorporation of other services focusing on drug user health 
such as Hepatitis C, overdose prevention using naloxone, as well as using harm reduction 
as a model of engagement to get high risk people into primary care. 
 
In the process, they are trying to pull harm reduction out of its isolated position in HIV 
prevention and related to other already existing services for drug users, including 
traditional drug treatment, which historically has not supported harm reduction measures.  
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GN: Part of what we're trying to do in this bureau is take harm reduction 
out of this ghetto. So far it's been—here's harm reduction and then here's 
the rest of the medical world and the drug treatment world. We're trying to 
really infuse a harm reduction philosophy into all things drug related. So it 
kind of normalizes harm reduction and takes off some of the hard core 
advocacy aggressive edge that I think we think about it as.  
 
To be sure, some activists mourn the loss of syringe exchange’s “hard core advocacy 
aggressive edge.” For some, having the health department define and dictate the content 
and meaning of the “harm reduction philosophy” is proof of harm reduction’s medicalization 
and its disconnection from its activist roots. But for GN and other harm reduction 
supporters within the New York City government, the process of taking back syringe 
exchange from the State is a fulfilment of the process of institutionalizing harm reduction, 
of getting it “out of the ghetto” and into mainstream public health policy. For them, this is 
social justice in action. 
 
The irony was not lost on activists that it took Bloomberg—whom 1980s-era harm reduction 
agitators would have reviled—to push the city to embrace syringe exchange. For AE, a 
harm reduction activist involved with the user advocacy organization UserUnion, 
Bloomberg was still the enemy. But Bloomberg’s support for evidence-based policy opened 
the door for the City to embrace syringe exchange: 
AE: We are one of Bloomberg's and Cuomo's number one critics, and that's 
not an exaggeration. At the same time, there are some areas, when it doesn't 
cost him any money, he tries to be evidence-based. So he's been a big 
proponent of syringe exchange. So I don't want to be too critical of Bloomberg 
in the sense that he doesn't give a shit about harm reduction—I mean, I don't 
think he doesn't give a shit about harm reduction, but he's not hostile to it, 
he's going to let the health people support harm reduction. 
 
Although some syringe exchange activists see themselves as the ideological and cultural 
opposites of Bloomberg’s technocratic approach to governance, it was only during his 
administration that the City government began directly supporting syringe exchange, and 
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the broader harm reduction project. AE and others see Bloomberg’s interest in “evidence-
based” governance as an advantage when it comes to harm reduction and drug policy more 
generally. 
 
The Bloomberg-era embrace of syringe exchange represented a further step in the 
institutionalization of harm reduction. Some elements of policy incoherence remained. 
Bloomberg of course never fully demobilized Giuliani-era policing strategies. Under his 
leadership, the City continued to punish poor communities with one hand while reducing 
the harm of drug use within them with the other. But by taking back contracts that had 
been administered through New York State and through key public health appointees, 
syringe exchange became more mainstream than ever before. And SEPs continued their 
evolution from outsider social movement to CBOs providing social services as part of a 
broadly neoliberal public health agenda.48 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In the past three decades, syringe exchange, which in the U.S. has been the paradigmatic 
harm reduction strategy, has undergone a far-reaching transformation. In the initial 
stages, it confronted the state as an outsider movement, promoted by groups that saw 
themselves as a social movement responding to a public health crisis ravaging an 
abandoned population. After the concerted effort of activists from a variety of 
backgrounds—poor communities, movements pushing for a stronger response to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 On CBOs as providers of social services in the context of privatization, see Nicole P. Marwell, 
“Privatizing the Welfare State: Nonprofit Community-Based Organizations as Political Actors,” 
American Sociological Review 69 (2004): 265-291; Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky, 
Nonprofits For Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting, (Boston: MA, Harvard University 
Press, 2009.) 
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HIV/AIDS crisis, public health professionals—syringe exchange became partially 
institutionalized and adopted by various levels of government. The space of exception that 
syringe exchange came to inhabit was due to the unwillingness of elected officials to 
publicly embrace a controversial strategy. But the result was that syringe exchange 
occupied an insider-outsider status at the edge of the state that allowed for further 
innovations to emerge. Finally, the government of New York City adopted syringe exchange 
and harm reduction in a more significant way. 
 
In short, as GN, one of my interviewees in the New York City government put it, syringe 
exchange has gotten out of the ghetto. We can understand this in a number of ways. A 
strategy born in the city’s poorest communities has become adopted more widely. Syringe 
exchange is no longer a separate and marginalized practice for a stigmatized population. It 
has been reorganized and rebranded as another form of health care. SEPs have increasingly 
come to resemble CBOs delivering routine social services in partnership with the state49, 
operating on a scale that was previously unthinkable. 
 
Two developments made the mainstreaming of syringe exchange possible. The first is the 
crisis of public health and social service provision during the heyday of government 
cutbacks. Syringe exchange could not have been adopted had the policies of punishing drug 
users and ignoring AIDS sufferers been successful. And the government of New York City 
did not embrace syringe exchange until there was an administration that allowed practical 
measures of success to override the moralizing symbolic politics of addiction. The second 
precondition was the concerted efforts over decades of activists who were canny enough to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Rathgeb and Lipsky, op. cit. 
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realize that the changing approach to public health created strategic opportunities for 
syringe exchange to jump scale from a series of uncoordinated local efforts to a city- and 
statewide venture. 
 
My informants have stressed that this is not a uniformly positive process. Important parts 
of the culture of harm reduction as an outsider movement have been erroded. These include 
not only the more politicized atmosphere of the social movement era, but also the more 
intimate environment when most people involved in syringe exchange were familiar with 
one another, creating a sense of warmth and belonging that was tied to the harm reduction 
philosophy. The process of institutionalization has also reduced organizational autonomy, 
subjecting SEPs to some extent to the programs of their funders.  
 
And although syringe exchange has been partially institutionalized at different 
governmental levels, it is still far from the dominant approach to public health, much less 
drug user public health. Abstinence continues to be the prioritized in political discourse and 
social service. There has never been a widely publicized announcement that harm reduction 
will be official policy. Syringe exchange still relies on the legal mechanism of waivering. 
And many communities are still facing drug war tactics in place of or alongside harm 
reduction. 
 
Although harm reduction has not yet been fully embraced by the City or State government, 
it seems clear based on the data presented here that syringe exchanges have evolved into 
more widely accessible community-based health and social service providers. And with 
Medicaid reform on the horizon (discussed in chapter five) SEPs are well on their way 
towards becoming fully mainstream. The harm reduction project also continues to evolve, 
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as evinced by fast-growing strategies like peer-delivered syringe exchange and peer-
administered naloxone, which is detailed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. 
Naloxone and the New Public Health 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Harm reduction in New York is evolving in two directions. It is moving towards new scales, 
impacting policy at higher levels and larger political units. And it is also developing new 
interventions, which use new methods and involve new populations. This chapter examines 
naloxone, an overdose prevention program, as an example of the latter.  Naloxone signifies 
a departure from harm reduction’s close association with syringe exchange and HIV 
prevention. With naloxone, harm reduction methods are branching out into areas that 
target a population that is broader than those who use syringe exchange programs. 
Naloxone’s use as a harm reduction strategy began as a limited pilot program in a handful 
of syringe exchanges, but it has now become a widely accepted public health policy, with a 
sufficiently high profile that Congress is now considering a bill establishing naloxone-based 
overdose prevention programs nationwide. It represents the combination of user advocacy 
and cutting edge thinking in public health policy. A closer look at the inner workings of 
naloxone is instructive in order to understand what harm reduction policy looks like today.  
 
The success of overdose prevention programs arguably depends not only on the chemical 
properties of naloxone itself, but on a number of social strategies developed by users, 
clinical personnel, public health workers, and others in the harm reduction movement. 
Naloxone demands a reorganizing of relationships within the public health system and 
what can be seen as the deputizing of users as agents of the public health state. Naloxone’s 
diffusion throughout the public health system required the adoption of peer administration 
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and lay training. It has benefits from positive identification from users themselves, many of 
whom enthusiastically participate in naloxone overdose reversal strategies as a way to be 
‘good citizens’ among users. It creates new alliances between drug users and medical 
professionals, as they extend expertise and authority into the worlds of the users 
themselves. The social networks of the users become a new target of public health 
intervention. All of this occurs in a legal space of exception, with regulations and laws being 
rewritten after the fact to take into account new practices. 
 
Community-based naloxone distribution is an example of a public health strategy that only 
became possible with the emergence of the “new public health.”1 Like syringe exchange, and 
like the New York version of harm reduction in general, naloxone is unquestionably an 
example of what scholars have in mind when they analyze neoliberal social policy—but it 
unsettles the usual critique. Overdose reversal might be the ultimate harm reduction 
practice, in that it embodies the idea that users are “deserving of caring and life”2 rather 
than death by overdose. Naloxone suggests that the forms of decentralization and 
responsibilization that typify neoliberal public health regimes are compatible with projects 
for collective dignity, autonomy and mutual aid. It is an example of what Ferguson sees as 
a progressive policy that uses typical “neoliberal moves.”3 
 
The roll out of naloxone and of peer-administered harm reduction exemplifies the process of 
policy transformation whereby harm reduction, itself moving away from a narrow focus on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Alan Petersen and Deborah Lupton, The New Public Health: Health and Self in an Age of Risk 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996) and chapter two. 
2 Dan Small et al., “The Establishment of North America’s First State Sanctioned Supervised 
Injection Facility: A Case Study in Culture Change,” International Journal of Drug Policy 17 (2006): 
74. 
3 James Ferguson, “The Uses of Neoliberalism,” Antipode 41.S1 (2009): 174. 
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HIV prevention into a larger program of drug user health promotion, is also influencing and 
to some extent promoting the reconfiguration of broader public health bureaucracies, while 
at the same time being shaped by them. Aided as well by the changing demographics of 
overdose, naloxone is becoming an important part of New York City and State’s public 
health system. As its use becomes more widespread and more entrenched within the fields 
of health and medicine, the development of peer-delivered naloxone enables deeper 
structural changes in public health policy. As a strategy, it formalizes a new relationship 
between drug users and the state. Whereas older drug policy paradigms relegated users to 
the role of passive recipients, increasingly public health strategies include them as active 
participants. 
 
II. Overdose death and its reversal 
 
In the United States, more injection drug users die each year from opiate overdoses than 
from any other cause, including AIDS, hepatitis, or homicide.4 Drug overdose is a grim 
reality for many drug users, with approximately half of all illicit drug users reporting at 
least one nonfatal overdose during their lifetime.5 And it has been a perennial problem for 
New York City, which has long had high levels of drug use in some quarters. Overdose is 
the third leading cause of accidental death among New Yorkers aged 25 to 34, with opioids 
being involved in 77% of cases.6 These overdose deaths are not only claiming the lives of 
heroin users. In line with national trends, the New York City Department of Health and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Karen H. Seal, et al., “Naloxone Distribution and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Training for 
Injection Drug Users to Prevent Heroin Overdose Death: A Pilot Intervention Study,” Journal of 
Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 82:2 (2005): 303 
5 Sandro Galea, et al., “Provision of Naloxone to Injection Drug Users as an Overdose Prevention 
Strategy: Early Evidence from a Pilot Study in New York City,” Addictive Behaviors 31.5 (2006): 908  
6 DOHMH, “Unintentional Drug Poisoning (Overdose) Deaths Involving Opioids in New York City, 
2000 - 2013,” Epi Data Brief 50 (August 2014): 2. 
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Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) reports that the rate of overdose deaths involving opioid 
analgesics  (otherwise known as painkillers) increased by 256% from 2000 to 2013, with 215 
reported deaths in 2013.7 And the rate of overdose deaths involving heroin increased for 
three consecutive years from 209 deaths in 2010 to 420 deaths in 2013.  
 
Before the development of overdose reversal programs, drug users had engaged in various 
do-it-yourself forms of overdose reversal, drawing on folk remedies and improvisation. One 
study of San Francisco drug users reported that:  
91% of respondents had tried various measures to revive their peers, the 
most common involving painful stimuli (physical striking; ice on genitals; 
injection of concentrated saline), but only half reported summoning 
emergency help for fear of reprisal from authorities responding to the 
emergency call.8 
 
These techniques were ineffective and dangerous. But in the ways in which they instigated 
drug users to act in a quasi-medical capacity as a form of mutual aid, they presaged more 
organized programs for overdose reversal. 
 
Naloxone hydrochloride, sometimes known as Narcan (one of the brand names under which 
it is sold), is an opiate-blocking drug that reverses the effects of overdose. It is effective on 
all types of opioid overdoses—from street heroin to prescription pharmaceuticals—by 
counteracting the depression of the central nervous system and respiratory system that can 
lead to death. It has an unscheduled regulatory classification, meaning that it has no 
addictive or psychoactive properties and thus no potential for abuse, and serious adverse 
affects are rare.9  It is however a prescription medication, which means that physicians and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid.: 3 
8 Sarz Maxwell, et al., "Prescribing Naloxone to Actively Injecting Heroin Users: A Program to 
Reduce Heroin Overdose Deaths," Journal of Addictive Diseases 25.3 (2006): 89 – 90. 
9 Seal et al., op. cit.: 304 
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others with prescribing authorities currently control access to naloxone. Administration of 
naloxone can lead to acute withdrawal symptoms in opiate-dependent persons but will have 
no effect on non-opiate users. Likewise, it will have no effect on someone overdosing on a 
non-opioid drug.  
 
Naloxone is administered via intramuscular injection or intranasally via an atomizer (See 
Figures 1 – 3). Typically, the drug takes a few minutes to take effect and can last about 
thirty minutes to two hours, depending on the dose administered and the amount of opiates 
present in the body. There is a risk of the individual returning to an overdosed state if they 
still have large amounts of opiates in their system as the naloxone wears off. Those who 
administer naloxone are thus instructed to contact emergency services and encourage the 
overdoser to go to the hospital to seek medical attention.  
 
 
Figure 1. Intramuscular naloxone kit. Contains two syringes; two vials of naloxone; 
gloves; alcohol swabs; a face shield for rescue breathing; a prescription written in my name; 
and an instructions pamphlet. 
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Figure 2. Intranasal naloxone kit. Contains two atomizers, two vials of naloxone, 
gloves, a face shield for rescue breathing, a certificate of completion certifying that I have 
been trained in opioid overdose prevention and citing New York State Public Health Law, a 
prescription in my name; an instructions pamphlet and a graphic instructions diagram, 
shown in detail in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Intranasal naloxone instruction sheet. 
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After a short training session led by peer trainers at harm reduction drop-in centers, 
interested participants are given a naloxone kit which contains a vial of the drug and either 
two syringes or an atomizer, first aid equipment, and written instructions (see figures 1 and 
2). These training sessions provide more than just instructions on how to deploy naloxone 
on an overdosing body; they are also occasions for formalizing a new relationship between 
the drug user and the state. 
 
Currently there are over 80 overdose prevention outlets in New York State, with the 
majority located in New York City.10 Other than syringe exchanges and harm reduction 
agencies, naloxone is also available at certain methadone programs, drug treatment centers 
and homeless shelters. Both the State and City health department provide naloxone kits to 
community-based overdose prevention programs, with the state supplying intravenous 
naloxone kits and the City supplying intranasal. The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) reported in 2012 that “since the first opioid overdose prevention program 
began distributing naloxone in 1996, the respondent programs reported training and 
distributing naloxone to 53,032 persons and receiving reports of 10,171 overdose 
reversals.” 11  One evaluation of the New York City program indicates that 82.2% of 
participants said they feel comfort or very comfortable using naloxone and 86.2% indicated 
they would want naloxone administered if they were overdosing.12 The eagerness with 
which naloxone has been met signals the ready willingness of drug users to take up the 
mantle of naloxone. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 NYSDOH, “Opioid Overdose Prevention Programs Directory.” 
11 CDC, “Community-Based Opioid Overdose Prevention Programs Providing Naloxone — United 
States, 2010” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 61:6 (February 17, 2012): 101. 
12 Tinka Markham Piper, et al., “Evaluation of a Naloxone Distribution and Administration Program 
in New York City.” Substance Use & Misuse 43 (2008): 858–870. 
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First developed in the 1960s, naloxone was initially studied as a possible replacement for 
methadone.13 It quickly became an important drug in the treatment of accidental opiate 
overdose within clinical settings. Hospitals are required to have naloxone on-hand 
whenever an opioid is administered. Naloxone has been actively used as an opiate reversal 
drug since the 1960s and has been a familiar and routine presence in emergency rooms, 
operating theaters, and ambulances since that time. But its adoption by the harm reduction 
movement and the development of a harm reduction strategy based around it—which 
facilitated the drug’s migration out of the clinic and onto the street, and out of the hands of 
doctors and emergency medics into the hands of drug users themselves—is considerably 
more recent. 
 
III. Bringing naloxone to New York 
 
Naloxone’s trajectory from clinic to street began in Chicago in 1996. Doctors working with 
the Chicago Recovery Alliance (CRA)—a harm reduction agency that had begun conducting 
syringe exchange in 1991—began prescribing and dispensing naloxone directly to select 
CRA participants. Motivated by the overdose death of one of the founders, and seeing a 
wider need among their program participants, the doctors undertook the task of 
transforming naloxone from an unwelcome intervention imposed by unsympathetic 
emergency medical personnel, to the symbol of drug user self help and mutual aid that it 
would eventually become. Dan Bigg, one of the founders of CRA, describes the first 
naloxone program: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Arthur Zaks, et al., “Naloxone in the Treatment of Opiate Dependence: A Progress Report,” 
Committee on Problems of Drug Dependence, Bulletin, Problems of Drug Dependence: Report of the 
thirty-first meeting (1969): 6263. 
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For those who had heard about naloxone, it was generally as kindly as garlic 
might be to a vampire as most experiences were abuses of the drug at the 
hand of an emergency medical provider who shot 2mg IV into a person who 
overdoses, then fought with them as they exploded out of the emergency room 
or ambulance in withdrawal. Following H[arm] R[eduction] practice we 
sought out medical help which valued and respected life and human rights. 
Shawn DeLater, an emergency room physician and Sarz Maxwell, an 
addictionologist, were our first medical care providers ready and willing to 
put a healthy, lifesaving touch to reversing opiate-related overdose with 
effective and humane intervention. 14 
 
As Bigg makes clear, naloxone’s reputation was as a drug often administered callously by 
first responders who did not understand the lived reality of both overdose and withdrawal 
for drug users. As practiced by paramedics, intravenous administration of a high dose (2mg) 
of naloxone rapidly strips the body of opioids, which is the functional equivalent of sudden 
and violent opiate withdrawal, causing dependent users severe pain and discomfort. In 
refashioning naloxone as a tool that “valued and respected life and human rights,” harm 
reduction practitioners modified not only the setting in which the drug is administered, but 
the nature of the medical intervention itself by introducing lower dose (0.4mg or 0.8mg) 
intramuscular or intranasal application which has a much gentler effect on the body. 
 
As with syringe exchange, naloxone’s use in peer administered overdose reversal took the 
tools of medical practice and applied an off label use. And also like syringe exchange, 
naloxone’s evolution as a harm reduction tool was borne of the relationships that developed 
between politically-committed medical practitioners and user-activists within syringe 
exchange sites. Naloxone had previously not been used in this capacity, and the peer-
administration model pushed against established medical norms. The development of peer-
administered naloxone thus had something of the character of direct action. It was not 
precisely illegal, but it pushed the boundaries of legality. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 HRC, “Chicago Recovery Alliance: Case study.” 
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In the years following the initial small-scale beginnings of naloxone distribution in Chicago, 
public health departments in a handful of other cities and states began developing pilot 
programs, including San Francisco, New Mexico and New York. In many instances, once 
underground or quasi-legal programs that had already been involved in syringe exchange 
with injection drug users began circulating naloxone through their already established 
networks.15 Naloxone was also becoming more prominent within harm reduction circles, 
and in 2000 the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) held the first Opiate Overdose conference in 
Seattle, attracting international attention. At the time, heroin overdose was the main focus 
of harm reduction activism and opioid analgesics were not the subject of any paper given at 
the conference. Harm reduction activists’ attention was focused on the high rates of 
overdose among intravenous drug users, a population now being accessed and served 
through the syringe exchange programs (SEPs) expanding across the country.16 
 
Utilizing the infrastructure of SEPs, community-based naloxone distribution programs 
expanded in New York City in the early 2000s. The Harm Reduction Coalition (HRC), a 
national drug user advocacy and service organization, initiated this program, drawing on 
the experience of Chicago. In 2004, a pilot overdose prevention program at two New York 
syringe exchanges trained approximately one hundred drug users on overdose prevention, 
including the use of naloxone. And in 2005 the HRC started the Skills and Knowledge on 
Overdose Prevention Project (SKOOP). According to the HRC, SKOOP had three main 
goals: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Maxwell et al., op. cit. 
16 “Preventing Heroin Overdose: Pragmatic Approaches,” Conference program available at 
http://adai.washington.edu/training/conf/agenda.htm. 
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(i) to reduce overdose-related deaths through the distribution of naloxone 
hydrochloride to injection drug users in NYC; (ii) to build evidence for the 
effectiveness of take-home naloxone in harm reduction settings, and (iii) to 
create wider support for the inclusion of naloxone in harm reduction, 
methadone, and other public health programs.17  
 
From the beginning, naloxone’s supporters in New York used the rhetoric of evidence-based 
health policy, which was encouraged by the Michael Bloomberg mayoral administration.18 
The data collection dimension of SKOOP provided the Harm Reduction Coalition with an 
evidence base and lobbying tool when pushing for laws to change and naloxone distribution 
to be expanded. 
 
Nationally, naloxone’s adoption by harm reduction programs preceded legal and policy 
changes to formalize its widespread use. This was also the case in New York. There are no 
legal barriers to prescribing naloxone to individuals at risk of overdose, but legislation was 
necessary to legalize third party administration by peers. New Mexico was the first state to 
act. In 2001, the legislature authorized naloxone distribution programs using lay savers 
and provided exemption from civil liability to doctors and laypersons who administer 
naloxone to others. New York followed in 2005 with legislation authorizing opioid 
antagonist administration programs.19 
In April 2006, a New York State law regarding opioid overdose prevention authorized the 
state health commissioner to establish standards for overdose prevention programs and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Tinka Markham Piper, et al., “Overdose Prevention for Injection Drug Users: Lessons Learned 
from Naloxone Training and Distribution Programs in New York City,” Harm Reduction Journal 4.3 
(2007): 292. 
18 See Ted Alcorn, "Redefining Public Health in New York City," The Lancet 379.9831 (2012): 2037-
2038; Lawrence O. Gostin, "Bloomberg's Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Meddling Nanny?" 
Hastings Center Report 43.5 (2013): 19-25. 
19 Leo Beletsky, et al., "Closing Death's Door: Action Steps to Facilitate Emergency Opioid Drug 
Overdose Reversal in the United States," Conference Report from The Center for Health Law, 
Politics and Policy, Temple University, (2009). 
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use of naloxone by non-medical staff in the case of an overdose. All naloxone programs are 
licensed by the NYSDOH and abide by the regulatory framework set out by the law. This 
bill was unanimously passed in the House and Senate and signed into law by the 
Republican Governor George Pataki. The conservative Medical Society of the State of New 
York also supported it.20 The bipartisan acceptance of overdose prevention and naloxone 
distribution represents a remarkable political outcome for advocates of harm reduction, 
considering how controversial syringe exchange had been when it had been first attempted 
in the mid 1980s. Unlike syringe exchange, access to naloxone did not take the form of a 
waiver or similar temporary, exceptional measure. Against the backdrop of a worsening 
opiate epidemic, activists, public health workers and politicians alike applauded naloxone’s 
authorization.21 
 
Both syringe exchange and community-based naloxone distribution are public health 
interventions that fall under the broad umbrella of harm reduction, but naloxone has 
tracked a different political trajectory. As FR, a prescribing physician and early naloxone 
supporter, noted: 
FR: This is a whole different cup of tea than needle exchange. We kind of 
equate them as movements in harm reduction, but my experience nationally 
and internationally is that overdose is much easier to get people behind than 
syringe exchange. 
 
Overdose prevention programs have proven to be much more popular than harm reduction 
policies like syringe exchange, as evidenced by the uncontroversial passage of the 2006 bill 
in New York. Part of the reason for this is that it had the public support of the DOHMH 
who began collecting data on drug overdose in 2005. And the HRC and the NYSDOH used 
data from New York’s naloxone trials, including SKOOP, to pave the way with groups like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Markham Piper et al., op. cit.: 294 
21 Maia Szalavitz, “The Shot That Saves,” New York Times, 21 August, 2005. 
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law enforcement and traditional drug treatment providers normally resistant to any change 
perceived as enabling drug use. FR, a physician and harm reduction activist, described to 
me the work done by the DOHMH and NYSDOH: 
FR: So we had been to all these different agencies. So the bill passes 
unanimously, the governor starts calling these places saying, "Should we sign 
this bill?" So it really wasn't very hard once whatever had happened behind 
the scenes happened. Once it was passed, as I say, it was unanimous in the 
house and the assembly.  
 
FR: The Department of Health does not necessarily work with any agency to 
push anything through, on paper. But yeah, they were, especially under the 
Pataki Administration. There were cooperative things going on. But it's kind 
of like the [New York State] Department of Health truly saw it was time to 
do it, I think. And I think that's a lot of what happened to change the 
legislation to something doable—and then we had a few problems with it. But 
given prescription regulations, I think it's about as good as it could have been 
then.  
 
Given the apparent risks and the break with established policy, the unanimous passage of 
the bill allowing for naloxone in New York was an impressive victory. 
 
Though widely celebrated, the bill’s unanimous passage did not necessarily represent the 
success of grassroots harm reduction at influencing state law. Daliah Heller, who had been 
the executive director of Citiwide Harm Reduction before becoming an assistant 
commissioner at the DOHMH was instrumental in launching New York City’s naloxone 
distribution program. She reflected on the way in which change in the law came about: 
DH: It wasn’t a program. It’s the law that changed... Nobody told us in the 
city that that law was happening. So what happened is San Francisco started 
doing it, a staff member from Citiwide, a staff member from Lower East Side 
[Harm Reduction] and the guy John who runs Streetwork Project wanted to 
try to get it going in New York, as a demonstration. So they developed 
everything and we put in for a little Tides grant, I got [DOHMH 
Commissioner Tom] Frieden to give us a letter of support, and we got it, we 
got the money... Little did we know, the state drafted up a bill, made 
something up... So the bill passed, but it was kind of without us, any input 
from the ground of what would meaningfully work and what could be done. 
Anyway, the bill passed in ’06... Then I found out that Frieden had done a 
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huge legal analysis like two years before I got there with the DOH lawyers, 
trying to figure out how could we do this…  
 
According to Heller, the shape the law ultimately took reflected the priorities of 
bureaucrats and program officers, without “input from the ground.” Public health agencies 
pursued a version of the law that was possible to achieve, if not seen by everyone as the 
version most desirable.  
 
Nevertheless, naloxone’s widespread support reflects the extent to which the public health 
bureaucracy had been successful in presenting the intervention as an apolitical first-aid 
measure. The connections to syringe exchange and the language of harm reduction were 
downplayed in favor of narratives about family tragedy and medical evidence.22 And some 
supporters, like DOHMH employee ON, believe that naloxone’s ready acceptance also 
reflects the changing demographics of overdose.  
ON: I think the whole naloxone shift has to do with because it's opiate 
analgesics, and that's a different population. And so it's the middle class 
white population that's affected by it now, and it's not injecting drug users. 
They are considered people of color, the junkies, and so I think that that's 
part of what's motivating this. But so what?  You use that. You know, it's all 
sad. But if it's going to move things forward, everyone is going to benefit from 
it. And that's how I look at it, but I'm aware that that's why - if we were 
talking about this in the context of only heroin, this wouldn't move forward. 
 
Unlike syringe exchange, which is still to a large extent a marginal public health 
intervention targeting a marginalized population, naloxone has moved into the 
mainstream. It is a harm reduction intervention for the white, rural, and suburban 
masses.23 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Stories like “Mom’s Last Resort: Opiate Antidote Saves Addicts’ Lives” which appeared on NBC 
News on 15 March 2012 humanized the overdose epidemic by focusing on the loved ones of addicts. 
23 David Goodman and Michael Wilson, “Heroin’s New Hometown: On Staten Island, Rising Tide of 
Heroin Takes Hold,” New York Times, 4 May, 2014. 
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Even after the NYSDOH cleared the way, other legal changes were necessary to encourage 
users to adopt naloxone. It is important that emergency medical services be called after 
administering the drug to someone experiencing an overdose, as the overdoser is still at 
risk of lapsing back into overdose, or may experience other symptoms associated with 
opiate withdrawal. Many drug users as well as their friends and family fear dialing 911 as 
summoning emergency responders can mean police involvement, which could lead to the 
arrest of the overdoser or the bystanders on drugs charges. 24  The Good Samaritan law was 
passed in 2011 to address this. “The law encourages people to call 911 immediately during 
an overdose situation by offering a limited shield from charge and prosecution of drug and 
alcohol possession for a victim or witness who seeks medical help during a drug or alcohol 
overdose.”25 As one naloxone prescriber told me,  
FR: What to tell people who are in New York State who are afraid to call 911 
cause they might have a warrant out for their arrest. You know, fear of police 
arrest—we know that’s the biggest barrier to effectively responding to 
overdose. 
 
The Good Samaritan law was designed to complement the existing public health statute 
authorizing naloxone distribution as it was observed that many for whom naloxone could 
potentially be a life saver were still nevertheless ambivalent about receiving the training 
and carrying the kit.  
 
Emergency call immunity laws can be a political challenge. Immunizing the possession of 
drugs, even the small quantities usually in question in a Good Samaritan situation, 
derogates from a “zero-tolerance” approach to drug control. 26  New York State had 
maintained an official policy reinforcing abstinence throughout the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 On the fear of outstanding warrants, see Alice Goffman, On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American 
City (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2014). 
25 DPA, “Implementing New York’s 911 Good Samaritan Law.” 
26 Beletsky et al., op. cit.: 12 
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1980s and 1990s. This was reflected in its tough-on-crime mandatory sentencing laws 
which locked away increasing numbers of people on drug-related charges27 and through the 
Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services (OASAS), the state agency responsible for 
drug treatment and methadone programs. OASAS had been critical of syringe exchange 
and generally resistant to adopting the language and philosophy of harm reduction. As a 
result syringe exchange did not become a regularized part of drug treatment in the state. 
But unlike its cool reception of syringe exchange, OASAS supported the Good Samaritan 
Law, and has been favorable to overdose prevention measures more generally.  
In January 2012 the Drug Policy Alliance hosted a meeting on the implementation of the 
Good Samaritan Law. During the meeting, a DPA representative reported that they had 
received very positive feedback on the law from OASAS. As reported in my fieldnotes: 
GE reporting to the group on his meeting with OASAS about the Good 
Samaritan Law. He describes OASAS as more “traditional,” but that in their 
last meeting there was some recognition that harm reduction should be part 
of the spectrum of treatment. GE says that DPA was encouraged to hear this, 
and that OASAS even referenced VOCAL’s methadone report in their 
meeting. GE says that OASAS are ready to work with groups to implement 
the law and are looking for direction from stakeholders. GE described OASAS 
as “very gung ho” and supportive of the Good Samaritan Law. “We have buy-
in from OASAS, even though they haven’t historically been part of harm 
reduction.” He continued by saying that he has never seen such an open 
dialogue with OASAS. They even sent out a letter to all their treatment and 
methadone programs encouraging them to become naloxone providers. 
 
OASAS’s ready acceptance of naloxone represents the extent to which naloxone has come to 
be seen as an important tool in the treatment of drug users. It also signals a broader shift 
within this “traditional” agency, long a stalwart of treatment programs that prioritize 
abstinence. OASAS’ embrace of naloxone is evidence of acceptance that people in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ernest Drucker, "Population Impact of Mass Incarceration Under New York's Rockefeller Drug 
Laws: An Analysis of Years of Life Lost," Journal of Urban Health Bulletin of the New York 
Academy of Medicine 79.3 (2002): 434-435. 
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traditional, abstinence-based treatment programs and methadone programs often continue 
to use illicit drugs, and that continuing to deny this reality puts the lives of the people it 
purports to serve at risk. The hope of many in the harm reduction world is that the dialogue 
made possible by overdose prevention will lead to the further development of strategies that 
decenter the necessity of abstinence in favor of addressing broader issues of drug user 
health. 
 
IV. Naloxone and medical authority 
 
Naloxone depends upon and requires a new relationship between drug users and medical 
authorities. The peer-to-peer administration model decenters the primacy of the physician 
in the provision of life-saving care. Physicians, reluctant to get involved with naloxone 
distribution because of anti-user bias as well as concerns over liability, were largely 
uninvolved with naloxone distribution, at least initially. This meant that public health 
departments and community organizations took the lead, shaping the program to avoid 
contact with a medical provider as much as possible. New ways of managing liability, 
responsibility and prescriptive authority had to be developed—and are still evolving. 
 
The prescription of regulated drugs is structured by a particular set of social and 
institutional relationships. Empowered by the state and their own professional 
organizations, physicians act as the gatekeeper and prescribing authority for their patients. 
Typically, to issue a prescription, physicians must abide by the ordinary standard of care. 
In general, this requires being in the same place at the same time as their patient. The 
physician will conduct an examination, collect a medical history, and make a determination 
of necessity and suitability based on his or her clinical knowledge and training. In return 
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for their monopoly on medical authority, physicians are liable for wrongful prescriptions or 
misdiagnosis and must be insured against these outcomes. The structure of legal and 
ethical authority here is relatively settled and straightforward.  
 
The innovation is that naloxone sidesteps the medical authority of the physician. The 
intention is that the overdose reversal drug be administered within a peer-to-peer context, 
outside of a clinical environment. And it is not intended to be used on the person for whom 
the prescription is written. Instead, naloxone is to be administered by the prescription-
holder on a third party whose identity has not been pre-determined by the prescribing 
authority and about whom no prior knowledge is available. The prescription-holder might 
have a longstanding relationship with the person to whom they administer naloxone, where 
medical history, risk and consent could conceivably have been discussed—or they might be 
complete strangers where none of these issues have been addressed. Questions of risk, 
consent and responsibility are unsettled. And because an element of anonymity is central to 
naloxone as a strategy, these questions might have to remain unsettled.  
 
The peer-to-peer deployment of naloxone—as opposed to its usage in emergency medical 
contexts—requires a wholesale, in some ways radical reordering of medical authority. This 
presented a problem to New York’s first naloxone programs. Daliah Heller explained: 
DH: The problem was we couldn’t get, I mean Streetworks and Lower East 
Side found a psychiatrist who was willing to prescribe, actually a doctor who 
happened to be a psychiatrist. We couldn’t get a doctor to come to the South 
Bronx in the evenings. That doctor wouldn’t and we couldn’t get anyone, we 
just couldn’t get any doctors to come and prescribe. And that was a problem 
cause it was sort of like taking a chance on your license cause you were 
prescribing something, you know, you were prescribing something to use on 
somebody else so it was a third party administration. 
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For those working to bring naloxone to New York, the need to prescribe a drug to an 
anonymous user was a major obstacle that raised questions about liability and licensing. 
According to analysts of naloxone’s legal feasibility: 
In strict legal terms, a prescription is only appropriate if it is issued to a 
patient for the patient’s own medical need. A lay saver who is not a drug user 
but is trained to help others at risk of overdose, strictly speaking, has no 
personal medical need for the drug. Moreover, providing naloxone under 
those terms would amount to deputizing the lay person as a medical 
practitioner, which contravenes the basic idea of licensure and criminal laws 
that prohibit the unlicensed practice of medicine.28 
 
Deputizing lay persons as medical practitioners is no simple matter. It requires the 
development of new legal and regulatory doctrines, and creates potential conflicts with 
those who have a stake in maintaining the status of medical licensure. 
 
The forward deployment of medical authority is not completely unknown. Established 
medical protocols set some precedents for non-medical personnel to administer drugs to 
bystanders. According to addiction researchers: 
Prescription of antidotes for peer administration in emergency situations has 
become routine medical practice in certain situations. Diabetic patients are 
prescribed glucagon and instructed to educate their family and friends 
regarding its use in reversing insulin shock. Persons hypersensitive to insect 
stings are prescribed equipment for emergency administration of epinephrine 
in case of anaphylaxis. Both of these examples involve medications that have 
far greater potential for adverse reactions than does naloxone.29 
 
But epinephrine or glucagon are prescribed to their ultimate recipients, even if they may be 
administered by a third party. In the case of naloxone, the drug is prescribed to the 
intended administrator while the ultimate recipient remains unknown to the prescribing 
authority.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Beletsky et al., op. cit.: 17 – 18. 
29 Maxwell et al., op. cit.: 90. 
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The closest analogue to this distribution model is the Expedited Partner Therapy (EPT) 
used to treat chlamydia or gonorrhea. Medication is given to the partners of those who test 
positive for the diseases, even though they have not been examined by a doctor.30 Like 
naloxone, this is a relatively new practice, first proposed by the CDC in 2005, and is not 
uniformly available across the country. Also like naloxone, EPT has been expanding rapidly 
despite uncertainties among medical providers about its legal status. Where EPT and 
naloxone differ, however, is that unlike EPT which simply requires one partner to give oral 
antibiotics to another, naloxone requires specialized equipment and complicated 
administration in stressful, potentially deadly situations.  
 
Different pilot studies used different approaches to satisfy legal requirements about the 
prescription and administration of drugs. For example, researchers who conducted studies 
in Chicago took this approach: 
A physician may prescribe medication only within the confines of a physician/ 
patient relationship. Establishment of a legal physician/ patient relationship 
is accomplished in our program by meeting three requirements: (1) formation 
of a clinical chart for each participant; (2) documentation within the chart 
that the participant has been informed of the risks, benefits, alternatives, 
and proper use of the treatment; and (3) evidence of the physician’s good 
faith.31 
 
In this case, the researchers still assumed some sort of stability in relationships between 
medical personnel and drug users. Other studies, including that of Seal et al., did not make 
that assumption: “Most of the overdose interventions occurred in non-study participants, 
confirming that IDUs are willing to intervene to resuscitate a peer in the event of overdose. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ryan Cramer, et al., “The Legal Aspects of Expedited Partner Therapy Practice: Do State Laws 
and Policies Really Matter?” Sexually Transmitted Diseases 40.8 (2013): 657. 
31 Maxwell et al., op. cit.: 92 – 93. 
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These results suggest that limiting naloxone training and distribution to IDUs with stable 
injection partners may not be necessary.”32 
 
By disconnecting the administration of a drug from the medical establishment’s traditional 
monopoly over prescribing authority, naloxone almost inevitably created a conflict between 
its supporters and doctors. Many harm reduction advocates see doctors as some of the 
biggest obstacles to wider usage of overdose reversal drugs. As naloxone trainer NK 
explained to me: 
NK: One of the big barriers is I think, one of the reasons I've been really into 
doing it is because it sort of breaks the professional barriers, and I think 
that's why in some ways a lot of the resistance is coming from MDs, because 
you are usurping their power. They like being the gatekeepers for control of 
this stuff.  
 
Part of what is at stake in the question of naloxone is a struggle over authority and control. 
NK: Which is a part of why doctors are like, the stigma against drug users by 
doctors is really bad because that's their prerogative to give people drugs and 
if you are doing that yourself, it's like you are usurping their power.  
 
The flipside to doctor’s control was that undercutting their authority could be seen as 
expanding the autonomy of their would-be patients. RN, a long time harm reduction 
activist, put it this way: 
RN: It [naloxone programs] is recognizing that you need to put tools in the 
hands of drug users so they can have autonomy over their drug use. 
 
This conflict over the gatekeeping function of medical decision-making is part of the 
broader politics of harm reduction. But because of questions surrounding prescribing 
authority specifically, it is particularly acute regarding naloxone. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Seal et al., op. cit.: 309. 
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The administration of naloxone can occur in any number of organizational contexts. As a 
harm reduction strategy, it is accompanied by a new bureaucratic and practical distance 
between the prescribing medical authority and the drug’s ultimate recipient. Naloxone’s 
advocates in New York and elsewhere moved towards the deployment of “standing orders” 
to work around the medical monopoly on legitimate drug distribution. There is still in 
principle a line of authority connecting legally empowered doctors with those who receive 
naloxone. But rather than a traditional prescription, it more resembles a blank check. 
FR: The last two years the change in law allows for standing orders. There 
are non-person-specific orders, and you can designate a lay person to train 
and distribute naloxone. 
 
These designatees can be anyone: a non-medically-trained social agency staff member, a 
drug user, a community member.  They are given the authority to distribute naloxone to 
people within their communities.  
FR: Okay, so standing orders is this idea that a doctor or somebody with 
prescribing privileges could deputize… my understanding of it is it somehow 
deputizes people who are under the supervision of a doctor or a nurse 
practitioner, somebody with prescribing abilities, to administer or prescribe 
the medication when they are not there. 
 
Standing orders maintain the basic status quo regarding the legal power to prescribe drugs, 
while allowing, practically speaking, for the redistribution of that power. In practice, once 
designated to train and distribute naloxone, laypersons freely circulate naloxone kits and 
the knowledge about their proper use. The standing orders ultimately become meaningless 
in terms of regulating the distribution and use of the drug. Naloxone programs in this sense 
do indeed engage in a form of deputizing, but rather than sharing the monopoly over access 
to regulated drugs with carefully selected laypersons, it dispenses with this monopoly 
altogether and allows anyone to decide on the naloxone’s appropriateness according to need. 
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The prerogatives to decide when and where to prescribe drugs are not the only dimensions 
of medical authority and responsibility that are unsettled by naloxone prescription 
programs. Uncertainty surrounding liability and the ever-present possibility of lawsuits 
was also a major obstacle to getting physicians involved. Since the early twentieth century’s 
hysteria over “dope doctors,” physicians have been wary of accepting active drug users as 
patients.33 This wariness was even stronger in the case of a relatively non-lucrative, 
experimental program where established norms surrounding responsibility did not apply. 
 
In order to address this wariness, New York State and other jurisdictions passed laws to 
exempt naloxone prescribers from medical liability. Researchers noted, “Medical liability is 
another concern voiced by some physicians”34 in relation to their involvement in wider 
naloxone distribution. FR, a physician who was involved in the development of naloxone 
told me: 
FR: The law holds the person administering naloxone harmless. And it holds 
the programs harmless. It doesn’t hold the prescribers harmless, they tried to 
make them harmless but they didn’t make it through the code committee on 
the state level. So liability and malpractice is still somewhat of a disincentive 
to physicians who want to get involved in prescribing naloxone. So liability is 
not decided. Malpractice companies haven’t looked closely at the naloxone 
program. There hasn’t been a test case. 
 
The lack of clarity regarding liability reflects larger questions about naloxone’s legality. 
Naloxone was at the time of its introduction in what numerous informants described as a 
legal “gray area.” One public health worker I spoke with told me that she asked the 
DOHMH legal team about the legality of naloxone at the department. 
GN: And legal said, ‘Well, it's not entirely legal, but it's not entirely illegal.’ 
So it was kind of this vague answer that we got back. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (Expanded Edition) (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
34 Maxwell et al., op. cit.: 93. 
 129	  
The uncertain legality of peer administered naloxone distribution was and continues to be 
the most important barrier to wider participation by physicians, even though legislation 
has been passed shielding them as much as is possible from liability.  
 
My respondents involved in naloxone distribution were unanimous in asserting that the 
risk of injury or harmful side effects of naloxone were minimal, possibly even non-existent. 
Yet many doctors remain worried. “Because health professionals have to be involved, these 
programs must deal with practitioner concerns about malpractice liability, which can be 
powerful even when not well-founded in fact.”35 As researchers note, “Anxiety can be 
minimized by the extremely low risk/benefit ratio for naloxone, as well as by recognizing 
the low potential for litigation in this patient population.”36 But the experimental, pilot 
nature of naloxone programs so far means that this has not been firmly established. 
 
Tellingly, the unresolved questions about liability, which can be decisive for other medical 
treatments, have not been insurmountable obstacles for naloxone. The question of liability 
has been absorbed into the logic of emergency. The assumption is that anyone who needs 
naloxone would otherwise die; hence, to a greater extent than in most other areas of 
medicine, anything goes. As FR said, “The only thing that could go horribly wrong is that 
the person dies anyway.” 
 
As will be explained below, the idea of emergency structures the politics of naloxone more 
generally. Here it means that issues surrounding liability have been reduced or relocated—
a stance that is almost unprecedented in American medical policy. It enables the naloxone 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Beletskly et al., op. cit.: 17 – 18. 
36 Maxwell et al., op. cit.: 93. 
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programs to proceed, but the issue cuts both ways. On the one hand, naloxone programs 
would likely not exist without laws removing medical liability from doctors, program 
staffers and those who administer naloxone on others. On the other hand, the lack of 
liability leaves the person on whom naloxone has been administered without any legal 
recourse. No one is held liable, but at the same time, no one—with the possible exception of 
the overdosing user him- or herself—is held responsible for the outcome. 
 
A redeployment of medical authority, liability and risk is an inherent part of naloxone 
programs. While pharmaceutical companies, harm reduction clinics and prescribing doctors 
are necessary for any naloxone program, in their traditional form they are not sufficient. 
New lines of authority had to be established. This is the emerging edge of public health 
practice: the redeployment of expertise and the transformation of medical risk and peer-to-
peer drug delivery. In line with the undercutting of the traditional structure of medical 
authority, naloxone strategies operate with a distinctly decentralized social logic. 
 
V. The social logic of naloxone 
 
As a harm reduction strategy, what can be called the social logic of naloxone is as important 
as its chemical properties. As the history detailed above indicates, naloxone was in 
production for decades before it came to be used as a harm reduction tool. Its deployment by 
drug users, as opposed to medics, makes use of a decentralized, peer-to-peer logic which can 
be seen both in the drug’s patterns of distribution and use as well as in the trainings and 
tacit knowledge upon which this use depends. 
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The notion of a peer-based, networked harm reduction strategy emerged from addiction 
researchers’ analysis of the structure of drug use itself. It had long been known that people 
use narcotics within a social matrix.37 Overdose, too, follows a social pattern. It is an issue 
that affects drug users collectively but unevenly. As addiction researchers studying a 
naloxone distribution program in Pittsburg noted: 
Our finding that 3.4% of program participants returned for refills 10 to 24 
times provides a glimpse into the social structure that is important to 
overdose prevention and health among the study population. This might 
point to the existence of ‘hubs’ or ‘nodes’ of experience and knowledge within 
drug-using communities which appear to be recognized by users and their 
peers.38 
 
The idea that there are “hubs of experience and knowledge” became central to naloxone as a 
strategy. Its proponents recognized that the people who occupy these nodal points in user 
social networks could serve as what they term “lay health care educators” and “indigenous 
public health workers” who could “help reach a larger number of users who may not be seen 
by mainstream and community-based services.”39 The idea of indigenous public health 
workers exemplifies the forward deployment of neoliberal strategies in health policy. They 
extend the reach of the public health system into previously impenetrable social domains. 
In doing so, they amplify the effectiveness of state policy but also obscure its presence. The 
hope was that “[o]nce naloxone rescue kits are distributed into the community to people 
trained in overdose prevention, they are further disseminated through social networks to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This point is made by an entire body of literature stemming from Howard Becker’s “Becoming a 
Marihuana User.” See Howard S. Becker, "Becoming a Marihuana User," American Journal of 
Sociology (1953): 235-242; Jock Young,The Drugtakers: The Social Meaning of Drug Use (London, 
UK: MacGibbon and Kee, 1971); Carl Latkin, et al., "Using Social Network Analysis to Study 
Patterns of Drug Use Among Urban Drug Users at High Risk for HIV/AIDS," Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence 38.1 (1995): 1-9. 
38 Alex S. Bennett, et al., “Characteristics of an Overdose Prevention, Response, and Naloxone 
Distribution Program in Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,” Journal of Urban Health: 
Bulletin of New York Academy of Medicine 88.6 (2011): 1020 – 1030. 
39 Ibid. 
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people who were not trained directly by the distribution programs.40 The very structure of 
user networks, which has historically been seen as an impediment to abstinence-oriented 
drug treatment, might become a tool to amplify the effectiveness of public health 
interventions. 
 
The notion of using these networks for the purposes of reducing harm represents a 
pragmatic departure from traditional politics of addiction by recognizing that sociability is 
an important dimension of drug use. From the “drug farms” of the early twentieth century41 
to the residential treatment facilities of today that cut off all contact with the outside world, 
drug treatment has relied on the need for dependent users to sever ties with the social 
world of their drug use. Naloxone distribution, rooted in the harm reduction philosophy, 
follows a different social logic. It sees the inherently social nature of drug use not as a 
hindrance to treatment but as a means to it. Speaking to a seminar room full of staff 
members from New York area social service providers and drug treatment programs, a 
naloxone trainer and prescriber described a situation with which many present were very 
familiar: 
HB: It’s a terrible irony that people go to detox to get clean, and they vow and 
are certain that they’re going to stay away from people, places and things. 
And as so many of you here know, they get out and what, after all, is there 
for them on the day they get out or the day after except those old things. And 
so relapse rates are 50% - 80% or so of these people. And they are at 
tremendous risk of overdose during that period.  
 
New York’s naloxone program designers decided that, rather than requiring users to vow to 
stay away from familiar people, places, and things, they should use these social contexts as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Maya Doe-Simkins, et al., “Overdose Rescues by Trained and Untrained Participants and Change 
in Opioid Use Among Substance-Using Participants in Overdose Education and Naloxone 
Distribution Programs: A Retrospective Cohort Study,” BMC Public Health 14 (2014): 297. 
41 Caroline Jean Acker, “The Early Years of the PHS Narcotic Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky,” 
Public Health Reports 112.3 (1997): 245 – 247. 
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a vehicle for providing care. Naloxone distribution is thus a policy innovation that deals 
with the actual practices and habits of drug users as they are, not as they should be.  
 
The question for naloxone supporters was precisely how to incorporate the social structure 
of drug use into overdose prevention. In 2001 the San Francisco Department of Public 
Health sponsored a pilot research study that included opiate education and naloxone 
prescription, using as a model the Chicago program.42 Anticipating political opposition, the 
pilot study initially involved pairs of drug users who were given four interactive training 
sessions of two hours each.43 The intention was that trained pairs would each receive a 
prescription and administer naloxone on one another, should the need arise. But it soon 
became evident that reality did not conform to this expectation, as pairs split up or used 
drugs with other people not trained in overdose reversal, and for whom naloxone had 
neither been prescribed nor administration consented to prior to overdose.  
 
Eventually, the pilot programs were taken by the researchers to have demonstrated that 
naloxone would not remain within the confines of consistent, long-term relationships 
between physicians, prescription-holders and those to whom naloxone is administered. In 
place of matched pairs, program designers moved to a more anonymous and decentralized 
model. FR described to me how even before the law was changed allowing third party 
administration, prescribing practices reflected the fact that it was impossible to keep 
naloxone within pre-determined pairs of users.  
FR: We started prescribing sort of very make believe in pairs. I didn't 
actually figure out who the pairs were. I mean, I may have in the first day or 
two, but after that it was just sort of make believe. So it was no secret that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Karl A. Sporer and Alex H. Kral, "Prescription Naloxone: A Novel Approach to Heroin Overdose 
Prevention," Annals of Emergency Medicine 49.2 (2007): 175. 
43 Seal et al., op. cit.: 304. 
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we were doing it. I may have sort of said that I was doing it in pairs, I don't 
remember, but we really weren't. So fortunately - so in March we started 
doing that, and the overdose bill passed in August of that year, and took 
effect April 1st, 2006. 
 
Eventually, those involved with naloxone prescription determined that the pair model was 
impractical. Drug use and overdose occur in far more complex social networks. In place of 
pairs, it was acknowledged that users would bring the tools and the knowledge of overdose 
reversal into their wider spaces and domains, and use it on anyone they witnessed 
experiencing an overdose. This became a central tenet of naloxone strategies: naloxone 
would spread along the vectors of overdose risk, freely circulating within user social 
networks, which were now seen as structures to be exploited rather than barriers to be 
overcome. And as with syringe exchange, the law was changed post-hoc to reflect already 
existing practice. 
 
Along with the naloxone kit, knowledge of naloxone’s proper application had to be 
distributed along peer networks as well. The training session is central to naloxone as a 
harm reduction strategy. Training sessions are a way to create the group of “indigenous 
public health workers” that are to carry out overdose prevention. It is only by training users 
to administer naloxone to one another that its decentralized logic is possible, as it allows 
overdose prevention to take place detached from medical settings and personnel. 
 
Training sessions take many different forms and have evolved over time to reflect not only 
pedagogical requirements but also the needs and experiences of those being trained. Early 
training sessions had a quality of direct action. At times they even occurred out in the 
street, in an unstructured, improvisatory manner. EL, a board member at HRev, described 
one such early training session: 
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EL: Me and Peter, through HRev, I wasn’t on the board yet, Roberta and 
some other people, we went to 125th and Lexington. Middle of the street. We 
had people there before hand, making announcements. We had about 65 
fucking drug users form a big circle around me and Roberta. And I did the 
overdose training. I yelled out real loud, Roberta translated into Spanish, 
Peter just sat there and wrote ‘scripts. We did 65 prescriptions in less than 
an hour and a half. 
 
As naloxone and harm reduction in general became more institutionalized in New York, 
training tended to become more regularized. Training sessions are a legal requirement 
under the law, which lays out specifications for certain material that must be covered. And 
though programs vary from one location to another, a core curriculum has been developed 
with the input of the HRC and includes: 
• Basic opioid neurophysiology 
• Pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics of commonly used opiates 
• Pharmacology and pharmacokinetics of naloxone and other opiate 
antagonists 
• Risk factors and prevention techniques for opiate overdose 
• Signs and symptoms for the early recognition of opiate overdose 
• Prevention of choking and aspiration in the unconscious patient 
• Techniques of rescue breathing 
• Routes of administration and dosing guidelines for naloxone 
• Protocols for follow-up care.44  
 
Learning to participate in the naloxone strategy requires mastering a broad amount of 
information. Properly administering naloxone requires knowledge about how to recognize 
that an overdose is occurring; how to manoeuver an unresponsive body into the recovery 
position in order reduce the risk of choking and to optimize airflow; how to perform rescue 
breathing; whether or not naloxone is even appropriate given the specific narcotics that 
have been ingested, a determination that requires knowledge about drug interactions and 
the social dynamics of drug using situations; how to correctly use syringes and other 
medical paraphernalia in a highly time-sensitive, life-and-death situation; and how to 
respond to possibly violent people experiencing drug withdrawal symptoms. Few public 	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health initiatives place this level of responsibility in the hands of non-specialists, and 
especially non-specialists who are as stigmatized and untrusted as intravenous drug users. 
But far from treating users as passive objects of policy intervention, naloxone draws on the 
relatively high degree of medical knowledge that exists, in its own distinct forms, within 
the cultures of drug user networks. As NK, a clinical staffer told me, “I mean there's a 
cultural thing. I think there's like, people who have experience with needles are fine with 
it.” 
 
One of the most important innovations of naloxone programs is that they came to build 
upon the specific forms of expertise that many users develop on their own. It was found that 
not only were drug users able to learn the skills necessary to properly administer 
naloxone,45 but that “people trained in overdose recognition and naloxone administration 
were comparable to medical experts in identifying situations in which an opioid overdose 
was occurring and when naloxone should be administered.”46 Naloxone strategies not only 
draw on forms of ‘street-level’ expertise; they also merge this with more formal medical 
knowledge to create a progressively better informed cadre of indigenous public health 
workers. 
 
Though the training curriculum listed above may seem intimidating to the uninitiated, once 
translated out of medical jargon, the content actually covers topics about which drug users 
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tend to have significant practical knowledge. An excerpt from my fieldnotes describes a 
typical meeting of an overdose prevention training group at SoBroHR.  
The overdose prevention training took place on a Saturday afternoon in April. 
It was led by NK, a physician’s assistant under the employ of UserUnion who 
was able to prescribe naloxone kits under Dr. FR’s license. Every other 
Saturday, NK would make the trip up to the Bronx to run this training and 
write scripts for any who wanted.  
 
The group began shortly after 2pm, and was held in the windowless ground 
floor group room. In the minutes leading up to the start, participants milled 
around the room before taking their seats around the table. There were 15 
participants in attendance, 12 men and 3 women. Many of the participants I 
had seen before and knew to be agency ‘regulars’.  
 
NK began the training by asking people to call out the names of different 
types of opiates. What followed was a long and detailed list of the many forms 
opioids can take, including and alphabet soup of pharmaceutical brand 
names, and their street appellations. 
NK: So what are the different kinds of opiates? 
Crowd calls out long list of different forms of opiates, including heroin, 
methadone, oxycodone, hydrocodone, morphine, codeine, Vicodin, Percocet, 
and lesser known variants such as Xolox, Dilaudid, Fentanyl, Demerol, 
among others. 
Male Participant: Opioids is made to work on the same receptors as the 
opiates. 
NK: Right, right. Besides opiates, there’s completely synthetic medicines, like 
Fentanyl is one, methadone is one, those are all made in the laboratory. 
MP: Suboxone is an opiod.  
NK: Right, right. Opioids are opiates, so they’re both natural opiates, from 
the opium poppy, and synthetic ones. 
Female Participant: Mmmhm. 
MP: I know medicine, man, I know medicine. 
NK: So again, those are the drugs that Naloxone works on. It doesn’t work 
on, in particular, the benzos, the benzodiazepines. So what are some of those?  
Group: Xanax, Klonopin, Librium, Ativan… 
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FP: What about Catapres? 
NK: No, Catapres is not a benzo, but it also doesn’t work with this. It’s 
something that you could potentially overdose on.  
MP: It’s not a benzo, but it works like one, boy. You take a Catapres with 
some dope or whatever… 
MP: It’s for high blood pressure. 
This excerpt demonstrates how training sessions build upon users’ experiential knowledge. 
The attendees have quite a deep level of knowledge about opiates already—they know the 
difference between opiates and opioids, they can identify benzodiazepines, and they have a 
basic understanding of the biochemical differences between different classes of drugs and 
their effects on the body.47 The trainer does not emphasize any status difference between 
himself and the attendees. Nor is he patronizing or condescending towards them. The 
training session has an overall atmosphere of peer education. The goal is to draw upon the 
knowledge that these assembled users have acquired in the course of their lives and to 
channel it towards harm reducing ends. 
 
Leveraging users’ experiential knowledge is important as a starting point from which to 
discuss the action of actually administering naloxone. The fieldnote excerpt below is 
reproduced at length to give the reader a sense of not only the tone of naloxone training, 
but also the technical nature of the task indigenous public health workers are asked to 
perform.  
NK, the trainer: So if you’re going to give them an intramuscular dose, you’ve 
got two bottles like this, and two syringes. One syringe for each bottle. You 
only have to use the syringe once. You know, you never want to use a syringe 
more than once, if you can avoid it. And if you do, you should clean them out. 
But you’ve got two here, just so you don’t have to worry about that.  
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Male Participant: You can use that to…? [crowd laughs] 
NK: Um, you could, it’s a big needle. This is a pretty big gauge needle. 
MP: That’s because it’s big like that so it could go through clothes, and stuff 
like that.  
NK: This is, you’re not looking for a vein. It’s intramuscular. 
MP: Yeah, it’s intramuscular but it’s made to be able to go through clothes.  
NK: You don’t even have to do that. You can go through clothes, but just 
before, like when you open up the needle, the points come off so make sure 
it’s on tightly. 
MP: You can hit the leg or no? 
NK: You can hit the leg. The next step… these are single dose vials, so use 
the whole bottle, you don’t have to worry about measuring. Use the whole 
bottle. And there’s not very much in here. It’s 1 CC, so the bottle looks like 
it’s almost empty, don’t be alarmed. You just want to get everything that’s in 
bottle into the syringe. And to help you do that, it helps to put some air into 
the bottle first. So open up your syringe, get a CC of air into there. And then, 
the bottles when they’re new, they have a little orange top on them. Pull the 
top off, and then there’s a little rubber stopper. Just put the needle right 
through the stopper, just so you can see the point sticking out at the top. 
Then we can push the air in, the pressure will start to push it out by itself. If 
the needle’s too high, you’ll start to get air, so if you’re getting air and there’s 
still liquid left in the bottle, push the air back out, pull the needle down so it’s 
under the surface, just so you can see the tip sticking out, and then pull the 
rest in. Just get as much in as you can, every drop. And then any air left in 
the needle, push it out. And then you’re ready to go. So there should be about 
this much liquid. If there’s a couple bubbles in that it doesn’t matter cause 
again, we’re not going for veins. Intramuscular injection.  So you want to go 
in the [MP: shoulder] shoulder, or in [MP: the thighs] right, the thighs. It’s 
better to go too deep than too shallow. Cause it’s a big needle and you want to 
get it into the muscle.  
MP: What about the butt cheek? 
NK: Not the butt cheek. Don’t go in the butt. One, that’s where the most fat 
is.  
MP: Oh yeah, that’s right. 
NK: And you want to go under the fat, into the muscle. So you got a guy with 
a lot of body fat, don’t be afraid to go deep. Cause you want to get underneath 
the fat. The muscle has all the circulation.  
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MP: What happens if the person is thin? 
NK: Thin? It’s not going to go that far, if you go too far you’re going to hit 
bone. Can’t go further than bone. You want to go straight in. Straight in. 
Cause that’ll get you to the muscle the quickest. If they’re skinny, it’s not 
going to go all the way. You can actually kind of feel cause your muscles are 
surrounded by kind of a thick membrane, so you might as you go in, you 
might feel it resist a little bit and then pop through. Then you know you’re in 
the muscle. You want to go in straight, don’t be afraid to go deep, like a dart. 
Stick it in, push all the medicine in, and then, when you’re done. 
MP: Get ready to run! 
NK: Well, be careful, there may be a little blood leaking out. But that’s good, 
cause that means you got into the muscle where there’s circulation. But you 
don’t want to come into contact with the blood. And the needles have a little 
flap that you pop up and lock over the point. That way, no one can stick 
themselves. If you need to use a second dose, just use another needle. So give 
them a dose, and again you don’t want to go in the butt, aside from being the 
place with the most fat, there’s also a large nerve that you might damage. So 
these two spots [points to the thigh and the shoulder] there’s nothing you can 
really damage, permanently. So. We called 9-1-1, we gave him some breaths, 
we gave him a dose, and you want to give it a couple minutes to work, cause 
sometimes it can take a little bit. So as soon as you give him a dose, go back 
to giving him breaths. Every 5 seconds. Now if you’ve given him 20 or 30 
breaths and nothing happened, then you can go ahead and give him a second 
dose. But give the first one a chance to work cause the more of it you give 
them the sicker they are likely to be when they wake up. So. We’ve gone 
back, we’ve given some breath, we’ve been doing this for a while and 
nothing’s happened so we’re going to give him a second dose. If you have the 
intranasal kit, how that works, you’re going to have 2 boxes like this. Each 
box has, again, a single dose. Inside is going to have 2 pieces like this [points 
to disassembled atomizer] Sometimes this piece might actually be separate, 
so in that case it’ll be… 
MP: And you got two liquid things in the nasal one, cause two of them equals 
on needle shot. 
NK: Well there’s only one vial. There’s one vial that has liquid in it. And 
then, if the nose piece comes separately, in a separate bag outside of the box, 
then it’ll look like this. So if that’s true, just take off the big cap and open up 
the little bag and it just screws right on. But the ones that we have here, we 
already did that part and taped the boxes back up, so you don’t have to do 
that stuff. But what you will have to do is, there’s two caps, actually this one 
disappeared, but there’s a purple or pink cap on the vial that has the 
naloxone, so you pop that off. And there’s a little yellow cap on the end here. 
Pop that off, and then the holes match, they slide together. And as soon as 
you feel that it won’t go anymore, give it a couple twists. This is important. 
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You don’t want to push it, you want to twist it just till it gets tight. And then 
it works just like a syringe. You point it up their nose and put half in each 
nostril. So there’s 2 ccs, you got twice as much liquid in here, so you push half 
in one side, and half on the other. You want them to be on their back, or have 
their head tilted  back or it’ll drip back out. It’s absorbed by the mucus 
membrane on the inside. Same way as you know when you sniff coke or 
heroin, it works the same way. So you squirt that up both sides, and then 
again you go back to giving him breaths to give it a chance to get absorbed in. 
It might take a little bit longer to work. Don’t be alarmed, just keep giving 
him breaths. But again, give him like 20 to 30 breaths and if nothing 
happens, give him a second dose.  
The excerpt illustrates the complexity and difficulty involved with overdose reversal. 
Administering naloxone is a medical procedure that requires a particular level of 
competence. Simply possessing a familiarity with injection is not sufficient to successfully 
administer naloxone. Users must know where and how to inject, how to load 1 CC of 
medication into a syringe or an atomizer, and crucially, how to perform rescue breathing. 
Although naloxone supporters insist to the contrary, this training suggests that there are 
real risks involved—risks to both the person receiving and the person giving the dose of 
naloxone. This highlights some of the challenges of rolling out a public health initiative of 
this type. 
 
The high success rate of naloxone is real, but training sessions clearly present challenges as 
well. One challenge for naloxone program designers is how to deliver the training, the 
content of which can be quite technical, to a group of people whose ability to retain 
information is far from certain. One evaluation of the New York City naloxone program 
admits that: 
Some of the highest risk users may not have more than 10 minutes to spend 
in a training as they are trying to sustain a heroin habit or may not have a 
long attention span because they are under the influence of several drugs.48 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Piper et al., op. cit.: 296. 
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Ten minutes is a far cry from the intensive eight hours of training spaced over four sessions 
that early participants in the San Francisco pilot were given. And indeed, skeptics of 
naloxone distribution questioned whether drug users would be able to retain any training 
and perform such critical tasks under pressure. Another staff member at a harm reduction 
agency told me that “One peer reports that there are people out in the streets of East 
Harlem that really don’t know what to do with the kits,” suggesting that once out of the 
training room, not all people are able to use the tools they have been given. 
 
The training session transcribed above was conducted by a physician’s assistant. With the 
most recent evolution in the law in August 2014, lay people may be designated as naloxone 
trainers and providers. This means a further step towards decentralization and devolution 
of medical authority. The concern held by some is that if access to naloxone is completely 
separated from formal medical oversight, naloxone might be given to people who do not 
know how to properly wield it. One prescribing physician told me she was in favor of 
making naloxone even more decentralized by having peers conduct trainings and do 
distribution, but that in order for this to happen “we need to figure out how to keep 
accurate and appropriate records, and keep the level of training high—even though the 
training around naloxone has been streamlined, so it now takes fifteen minutes and it used 
to take four sessions.” One of the DOHMH harm reduction staffers told me: 
GN: I'm all about getting more naloxone into the hands of more people. I 
mean I think that's the ultimate goal. The problem with naloxone is as it 
stands right now, it's coupled with education. And that education piece is 
really important. So how do you talk to people about like the risks of an 
overdose and how you actually use the naloxone, and if you can just buy it off 
the shelf at a pharmacy, it's not clear that somebody's going to A, use it in the 
right circumstance, B, use it in the right way, C, still call 911, which is 
crucial and that's like the biggest thing that we educate people about: Call 
911, then give the naloxone. Like whatever you do, you still have to call 911 
because it could be other stuff. They could go back into an overdose after the 
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naloxone wears away. There's a lot of reasons why. We could put in on an 
insert maybe. 
 
The worry is that if naloxone were to be decoupled from the trainings and broader social 
strategy, it would lose its harm reduction efficacy. 
 
The social logic of naloxone means that the strategy socializes both benefits and risks. 
Recipients risk possible nerve damage from a misplaced injection, among other possible 
injuries or worse. Administrators risk exposure to blood and other potentially biohazardous 
bodily fluids, and people who “wake up swinging.”  But participants—and not only those 
revived by naloxone—derive a host of benefits as well. Putting on its head the assumption 
about users as essentially anti-social, naloxone strategies expect and encourage drug users 
to act towards one another in a deeply social way. As researchers have determined,  
Many participants involved in an overdose reversal, both as victim and as 
rescuer, report that the education about and availability of naloxone has 
opened new avenues of thought regarding safety and personal health.49  
 
In fact, one naloxone prescriber told me, “Actually, my personal view of it, which is based on 
no data whatsoever, is that the person doing it, the person reviving the other person may be 
the person most likely to go into treatment.”  
 
Some trainees come to strongly identify themselves with the naloxone project. My fieldnotes 
describe one such training session participant: 
Ricardo is a tall Latino man in his mid-thirties. He has short black hair and a 
rigid posture. He strides through SoBroHR and HRP with an air of 
familiarity and authority. He is a regular at several of the local harm 
reduction agencies and is known to staff and many of the participants. He 
attends all of the naloxone training sessions, often volunteering to act out the 
role of overdoser. He wears a naloxone kit around his waist, the blue pouch 
dangling from his belt like a janitor’s key ring. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Maxwell et al., op. cit.: 92. 
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Not all training session attendees adopt these sorts of proudly pro-naloxone subjectivities, 
but Ricardo is not alone in doing so. And many participants see becoming trained in 
naloxone administration and carrying naloxone kits as opportunities to give back. This is a 
powerful and deeply social dimension of the naloxone strategy, one which researchers have 
determined may carry its own benefit: 
The finding that perceived competency (i.e. self-efficacy) in recognizing opioid 
overdose was associated independently with greater knowledge of overdose 
recognition suggests that mechanisms to improve confidence in one’s abilities 
such as attending trainings and practicing newly acquired skills exert an 
influence on knowledge, a key mediator of behavior change…. For drug users, 
there may be a sense of empowerment and other important psychosocial 
benefits gained through receipt of overdose recognition and naloxone 
training.50 
 
Reversing an overdose is a significant experience. Merely being a part of it may have knock-
on effects on the long-term health prospects of participants. 
Interestingly, many participants involved in an overdose reversal, both as 
victim and as rescuer, report that the education about and availability of 
naloxone has opened new avenues of thought regarding safety and personal 
health. Some participants, after being dispensed naloxone, have returned to 
be tested for HIV and HCV, telling us that they are now feeling a greater 
sense of hope that they may live to see a long-term future.51   
 
By adjusting one’s sense of self as an informed, concerned, active moral agent, merely 
attending overdose prevention training sessions, even if one never attempts to reverse an 
overdose event, might have positive effects on users. This is not an accidental side effect but 
a consequence of the inherently social logic of naloxone strategies. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Green et al., op. cit.: 985. 
51 Maxwell et al., op. cit.: 92. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Peer-administered overdose reversal was pioneered by users in a syringe exchange, but it is 
now widespread and being used as a model for other public health strategies. Overdose 
prevention is still evolving. But in a relatively short period of time, and going against the 
grain of traditional medical authority and official prescription practices, naloxone in New 
York has been legalized and is on its way to being fully incorporated into mainstream 
public health. 
 
In its goal of ameliorating some of the terrible consequences of drug use without asking for 
abstinence, its historical origins in user self-help networks, and its appeal to medical and 
social-scientific evidence, naloxone is a prototypical harm reduction policy. It is also 
unthinkable without the changes in the structure of the state and the policy process that 
some have identified with neoliberalism. Naloxone would arguably have been impossible in 
the Fordist-Keynesian era, which tended to pursue policies that were hierarchical, 
centralized, clinical and paternalistic. And in attempting to save drug users’ lives without 
regard to their behavioral changes, naloxone is the antithesis of the war on drugs. Only in a 
larger policy environment that encourages decentralization and the exploitation of social 
networks, where normal procedures can be suspended in the institution of the pilot study 
and where seemingly apolitical appeals to medical science can be sufficient justifications 
could naloxone have become established policy.  
 
In many ways, naloxone is a good example of a neoliberalism policy. Its introduction into 
user networks is a “responsibilization strategy.” Predicated on the existence of an 
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individualized, responsible subject,52 naloxone deputizes the user him- or herself to act as a 
public health agent, moving the techniques of overdose reversal out of the clinic and into 
the spaces and streets of the city. By giving users the tools for their own survival, the state 
is responding to the needs of users who, for various reasons, are unable or unwilling to 
access health services in conventional ways (such as presenting themselves in emergency 
rooms) and is thus fulfilling its obligation to promote life for all citizens. But it 
accomplishes this by drastically extending its reach into the practices and habits of drug 
users, while simultaneously obscuring its presence, turning the object of its medicalized 
gaze into its primary acting agent. 
 
But the standard critique of neoliberal policy almost completely misses the mark when it 
comes to naloxone. In part, this is because the relationships between marginalized groups, 
experts and the state are far more unsettled than this literature tends to acknowledge. 
These unsettled relationships suggest unsettled questions about risk, expertise, and 
responsibility: the responsibility to administer naloxone if and when it is needed, the 
responsibility to learn about its risks, and the larger issue of responsibility within new 
public health paradigms. 
 
More fundamentally, naloxone highlights how the new state formation that marks the 
neoliberal era can harbor some progressive policy potentials. Naloxone’s goals and peer-to-
peer administration establishes that users have a claim on a right to life and access to those 
tools—including overdose reversal drugs—that will enable them to continue living. In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The production of the responsible subject is ongoing, though to a certain extent the legwork has 
already been done by already existing programs like needle exchange and methadone. For a 
discussion of the biopolitics of needle exchange, see Katherine McLean, "The Biopolitics of Needle 
Exchange in the United States," Critical public health 21.1 (2011): 71-79.        
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sense it is not adequately captured by the idea of either the “roll back” of social protections 
or the “roll out” of new forms of social governance.53 Rather, it points to the ways in which 
new collective claims can emerge in a post-welfare context. Enabled by quantifiable forms of 
evidence, justified in both ethical and fiscal terms, and empowered by legal exceptionalism, 
activists managed to establish state support for the avoidance of user-specific forms of 
death.  
 
As discussed in chapter two, Foucault saw responsibilization as one of the central 
characteristics of neoliberal governmentality. As subjects become increasingly responsible 
for their own wellbeing, that move absolves the state from the duty to protect the wellbeing 
of all. There is undoubtedly much about naloxone, as with harm reduction generally, that 
confirms Foucault’s perspective. But what he missed, and what the standard critique of 
neoliberalism tends to miss, was the possibility that newly responsible subjects, far from 
being the individualistic atoms of neoliberal rhetoric, might be able to enact forms of social 
care in ways in which the pastoral state was unable or unwilling to manifest. They might 
learn to effectively exercise this responsibility to aid each other. With naloxone programs, 
users are becoming subjects responsible for their own fate in new ways—but along with 
allies in the public health and medical establishments, they use these new capacities to 
occasionally bring one another back from the brink of death. 
 
Naloxone, represents one of the new directions in which harm reduction is currently 
moving. It is a highly technical yet highly social innovation that circulates in locations far 
from the syringe exchange. It is one way in which harm reduction is becoming more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," Antipode 34.3 (2002): 380-404; see also 
chapter 2. 
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mainstream. But it is not the only way. As the next chapter explains, syringe exchanges 
themselves are becoming integrated into the public health system.  
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Chapter 5. 
Harm Reduction, Medicaid and the Future of Policy 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Towards the end of my fieldwork, two events took place that captured the state of the harm 
reduction field in New York at that moment in time. The first was a celebration, hosted by 
the AIDS Institute, marking twenty years of syringe exchange in New York State. Held on 
the top floor of a Midtown office building, the room was bright and festive. Tables were 
spread throughout the room and attendees milled around, moving from table to table, 
chatting and catching up with friends and colleagues. Representatives from all of New York 
States SEPs were present, and the day was filled with testimonials of struggle and 
triumph, call-outs of appreciation to activists and AIDS Institute employees, remembrances 
of the fallen, and exhortations to continue to fight for an end to the war on drugs. This was 
a gathering to recognize the accomplishments of a movement, with attendees linking the 
plight of drug users to larger struggles for social and economic justice. 
 
The second event, also hosted by the AIDS Institute, was a meeting on Medicaid reform and 
the future of harm reduction in the state. The same people now sat quietly around a large 
conference table in the New York State Department of Health’s downtown offices, watching 
PowerPoint presentations on budget restructuring and Medicaid payment delivery system 
reform. Ostensibly held to keep “stakeholders” in the loop about the changes underway, the 
meeting was also an opportunity for front-line harm reduction providers to voice their 
concerns about the highly complex, state-driven process that would inexorably affect their 
organizations in profound ways. 
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Taking place within a month of each other, these events brought home the internal 
contradictions of harm reduction in New York. While the anniversary celebration looked 
back on the history of struggle and all that harm reduction activists had achieved, the 
Medicaid meeting looked forward to the future of healthcare delivery and spoke to SEPs as 
service providers in the language of bureaucracy. The future, it was becoming increasingly 
apparent, would include greater levels of integration into state healthcare provision 
through SEPs’ absorption into Health Homes and Medicaid managed care networks. 
Regularized state support of harm reduction services seems poised to be the ultimate 
conclusion to the institutionalization process that had begun with the waiver twenty years 
previous. But what will become of harm reduction as a philosophy of drug user health and 
empowerment, and as a political movement oriented towards social change, after it goes 
fully mainstream? 
 
This chapter looks at the way harm reduction accessed mainstream channels of health care 
provision in New York State through the state’s Medicaid redesign process. This process 
began in 2011 and was ongoing at the time my fieldwork concluded. It was, and continues 
to be, a profound change in the funding, political standing and ultimately the culture of 
harm reduction—and it also shows evidence that harm reduction is beginning to shape the 
structure and culture of Medicaid. Not only have specific harm reduction interventions been 
recognized as legitimate for Medicaid reimbursement; in fact, the harm reduction 
philosophy has helped to shape larger scales of reform by providing a new model of health 
care delivery. Within the larger project of health system reform, the harm reduction 
philosophy has been accepted by and integrated into other state behavioral health and 
substance abuse services.  
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Chapter three argued that the partial institutionalization of harm reduction through the 
grant funding system left space for organizational autonomy. With Medicaid, this space 
may be closed. Medicaid integration therefore may prove to be a paradoxical process for 
harm reduction. The distinctiveness of harm reduction services offered by syringe exchange 
programs (SEP) could potentially be eroded. And yet the larger health system is being 
influenced by the ethos and techniques of harm reduction. 
 
II. Medicaid reform in New York State 
 
Harm reduction has entered a new period of expansion and institutionalization at precisely 
the moment when New York’s health system is being significantly transformed. Due to the 
restructuring of the state’s public health bureaucracy and changes in the financing of 
health care, the grant-funded infrastructure that supported harm reduction’s expansion in 
New York is changing. A new set of organizational and political opportunities is arising for 
harm reduction, most significantly though not exclusively in the overhaul of Medicaid. 
Becoming integrated into Medicaid represents the direct inclusion of SEPs and their 
participants into the mainstream health system. From their origins as activist 
organizations engaged in protest and clandestine activity to being grant funded agencies on 
the margins of the public health state, harm reduction organizations are now becoming an 
exemplary model of success for other areas of health service delivery in New York State. 
Harm reduction organizations have come a long way. 
 
In 2011, New York State initiated Medicaid reform. The state faced sky-high levels of 
spending on Medicaid and the prospect of vastly increased enrolment with the upcoming 
 152	  
roll-out of the Affordable Care Act. It also offered mediocre quality of service, which 
contributed to major health disparities.1 In an effort to control costs and address quality 
issues, Governor Cuomo created the New York Medicaid Redesign Team (MRT), which set 
about proposing sweeping changes to the state’s Medicaid program. The extent of reform 
has been broad and complex.  Among the most significant changes proposed by the MRT is 
“ending the state’s Medicaid fee-for-service system and replacing it with a comprehensive, 
high-quality and integrated care management system.”2 And it has focused particular 
attention on a population subgroup identified as high need and high cost. Drug users, with 
their multiple physical, behavioral and substance abuse problems, fall into this category. 
Managed care is a form of devolution. Rather than the state providing direct 
reimbursement for individual services to specialists and hospitals, it outsources 
administration, patient care and reimbursement of providers to private, mostly for-profit 
managed care organizations (MCOs), which are paid a set per capita rate. In theory, the 
capitated payment structure incentivizes MCOs to seek efficiencies above that of which 
government is thought to be capable, as any savings can be appropriated by the MCOs 
themselves as profit. In this, the move towards managed care is undeniably a form of 
privatization. And in a classic example of the redistribution of risk, MCOs are freighted 
with the responsibility to economize, a risk that had previously been borne by the state.  
 
Some observers of this process are deeply skeptical of these claims. Maskovsky, for 
example, argues that managed care “has transformed the question of the state's willingness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kevin Fiscella, et al., "Inequality In Quality: Addressing Socioeconomic, Racial, and Ethnic 
Disparities in Health Care," Journal of the American Medical Association 283.19 (2000): 2579-2584.; 
Ichiro Kawachi, et al., "Health Disparities By Race and Class: Why Both Matter," Health Affairs 
24.2 (2005): 343-352. 
2 NYSDOH, “Medicaid Redesign Team Health Disparities Work Group Final Recommendations,” 20 
October, 2011: 5. (Hereafter MRT) Emphasis in original.  
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to provide public health services into a question of the state's willingness to enable or 
inhibit the profitability of commercial insurers.”3 For Rylko-Bauer and Farmer, managed 
care represents “an incrementalist market-based strategy that champions cost-effectiveness 
and profits rather than equity and compassion, while shifting responsibilities for cost-
containment onto the individual ‘consumers’ of health care ‘products.’”4 
 
Yet for many committed progressive public health reformers, managed care represents an 
opportunity to improve a fatally flawed system. EU, an employee of the DOHMH and a 
member of the MRT admits that MCOs are “mercenary…profiteering… They’re not 
interested in wellbeing.” Despite this, however, EU supports the transition to managed care 
and sees in it an opportunity: 
EU: So we have this huge opportunity to expand the services now, because a 
managed care company doesn’t give a shit whether it happens in a clinic or 
not. The government shouldn’t give a shit, but it does give a shit because it’s 
worried about being audited and it’s worried about pushing the envelope too 
far open. A managed care company isn’t worried about those things in the 
same way. It just wants to see low cost services delivering high yield 
outcomes.  
 
For EU, a private, profit-driven MCO is more likely than government to “push the 
envelope” and expand services. They are not beholden to a voting public and can therefore 
promote services, like harm reduction, which may not be politically popular but are low cost 
and produce “high yield outcomes.”  
EU: If [MCOs] can be real smart about what kind of care is most cost 
effective, theoretically, that produces profits for them, because they have a 
contract that allows them to play with a certain amount of money, and there’s 
something called a medical loss ratio that we determine in the contract that 
sets a threshold for how much of their contract has to go towards paying for 
services, and how much of it can go towards administrative expenses. And 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jeff Maskovsky, "“Managing” the Poor: Neoliberalism, Medicaid HMOs and the Triumph of 
Consumerism Among the Poor," Medical Anthropology 19.2 (2000): 132. 
4 Barab Rylko-Bauer and Paul Farmer, “Managed Care or Managed Inequality? A Call for Critiques 
of Market-Based Medicine,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 16.4 (2002): 477. 
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the better they are at supporting services that are cost effective, the more 
profitable the whole venture is for them. What contributes to cost effective 
services? Cheaper services, better outcomes, theoretically. So theoretically, 
it’s a system—in Newt Gingrich’s wildest wet dream—that should produce 
much better health care.  
 
Despite describing the emerging managed care system as “Newt Gingrich’s wildest wet 
dream,” EU supports the replacement of fee-for-service in favor of managed care and is 
helping to design and implement it in New York State. EU is not a general or ideological 
supporter of market solutions. Rather, like many harm reduction supporters, he sees in this 
change an opportunity to work the ethos and techniques of harm reduction into the medical 
system at a new scale. 
 
An important aspect of the MRT’s plan for managed care in New York is the roll out of 
Health Homes. Health Homes are an Affordable Care Act initiative whose purpose is to 
create better coordination and communication between different service providers and to 
bring down costs and improve outcomes. Health Homes are an integration of medical and 
behavioral care, to break down the silos in the care system that have existed. According to 
the NYSDOH: 
A Health Home is a care management service model whereby all of an 
individual's caregivers communicate with one another so that all of a 
patient's needs are addressed in a comprehensive manner. This is done 
primarily through a "care manager" who oversees and provides access to all 
of the services an individual needs to assure that they receive everything 
necessary to stay healthy, out of the emergency room and out of the hospital.5  
 
The MRT identified the lack of coordination between different health care providers 
regarding high-need patients as one of the causes of high costs in the fee for service model. 
They argue that “for far too many people, care is not effectively managed.”6 Instead of 
offering consumers more “choice,” the mantra of earlier iterations of the transition to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 NYSDOH, “Medicaid Health Homes.” 
6 MRT, op. cit.: 6, emphasis in original. 
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managed care, Health Homes are decidedly more paternalistic. They seek the “active 
management” of care through case management and care coordination for high need, high 
risk, high cost populations. Rather than conceiving of the Medicaid enrolee as an 
autonomous consumer of self-selected services, Health Homes introduce a “care manager” 
whose job it is to guide the person towards the care they need in order to stay “out of the 
emergency room.” 
 
Health Homes are where and how SEPs connect to Medicaid. The MRT is explicit in the 
requirement for Health Homes to involve “community-based organizations” in the 
management and delivery of care for enrollees with complex health issues. In EU’s 
comment above, he alluded to the devolution of healthcare delivery, saying that “a managed 
care company doesn’t give a shit whether it happens in a clinic or not.” This comment 
reflects a broad shift within the thinking of those planning New York’s healthcare delivery 
system. There is recognition and acknowledgement of the important role community based 
organizations play in promoting health, supported by the growing prominence of the ‘social 
determinants of health’ in public health scholarship.7 According to the MRT: 
New  York’s  vision  for  health  homes relies on a wide array of current 
providers forming new partnerships and stretching their list of services in 
ways that ensure recipients with complex health issues are effectively 
managed. … Health home networks will always include community-based 
organizations because they are uniquely positioned to meet the social needs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Health system reform is not unique to New York State or even the United States. Similar processes 
are taking place across the developed world, driven by the new priorities in health care imposed by 
aging populations and the need to mitigate the ever increasing cost of managing chronic conditions. 
There is growing consensus that health systems must incorporate an understanding of the social 
determinants of health—that is, socio-economic factors that shape the conditions of people’s lives—in 
order to do a better job designing impactful and cost-effective interventions. This is a departure from 
health systems, like the U.S.’s, which has hitherto focused on finding cures for diseases, rather than 
on their prevention. See WHO, "Closing the Gap: Policy into Practice on Social Determinants of 
Health: Discussion Paper," (2011); Michael Marmot and Richard Wilkinson, eds. Social determinants 
of health. Oxford University Press, 2005. And for a critical perspective, see Vicente Navarro, "What 
We Mean by Social Determinants of Health," International Journal of Health Services 39.3 (2009): 
423-441. 
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of patients that often transcend health care needs.8 
 
By emphasizing the need for current providers to stretch their list of services and to 
partner with community-based organizations, the MRT is signaling the way forward for 
harm reduction organizations. The logic of healthcare delivery is changing focus—from 
treating disease in the hospital, to engaging with people in their communities, to address 
the “social needs of patients” in order to prevent disease. According to the New York 
Academy of Medicine: 
Addressing basic needs through providing pantry bags of food and meals, a 
warm place to spend the day; and maintaining a connection and 
communication to the world, including the healthcare system, through access 
to computers and a place to receive mail, are critical to facilitating 
appropriate healthcare utilization for many people. It’s not necessarily the 
role of the healthcare system to create these places, but it becomes incumbent 
upon the healthcare system to partner with such places and work to ensure 
that they can operate.9 
 
The MRT plan laid out a blueprint for major changes in the way healthcare would be 
designed and delivered in New York State. It also explicitly signaled the intention of the 
state to incorporate SEPs and harm reduction services into Medicaid. The MRT report 
recommends:  
Actions should be taken to promote and address health care needs of persons 
with chemical dependency including allowing medical providers to prescribe 
syringes to prevent disease transmission; and by authorizing NYS DOH 
AIDS Institute Syringe Exchange providers to be reimbursed by Medicaid for 
harm reduction/syringe exchange program services provided to Medicaid 
eligible individuals.10 
 
The inclusion of SEPs in the MRT’s report was highly significant. Drug users were no 
longer an exceptional, essentialized population. The reality is that the “vast majority of 
harm reduction participants are Medicaid beneficiaries and many have multiple chronic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 MRT, op. cit.: 13 
9 Peter Schafer and Michele Calvo, “The Integration of Harm Reduction and Health Care: 
Implications and Lessons for Healthcare Reform,” New York Academy of Medicine: 2015.: 33. 
(Hereafter NYAM) 
10 MRT, op. cit.: 24. 
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conditions and are high utilizers of emergency department and inpatient services”11 which 
makes them “relevant to the larger New York State Medicaid reform initiatives underway, 
and whose experiences can inform the implementation of those initiatives by healthcare 
systems in New York.”12  
Though still thought of as a fringe or outsider movement, harm reduction has become 
official health policy in New York. This led to much excitement and uncertainty among 
harm reduction providers and advocates. Medicaid integration is altering the funding 
structure, the organizational autonomy and the general mission of harm reduction in New 
York. 
 
III. Opportunities and threats of Medicaid integration 
 
Medicaid integration requires that harm reduction organizations adapt to the requirements 
of a new system. As one of informants told me of the Medicaid Redesign Team’s harm 
reduction proposal, “I think a lot of us saw it as equal measures opportunity and threat.” As 
Chapter 3 argued, the grant funding system only facilitated partial institutionalization. 
Medicaid integration represents a fuller form of institutionalization. In that sense, it is a 
solution to the challenges of grant funding. Not only does it promise a steady flow of 
resources and a new level of legitimacy in the eyes of the public—it also allows for the full 
development of harm reduction as an approach to drug user health broadly defined, rather 
than an adjunct to HIV prevention. But the relative autonomy of SEPs from the AIDS 
Institute allowed for flexibility. It allowed harm reduction activists to maintain an 
oppositional, outsider identity which gave them legitimacy in the eyes of their program 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 NYAM, op. cit.: 23. 
12 NYAM, op. cit.: 9. 
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participants. SEPs fear that integration into for-profit, highly bureaucratic MCOs will 
mean a loss of autonomy and the eclipsing of the political dimension that brought many 
activists to harm reduction in the first place. 
 
The idea that SEPs should take advantage of the changing funding landscape—or risk their 
ability to continue functioning—was reinforced during both the twentieth anniversary of 
syringe exchange celebration and the Medicaid redesign meeting. At the former, CB, a 
manger at the AIDS Institute, urged agencies to “evolve” to stay alive. 
CB: As grants change, as funding becomes less available for a discreet area, 
there has to be a mechanism in the organizations, and in your thinking, to 
evolve. To take advantage of your expertise, your knowledge and your 
experience so you can take advantage of the opportunities so that you can 
survive, so that you can continue to provide the services to the population 
that you want, but at the same time, be able to survive as an entity.  
 
Organizational survival was the main topic of discussion and concern at the Medicaid 
redesign meeting. Agencies had been told about the opportunities presented by Medicaid 
reform but were unsure how, in their current form, they would be able to take advantage of 
them. 
 
In their integration into managed care networks, SEPs are able to untether themselves 
from most of the grant-funding infrastructure. This means a move away from the close 
connection between SEPs and HIV prevention, the source of the majority of their funding 
up to this point. MI, an employee of a harm reduction advocacy organization, explained the 
funding landscape SEPs were facing: 
MI: We cannot count on HIV being the rationale for supporting our programs 
anymore. … To the extent that we’re successful, people forget that there was 
a reason to support us in the first place, in the context of the HIV epidemic. 
Overall, HIV is de-prioritized in public opinion and in the political sphere.  
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The importance and public profile of HIV has waned, thanks in part to the success harm 
reduction organizations have had in reducing new infections among drug users. For SEPs 
relying on grant funding tied to HIV, the looming prospect of this source of funding drying 
up means that SEPs must look elsewhere for support. MI shared with me the calculations 
that many SEPs are making: 
MI: A lot of the money for HIV case management and linkage to care is 
coming from the Ryan White Care Act, which is about 2 billion dollars. Now, 
the Ryan White Care Act was created over 20 years ago as a payer of last 
resort. Now, this is in a pre-Affordable Care Act environment. In theory, the 
Affordable Care Act will expand coverage. What’s the role of Ryan White 
after 2014? After Medicaid expansion, after the establishment of insurance 
exchanges and subsidies and all that stuff—do we still need this special 
program? And the fear is that it will essentially wither on the vine. So, if you 
are an HIV organization that was getting Ryan White funding, and you were 
looking ahead, you would have to be very scared … And if you’re not 
currently able to bill Medicaid, or you’re not currently partnering and have a 
formal relationship with an institute that can do Medicaid billing, then you 
could be left out in the cold. 
 
MI looks ahead at the uncertain funding landscape facing SEPs as “HIV organizations.” He 
concludes that without a formal relationship tying agencies to some sort of Medicaid 
reimbursement mechanism, agencies, like the Ryan White program to which they are 
fiscally tied, risk “withering on the vine.” MI’s speculation and calculation was 
representative of an overall uncertainty in the harm reduction field. 
 
In order to benefit from Medicaid, agencies must play by the rules laid out by the MRT. 
That includes demonstrating their ability to cater to more than just HIV, something that 
many of the SEPs are keen to do anyway. But the way in which they must go about it is by 
marketing themselves and their service models to MCOs, using the language and the 
metrics of profit. JH, a NYSDOH employee and member of the MRT, exhorts the assembled 
group of SEP directors at the Medicaid Redesign meeting to show themselves in the most 
attractive light: 
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JH: I really think this is an opportunity to sell yourselves, and the fact that 
you have boots on the ground. There’s going to be a certain amount of 
marketing yourselves. We have these services to work with this client 
population that is traditionally not in care. 
 
Agencies are compelled to sell themselves, to market themselves on the basis of having 
“boots on the ground.” They must leverage their experience ministering to high need, high 
cost, hard to reach populations in order to win the approval of the MCOs who, because of 
the capitated payment structure, see new enrollments as an opportunity to increase 
revenue. 
 
Throughout this process, harm reduction supporters recognize that the state is not 
necessarily investing in drug user health out of a benevolent concern for their wellbeing. 
MI: If we say we’re not just a syringe exchange agency, we’re not just the HIV 
prevention people, we’re the drug user health people. Who is the audience for 
solutions to drug users health problems? Who is invested in having healthy 
drug users?  
 
After all, drug use is still illegal, and numerous other “right hand of the state” functions are 
still dedicated to punishing drug users. 
 
The fact of the matter is that drug users are an expensive population. An IDUHA survey 
shows that 75.4% of SEP participants have at least one non-substance abuse related 
chronic health condition and 41.9% have two (asthma, hypertension and liver disease are 
the three most common).13  
MI: People who have addictions and mental health issues, are high utilizers 
of very expensive health care. Emergency room care. If they’re on Medicaid, 
or if they are dually eligible for Medicaid and Medicare, these are what are 
being seen in the accounting, actuarial terms as the cost centers, the cost to 
be driven down. And there are two ways to drag these costs down. Refusing 
care, or improving care. I think we’re on the side of improving care. But we 
need to prove that we have a way to do that. And we will have opportunities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 NYAM, op. cit.: 8. 
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to do that, but I think that we’ll have to be very nimble and we’ll have to be 
very fast in order to take advantage of that.  
 
Harm reduction supporters are well aware that the Medicaid embrace of their 
organizations is driven by economic calculations. According to MI, SEPs are the most 
appropriate agencies for targeting these “cost centers.”  
 
In order to become part of an MCO network, SEPs also must have particular levels of 
organizational capacity. Medicaid imposes huge responsibilities for billing and 
recordkeeping. SEP directors and employees worry that as small organizations, they will 
not be able to cope with the technical requirements of the Medicaid billing and record 
sharing systems. As NYSDOH employee YH explained to me: 
YH: These are small agencies that are going to have to either link with 
someone who can bill for Medicaid or develop that ability themselves. Well 
that is a huge bureaucratic hurdle, to bill for Medicaid.  I don't understand 
anything about it, really, except that I know it is very intensive. The billing 
itself and the administrative infrastructure that you need to do that is 
significant. The application process itself is significant. Yeah, huge hospitals, 
gigantic organizations like Housing Works or Gay Men's Health Crisis, they 
can hire a consultant or hire someone to do these applications. 
 
Larger, more established organizations like Housing Works or Gay Men’s Health Crisis 
would be able to handle this challenge. But smaller, community-based SEPs will struggle to 
meet Medicaid’s onerous administrative burden. IH, the executive director a major New 
York harm reduction organization and long time activist put it this way: 
IH: You're going to have to be able to bill Medicaid. Probably it's an 
improvement over a cost reimbursement contract, but particularly smaller 
organizations realize that right now they don't have the technical capacity to 
do that. They are going to have to learn how to do that. If they don't do it well 
they are going to lose money. 
 
The fear is that organizations must learn to operate by Medicaid’s rules or face the 
disappearance of their funding. 
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This same process also raises the threat that SEPs will lose the organizational autonomy 
that has always been so important to them. As LD, the executive director of a SEP 
explained, it may cause some syringe exchanges to partner with large organizations, which 
will overwhelm them: 
LD: Syringe exchange programs can very quickly be submerged in the 
tsunami of much, much larger agencies. And I think there has to be a 
recognition of the transformation that needs to happen, or the maturation if 
you will, that the syringe exchange programs can in fact be capacitated to bill 
Medicaid. Unless there is a mechanism that really allows the agencies to 
understand the full requirements and the path that will enable us to become 
licensed either as a 31 under mental health services or a 32 relative to drug 
treatment that we are not going to ultimately be able to stand independently. 
There will be the continuous need for us to lean on another entity that will 
then have control of the purse strings. We want to look at the fullest breadth 
of harm reduction services that can address our constituents, and not limit it 
only to syringe exchange.  
 
LD’s concern is that in their current form, many SEPs lack the capacity to bill Medicaid. 
This means that in order to benefit from Medicaid funding, agencies would need to “lean on 
another entity” and risk being “submerged in the tsunami” of much larger organizations. 
The loss of “control of the purse strings” would signal the end of SEPs as autonomous 
organizations. 
 
SEPs are also concerned that the eligibility requirements for reimbursement will be 
incompatible with harm reduction strategies. SEPs developed a low-threshold model of 
health service provision, with low barriers to access: no identification was required, no 
referrals. Patients could remain anonymous. Low threshold services were compatible with 
the arms-length management of the grant funding system. Could the low-threshold model 
survive the stiffer requirements of Medicaid? GN, a DOHMH employee, reflects: 
GN: Syringe exchange is one of the last services around that's still completely 
anonymous. I mean, people have member ID codes, but it's not like John Doe 
has a case file at a syringe exchange program that has all of his health 
records and all of his everything. It doesn't work that way. 
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Having a low-threshold for access is not an incidental part of the SEP model—it stems from 
the core of the harm reduction approach. UserUnion organizer AE is concerned that moving 
towards Medicaid integration could mean compromising harm reduction’s ability to “reach 
people.” 
AE: We also want to be low threshold enough to reach people who aren't 
going to interact with the health care system anywhere else. And if you just 
support syringe access, in particular solely through Medicaid, you are going 
to lose a lot of drug users. 
 
Yet for EU, these concerns are overblown. 
EU: Most of the people who go in there are enrolled in Medicaid and so are 
already part of systems of surveillance that these agencies, as they represent 
themselves, would find totally draconian, but that their consumers may not 
have problems with it. And so that's also kind of where you see this funny 
disconnect between harm reduction idealized, the way it actually works, and 
the way people actually get the services. A lot of people who run these 
agencies are like "Fuck this, fuck Medicaid." I mean, they will say that. But 
then where would the preponderance of people who come in there be without 
Medicaid. Most of the people they are serving would not say, "Fuck 
Medicaid." 
 
EO, from the perspective of a service provider, echoes this view. 
EO: I don’t think there's one participant that's come in and said they don't 
want to give their name to get on Medicaid to be able to see the doctor. 
 
There is a residual impulse within the harm reduction world to be wary of the surveillance 
of drug users. But this often clashes with the reality of contemporary health service 
provision. 
 
While anonymity may be difficult to maintain, for many SEPs, trust is paramount. As a 
public health strategy, harm reduction interventions like syringe exchange rely on a close 
relationship with service users. It is important that drug users identify with and ‘buy into’ 
the harm reduction project in order for it to work. User involvement in the design and 
delivery of services has, from the beginning, been a constitutive part of harm reduction both 
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in theory and in practice. AL, an AIDS Institute employee who has overseen harm 
reduction programs since the earliest days of the waiver sees the conflict this way: 
AL: Here in New York with the Medicaid redesign, Medicaid reform, there is 
this opportunity where harm reduction is making this move towards more 
mainstream. But that's not good now because it may take away—I don't want 
to say the simplicity of harm reduction, I would say it's more of the easy 
access to services. There are other people that are thinking, well, let's 
examine this and let's try to point out what are the models that may work. 
And I think that the fear of the further we go into mainstream is that people 
fear the further we'll get away from the people, that means the service. 
 
MI made a similar point. 
MI: When we talk about user involvement, we become trapped in becoming so 
successful that we get more government funding and that we lose the 
legitimation that we needed in the beginning. Where we didn’t have so much 
money so we had to make a lot of friends. And our first friends were people 
who were injecting drugs who came to us for supplies.  
 
In their early days, SEPs didn’t have a lot of money and so had to rely on their “first 
friends,” people who were injecting drugs. The risk, as MI sees it, is exchanging increased 
scale and stability for the street-level legitimacy that made them into the models of success 
they are today.  
 
To a certain extent, concerns around the kinds of services Medicaid would reimburse were a 
response to the Medicaid system as it was, rather than what it was becoming. SEPs did not 
believe that Medicaid would reimburse the sort of non-medical, peer-focused practices that 
constitute harm reduction. Yet some policymakers were intent on importing precisely that 
aspect of harm reduction into the revamped health system.  EU—who was a member of the 
Medicaid Redesign Team responsible for determining what would be reimbursable, and 
how—made this quite clear to me: 
EU: Medicaid would reimburse peer support activities that folks are engaged 
in; Medication distribution; care coordination; recovery management…. If 
there is a singular emphasis on shifting the purview of reimbursable services 
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within Medicaid, it’s on that. It’s on low-intensity, sub-clinical, services. With 
the biggest emphasis being on peer support. 
 
To be sure, some SEP directors dismiss concerns about the loss of autonomy or goal drift as 
missing the point. For EO, executive director of SoBroHr, harm reduction has always been 
about addressing drug user health in the broadest way: 
EO: I think selling out is hanging on to just the syringe transaction and never 
digging deeper to see what people need and trying like hell to meet those 
needs. Like hunger, like housing, like treating hepatitis while the liver is 
rotting away. Or worrying about the syringe exchange transaction and doing 
harm maintenance, when someone's toes are falling off from diabetes. And so 
to me, that's the cop-out. Get your shit together and if you can't do it yourself, 
connect them with somebody who can or get doctors here or whatever.  
 
SoBroHr has gone farther than many other SEPs in embracing the emerging medical 
model. It has located a health clinic and pharmacy on site, and is expanding into other 
areas of social service provision like job training and housing. But for EO, all of this is 
represents a fulfillment of the harm reduction project, not an evolution away from it. 
 
Ultimately, Medicaid integration raises fundamental questions about what harm reduction 
is for and whether its original goals can survive its own success. AIDS Insitute employee 
YH reflects on the potential of a standardized harm reduction: 
YH: When things become too standardized, and you can't just be, you know, 
the thing about harm reduction is it's based upon this idea of meeting the 
client where they are. I fear that some of this is going to turn into meeting 
the bureaucracy where it's at. 
 
Other informants saw this situation in similar terms. 
MI: There is an inherent tension between building up your syringe access 
component, which really has to be about being nimble, being low threshold, 
being networked and engaged with the cultures and communities of people 
who are injecting drugs. And the imperative to address more and more health 
issues, by professionalization, by institutionalization, by expansive services, 
by new facilities. There’s just an inherent tension there.  
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For MI, there is no way to avoid the trade-off between the institutionalization that 
Medicaid integration brings and the informality that is central to the harm reduction 
mission. This is another version of the tension between politics and medicine that has been 
at the heart of harm reduction from the beginning. 
MI: There’s a sort of historical, archaeological sense to it that harm reduction 
entered the lexicon in the States through syringe exchange, which was a 
response to the HIV epidemic. So that it was around public health, it was 
around preventing blood-borne virus, and syringes were the tool for that and 
the philosophy that explained and rationalized it was harm reduction. So, by 
extension, anything that you could analogize to syringe exchange to prevent 
HIV could be seen as a harm reduction intervention. But if you talk about 
operationalizing drug user health as a concept, then you’re moving into a 
maybe more clinical context. You could include psycho-social aspects to that. 
You could conceive of it broadly. And there’s a certain resistance to that, 
because harm reduction’s other route was not just the public health thing but 
was the more radical challenge to the laws, policies and norms that 
marginalized, stigmatized and excluded people who use drugs. So there’s a 
certain kind of political element to it that if you use a clinical framework—
which is the language you end up finding yourself talking in when you start 
talking about Medicaid, then you’re talking in theory about depoliticizing a 
movement. So I think it’s a tension right now.  
 
What is interesting about MI is that he recognizes these tensions but is quite sanguine 
about them. For him, harm reduction is not selling out by scaling up. It has always had a 
philosophical commitment to practical solutions to health problems, and hence asserted the 
necessity to operate at greater and greater scales. Similarly, for EO, the director of 
SoBroHr, there is no contradiction between growing larger and staying true to the original 
spirit of syringe exchange. Medicaid and the move towards a more holistic approach to drug 
user health that it represents, is fully compatible with what harm reduction has been all 
along. 
EO: We serve active drug users. Some are in recovery, but ours is a model of 
serving drug users that really emphasizes health. That emphasizes 
improving their social status, meaning destigmatizing homeless people, and 
drug users, and people with AIDS, and people with Hepatitis, and really 
building a way that’s effective for serving people. The days of just giving out a 
syringe, for us at least, are over. It’s unacceptable just to do that. 
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For EO, authentic harm reduction lies in the future, not the past. When SEPs were 
distributing needles out of backpacks in the street, they weren’t practicing an outsider 
approach to public health. They were stepping in to provide services that they always felt 
should be provided by the state. As EL put it “we were providing services the state was not. 
And the state should have been providing these services and someone had to step up to the 
plate.” Now, with full state support and integration into the same health system that serves 
the wider non-drug-using population, many harm reduction activists have seen the 
realization of their ambitions. 
 
On entering the field, I expected to find grassroots organizations opposing managed care, 
because it operates on a for-profit basis and seems anathema to the politics of harm 
reduction activists. Some SEP rank-and-file do criticize Medicaid integration on these 
grounds. But my findings on this matter confounded my expectations. Despite their 
misgivings, most of my informants embraced Medicaid as the future of harm reduction in 
New York. 
 
IV. Mainstreaming harm reduction 
 
The mainstreaming of harm reduction has not only meant the transformation of SEPs into 
Medicaid-eligible service providers. At the same time, Medicaid and other welfare state 
infrastructures are transforming to reflect the priorities of harm reduction. Mainstreaming 
does not only mean SEPs linking in to networks of state-funded healthcare. It also means 
dissolving the distinctiveness of SEPs. This has happened because people like EU, a vocal 
proponent of harm reduction as the only approach to drug use that, as he put it, “makes any 
fucking sense,” have influential positions within city and state bureaucracy. And it is 
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happening because of larger social, cultural, and political shifts in the way drug use is 
understood and dealt with. The consensus is growing that addiction is a chronic relapsing 
disorder,14 that the war on drugs has failed,15 that drug users are not just criminal lowlife 
types lurking in the ghettos of the inner city.16 So where does this leave harm reduction as 
a social and political movement? Have activists succeeded?  
 
Harm reduction is rippling out from the world of drug user treatment and health and into 
larger state bureaucracies with a broad reach. Specifically, the movement’s oft-repeated 
guiding principle of “meeting people where they are” is beginning to gain acceptance as a 
sound approach to social service delivery outside the small world of community-based 
syringe exchange organizations. One of the three aims of Medicaid reform is to offer 
“person-centered care,” which implies a harm-reduction-like emphasis on tailoring services 
and interventions to the specific realities of individual health consumers, and aiding the 
whole person, not just addressing the medical condition. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In recent years, addiction research has focused on the genetic and biological components of 
dependent drug use. This is a departure from earlier eras of drug use research that emphasized 
personal deficits and criminal tendencies. See Alan I. Leshner, "Addiction is a Brain Disease, and it 
Matters." Science 278.5335 (1997): 45-47.; Charles O'Brien, "Addiction and Dependence in DSM-V." 
Addiction 106, no. 5 (2011): 866-867. 
15 The literature on the failure of the war on drugs is vast (for some scholarly examples see Chapter 
1), and not only found among the usual critics of state policy. Even former New York State senator 
and presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton said recently in a speech on criminal justice reform that she 
supported a change in the “unjust federal sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine 
crimes” which have contributed to high incarceration rates among minority communities. Clinton 
seems to be deliberately veering away from the tough on crime language of the war on drugs in 
favour of an emphasis on treatment. In this she is representative of a bi-partisan shift away from the 
tough on crime policies that epitomize the war on drugs. See Daniel Strauss, “Read the Full Text of 
Hillary Clinton’s Prison Reform Speech,” Talking Points Memo 29 April, 2015. See also Saki Knafo, 
“Senators Take Major Step Toward Ending the Drug War,” Huffington Post 1 January, 2014. 
16 Drug use in the U.S. is on the rise, and the demographics are changing. Increasingly, it is white 
youth in suburban or rural areas that are grabbing headlines. See for example Olga Khaza, “The 
New Heroin Epidemic,” The Atlantic, 30 October 2014; Nan Marie Astone, et al., “Death Rates for 
US Women Ages 15 to 54: Some Unexpected Trends,” Urban Institute, March 2015. 
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The philosophy of harm reduction accepts that drug users are willing and able to make 
decisions and take responsibility for their health and care. As explored in detail in chapter 
four, harm reduction’s approach to health decenters the physician or credentialed service 
provider as ultimate authority in favor of the expertise drug users gain through lived 
experience. It relies on the power of peers and social networks to amplify the effectiveness 
of interventions by modeling behavior change within the communities of concern outside of 
clinical or bureaucratic environments, communicated in the language of the street, and 
delivered by peers in whom the targets of intervention see themselves reflected. Medicaid 
reform is embracing, or at least paying lip service, to all of these ideals. This may not sound 
revolutionary, but in the highly structured, top-down world of health and social service 
delivery, this blurring of the lines between client and provider is a revelation.  
 
Harm reduction programs provide one of the earliest and clearest examples of devolved, 
decentralized, individualistic social service provision. EU, the MRT member, made this 
clear: 
EU: What we have an opportunity to do here is not just help agencies decide 
whether they want to become medicalized or not, and thereby participate in 
Medicaid or not. We have an opportunity to reshape what the whole medical, 
Medicaid model means, in the minds of the people designing this system in 
the state. 
 
Other people involved with policymaking made similar points. According to AL, a DOH 
bureaucrat, SEPs are one of the “shining success stories” of New York State in their ability 
to tackle a troubling and entrenched health problem within a difficult to engage population, 
and, she marveled, they did it with “limited resources.” According to several people I spoke 
to at both the city and state public health departments, there is a lot of interest in applying 
the model pioneered by SEPs to other areas of healthcare reform. CB, a director at the 
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AIDS Institute, told New York’s harm reduction community at the 20th anniversary 
meeting: 
CB: My vision of what syringe exchange programs are, is that you have been 
a successful partner in bringing together a model that has such a great 
potential to be helpful in many of the public health activities that entities 
such as the health department has to offer to people in many different areas.  
 
And JH, a Medicaid economist with the NYSDOH and member of the MRT told the group 
at the Medicaid redesign meeting: 
JH: It’s somewhat refreshing, over the last two years, in how it’s been 
recognized by the folks in Albany, a lot of the concepts that are being used by 
the Medicaid program in its entirety, which is essentially care management 
for all, it’s been acknowledged that we have been there, we have done that. 
And what we have established is not perfect, but it was so far in advance of 
the general Medicaid program. 
 
For CB, JH and others, harm reduction services and programs are the vanguard of a new 
type of public health care. Again, it is important not to flatten the complexity of this 
change. It represents an approach to care management that is at once paternalistic and 
individualistic, focused both on guided behavioral change as well as personal responsibility. 
All these angles are indivisible from the type of health care system taking shape in New 
York, as elsewhere.  
 
The resonance between the harm reduction sensibility and the new approach to Medicaid 
can be seen in the language used to promote the program’s changes. According to the New 
York Academy of Medicine, SEP’s success comes from “addressing participant’ immediate 
needs and individual desires,” creating a “service environment in which “stigmatized 
participants feel respected and even loved.”17 This creates a “health and social support 
home in the truest sense” which then sets up the service site as “trusted place” which then 
opens the door to “successful service delivery because participants want to keep coming 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 NYAM, op. cit.: 39. 
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back an they are able to share their needs honestly.” Terms like “love,” “respect,” “trust” 
and “home” demonstrate the affective scope of the emerging paradigm in Medicaid. They 
are what EU described to me as “All these sorts of vague soft-touch, behavioral, not even 
behavioral-therapeutic, but just kind of like human contact interventions.” For EU, instead 
of “ghettoizing” this approach within harm reduction settings, Medicaid should offer 
programs along this model for everyone, not only drug users. 
EU: One thing I would like to see more of, that isn’t an explicitly harm 
reduction service, and that again is sort of my bent, to not proliferate quote-
unquote harm reduction services but to promote services that reflect the only 
orientation that makes any fucking sense, so there are recovery centers, 
that’s a model. It’s not a clinical setting… They are staffed mostly by peers, 
and it’s a place where maybe there will be some clinical services available but 
really where it’s about feeling connected to your life. There’s community shit 
happening there, there are vocational resources, there are housing resources 
there, you know, just sort of emotionally supportive resources there. Folks 
with whom you share a sense of identity. So one thing I’ve submitted to the 
folks at the state Department of Health is considering funding that 
programmatically, so with some kind of flat rate for the program, but then 
also funding individual services within that. 
 
This is an explicit articulation of the plan promoted by some Medicaid reformers to fund 
practices that are not specifically medical—to include “community shit” and affective 
identification. We can view this cynically, as the evidence of harm reduction as a 
biopolitical project, which surely it is.18 And there is no doubt that cutting overall costs is 
the overriding motivation for embracing this approach. But at the same time, it arguably 
does harbor significant potential for a more humanistic model of social service provision. 
 
There is another important dimension of the mainstreaming of harm reduction that may 
have even more profound consequences than the transformation of service models described 
above. By accepting the harm reduction approach to drug use, and incorporating it into 
Medicaid the state is signaling a willingness to abandon its insistence on abstinence as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See chapter two for a discussion of the biopolitical critique of harm reduction. 
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pre-condition for the receipt of state benefits. Drug use is no longer a disqualification for 
social rights. It would be overstating the case to say that harm reduction is solely 
responsible for the change. It is connected to larger social, cultural, and political shifts, not 
only a marked liberalization in attitudes towards drug use, but also a renewed emphasis on 
the individual as change agent that is increasingly coming to eclipse the postwar emphasis 
on social institutions.19 But harm reduction activists have definitely played a role in 
shaping the specific form that this process is taking in New York State.  
 
A separate process has been underway at New York State’s Office of Alcohol and Substance 
Abuse Services (OASAS), the state agency responsible for overseeing drug treatment, 
including methadone treatment. Historically, the treatment community had been among 
the most vocal opponents of the harm reduction approach, arguing that interventions like 
syringe exchange and naloxone distribution enable the continuation of drug use. There are 
many reasons for OASAS’s traditional resistance to harm reduction. The treatment 
industry in New York, as elsewhere, is based upon the supreme importance of abstinence. 
Most treatment programs are versions of the 12-step, abstinence-centered model pioneered 
by Alcoholics Anonymous. 
 
But there is growing acceptance within OASAS that current treatment models are failing to 
yield the hoped for results. Relapse is a reality for many if not most chronic drug users.20 
Seeing in this an opportunity, savvy policy entrepreneurs working both within government, 
like EU, and without, like MI and IH, have capitalized on the upheaval brought by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Pew Research Center, America’s New Drug Policy Landscape (Washington, DC: Pew Research 
Center, 2014). 
20 Michael Gossop, et al., "Lapse, Relapse and Survival Among Opiate Addicts After Treatment. A 
Prospective Follow-Up Study," The British Journal of Psychiatry 154.3 (1989): 348-353. 
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Medicaid reform to push through changes in subsidiary systems like OASAS. For example, 
IH had a hand in rewriting OASAS’s clinical guidance “towards harm reduction outcomes, 
as opposed to the traditional model.” The goal was to change mainstream drug treatment to 
be more in-line with harm reduction principles. In this case, this simply meant a non-
abstinence approach, rather than any specific public health interventions like syringe 
exchange. 
IH: What makes it different from the other guidance is the outcomes are not 
abstinence. The outcomes are improved health outcomes, improved activities 
in daily living, such as a job, reduced use as opposed to eliminating use, and 
then reduced threat to public safety. All of those are perfectly good harm 
reduction. This is the official clinical guidelines that all programs have to use 
to run their program. The guidelines do not mention the word harm reduction 
once. That phrase is not used at all, but they change the measure from 
abstinence to this other set of clinical indicators. 
 
The significance of the change in clinical guidelines for OASAS drug treatment programs is 
far reaching. Many drug users who end up in treatment have been remanded there by court 
order, as part of drug court diversion programs. Typically, these programs expect that the 
drug user will undergo detox and then remain abstinent or be sent back to prison. As IH 
explains, OASAS’s new clinical guidelines mean that drug users can now be mandated to 
harm reduction programs instead. 
IH: So they get mandated to a licensed OASAS program, but if that program 
adopted a harm reduction modality, then someone could elect to go to that 
program as opposed to an abstinence-only program. They are still going to get 
the urine test because they are going to have to volunteer for it, because if 
not, whoever is mandating them has sanctions. So but I'm not going to throw 
them out of my treatment program. Their parole might be revoked, or their 
probation might be revoked, but I'm not going to throw them out of my 
treatment program because they didn't do it. It's up to the mandatory to 
decide how they are going to treat somebody if they refuse the test. 
 
This is a somewhat paradoxical application of harm reduction. The activists who 
formulated it did not imagine harm reduction as something to which a user would be 
“mandated.” It was based around a stronger conception of the autonomy and dignity of the 
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user. OASAS’s appropriation suggests that harm reduction can be used as a means that can 
be applied to a variety of ends. 
 
Harm reduction techniques and terms are being work into other areas of mainstream social 
service provision. The Human Resources Administration (HRA), which oversees New York 
City’s welfare program, has been exploring harm reduction policies. 
EU: There's been this other conversation that was initiated by the HRA. They 
approached us and said, ‘We have this program called Housing Assistance 
and Cash Assistance for people who are HIV positive. And we want to make 
that program as low threshold as possible. We have requirements for people 
who screen positive for drugs. In order for them to keep getting the full 
complement of assistance, they need to be enrolled in some kind of drug 
treatment program. Well, we would like to give them the option of enrolling 
in harm reduction services.’ Which is great! But then that immediately raises 
all these questions about, okay, so if they need to comply with treatment in 
order to continue to get their assistance, what does that mean in the context 
of a harm reduction service? And is it enough for them just to enroll? I mean, 
how does that impact the whole question of anonymity and personal 
directiveness? That's a really important aspect of harm reduction, that people 
determine their own course through it. What if what they determine their 
want or need is, and for whatever reason, it doesn’t satisfy the caseworkers of 
HRA, then how do we resolve that issue? Do we need maybe to institute a 
means of measuring progress for people in harm reduction settings that HRA 
would find acceptable and that the harm reduction service providers would 
also be invested in, like the quality of life indexes. … We will do a 
presentation in collaboration with HRA on sort of these issues to a 
community of harm reduction providers and say, "So this is kind of what's at 
stake, these are the issues that we need to hash out. Who wants to be a part 
of this? Who wants to be an agency to which HRA will refer people? It's likely 
that HRA would consider at some point making this option available for all of 
their clients. 
 
At the time of my research, this meeting had not yet taken place. But crucially, according to 
EU, ideas about how to move away from a strict requirement of abstinence were beginning 
to circulate in spheres of social service provision that are not directly connected to HIV, 
health care or even drug users. What would it mean for the thousands of people who had 
their social services cut off, or were sent back to jail, for failing a drug test? At the same 
time, EU points to several issues that highlight the uneasy incorporation of harm reduction 
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into systems of governance. The importance of self-directiveness is invoked by the state. 
But ultimately, these are huge bureaucracies that may not be, in their current forms, 
structurally capable of the type of flexibility required by harm reduction.  
 
Many of my informants noted that as the harm reduction approach filters through 
institutions that do not have a history or a pre-existing ideological affinity with its 
philosophy, the risk is that it becomes just another label without also importing the 
substance. When various elements are cherry picked to serve the interest of the importing 
institution, harm reduction risks being reduced to a buzzword. PR, executive director of 
HRev, is skeptical of the motives behind large institutions like hospitals adopting harm 
reduction programs: 
PR: The harm reduction label is now something that people are talking 
about. But what that means is you've got hospitals with harm reduction 
programming—it's not fucking harm reduction programming, are you kidding 
me!? So in a weird way, it's almost like the concept is being co-opted by 
entities that are better positioned to grab this money, so that they can grab 
the money. And you know, I don't doubt that there are tons of people at the 
city health department and state health department who buy into it, and who 
think it's important, but it's the health department. 
 
For PR, hospitals and other larger institutional players are motivated to adopt the 
language of harm reduction because there is now money behind it, provided by the 
incentive created by Medicaid reform. Interestingly, she acknowledges that people in the 
city and state health departments “buy into” harm reduction, but feels that they will 
ultimately not be successful in transforming the for-profit healthcare world. This thought 
was echoed by YH, a NYSDOH employee: 
YH: I think the people that are now drawn to harm reduction are people that 
have characters open to working with difference in some way or another. And 
what happens when you go to a place where the policy is harm reduction but 
the person who is providing the service may just think you're a piece of shit? 
I'm nervous because now you have people that are drawn to it, but then it's 
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going to be functionally and operationally realized perhaps with people that 
have no philosophical commitment to harm reduction. 
 
YH, a long time harm reduction advocate and AIDS Institute employee, worries about the 
consequences of importing a harm reduction policy without also ensuring the people 
providing the services have a “philosophical commitment to harm reduction.”   
 
In order to ensure that as harm reduction takes its philosophy with it as it becomes 
mainstream, people like IH want to see it become its own accredited field. He would like it 
to become a discipline: 
IH: Any new innovation, whether it's in medicine or anywhere else, if you 
want an innovation to become part of the norm, you've got to move it into the 
mainstream. It’s very important to me that we have the right kind of 
credentialing for harm reduction psychotherapist, drug counselors, etcetera. 
Why? Because I want Hunter [College] to be teaching it. And I want Hunter 
to be issuing a credential to people. Why? Because once Hunter starts 
teaching it, and having that certification can get you a job at a licensed 
facility, it becomes the norm. And people start offering it and innovating off of 
it, because there's money to be made, there's jobs to be had. And if it starts 
becoming the norm, and we start showing that this new norm is producing 
better outcomes than the old norm, it will take over. And it will become the 
treatment ideology, which is what I want to see happen. These are all tactics, 
but at the end of the day, what I want for harm reduction is, I want to be able 
to prove that it is more successful than the traditional in a big enough way to 
where the traditional that is an absolute failure dies away, and harm 
reduction takes it's place.  
 
IH’s ambitions for harm reduction is that it not only becomes mainstream but that it 
supplants the “traditional” so that the traditional “dies away and harm reduction takes its 
place.” And the way he sees this happening is by turning harm reduction into a 
credentialed professional discipline. 
 
That harm reduction, based upon a critique of expertise, might transform into a 
credentialized discipline suggests that the integration of harm reduction into the medical 
system heightens some of the contradictions within it. A argued in chapter two, there have 
 177	  
always been many different version of harm reduction, and many contradictions within any 
one formulation of it. What version of harm reduction is being incorporated into Medicaid? 
 
New York State is taking up the more practical, cost-cutting side of harm reduction while 
deemphasizing or flatly contradicting its project to expand the rights and dignity of drug 
users. Harm reduction is being more fully institutionalized than before. But its 
formalization still only represents the partial enfranchisement of drug users. If New York 
State were to fully embrace harm reduction, it would require not only ending the war on 
drugs, but a revalorizing of the lives of drug users and their communities. 
 
Most of the leaders of harm reduction organizations acknowledge this conflict—but most 
still think that institutionalization is a worthy goal. As IH, the executive director of a major 
AIDS services agency, told me: 
IH: Look, the ban needs to be lifted, the war on drugs needs to change 
radically, we need to look at decriminalization, all of those things are very, 
very important political issues that we need to fight out. But at the end of the 
day, for harm reduction to become a successful treatment modality, it has got 
to move into the mainstream. 
 
IH, like many of my informants, feels that the true goal is becoming a widespread 
treatment modality; emphasizing less practical goals is almost a kind of indulgence. RN 
made a similar point: 
RN: I would personally say more and more services based upon a harm 
reduction model that provides access in health care and everything else for 
drug users is the way to go.  Keeping it scrappy and authentic is ultimately 
going to betray the people you want to serve. 
 
For IH, RN, and other informants, institutionalization is the entire point of harm reduction. 
For them, harm reduction has always been a project to transform the health of drug users:  
IH: So the question is, do you see harm reduction as this low-threshold 
maintenance program, or do you genuinely view it as a successful treatment 
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modality to deal with addiction? And I happen to believe that it's the best 
treatment modality we have to deal with addiction. And so absolutely, if 
somebody wants anonymous exchange and low-threshold services and that's 
all they want, then I should provide them with that. But if I'm doing my job 
right, I'm inviting them into higher and higher levels of engagement, a higher 
level of services, so that they can start getting the treatment that they need 
and start beginning to take control of their addiction. So to me, at the end of 
the day, that's the end-game. Needle exchange started out as a public health 
measure. It was about prevention of disease transmission. That's not the full 
sum of harm reduction. Harm reduction is giving people their lives back. 
 
The threshold question here is a matter of tactics. Harm reduction, in this telling, has 
nothing to do with the political and social standing of drug users. It is only about finding 
ways to reduce the personal harm of addiction.  
 
Others, however, still see harm reduction as a project to uphold the dignity of the user. VC, 
executive director of Harm Reduction Partnership offered an alternate reading of harm 
reduction’s past and its future to the 20th anniversary of harm reduction meeting: 
VC: This is really like a family gathering. … Looking back at our work, and 
how we demonstrated that a behavior did not amount to an identity. People 
who use illicit drugs have multiple identities. Mothers, colleagues, bankers, 
bosses, politicians. In our work, we affirm the social facts of those lives, and 
their intrinsic necessity to community. Sorting people by behavior and then 
later denying them access to life saving resources, requires sustained 
institutional effort and a process of dehumanization that diminishes us all. 
We knew from our work with drug users that they were competent and cared 
for their health and those of their loved ones. [Applause] We sought to 
demonstrate that competency as we constructed syringe exchange. Hence, we 
first had to have an exchange, the one for one, to realize the necessity of 
wider access. And safe injection facilities are the next logical step.  
 
VC emphasizes the social dimensions of harm reduction work, not the health dimension. 
And she alludes to harm reduction’s oppositional orientation when she talks about the 
“sustained institutional effort” that has created the “dehumanization” of drug users. In her 
telling, harm reduction’s core is accepting and demonstrating the “competency” of drug 
users. And for her the way forward, the “next logical step” isn’t deeper integration into the 
state but taking on the hot button issue of safe injection facilities—of which there are 
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currently none in the United States. Needless to say, introducing one does not figure into 
the MRT’s recommendations. 
 
As harm reduction becomes more mainstream, there are still those who want to hold on to 
an oppositional, activist identity and counter-hegemonic political orientation. The role of 
politics within harm reduction has always been a bit tricky to define. As a movement, many 
of their claims to legitimacy hedged on not being about politics but about policy,21 claiming 
that theirs was a pragmatic, non-ideological approach to solving a pressing health crisis. 
There are plenty of participants within the harm reduction field who want to maintain this 
political element within harm reduction, shifting their focus from HIV to social justice for 
drug users, which they claim has always been the underlying philosophical orientation for 
the public health interventions. This part of the movement has not been embraced or even 
acknowledged by the powerful institutions that are now interested in harm reduction 
measures. 
 
Despite harm reduction’s seeming acceptance by the state, there are those like ON, a long 
time DOHMH employee and harm reduction researcher, who see harm reduction as 
irreducibly political. 
ON: I think that with harm reduction, syringe exchange, there still has to be 
some activism that goes on. People that fight for things, that don't just do it 
as a job. 
 
For these representatives of the more politicized tradition within harm reduction, 
institutionalization is betrayal. EL, a board member of HRev, is pessimistic:  
EL: I think what we’re getting at here is again this threshold, and the arms 
of the state entering into people’s lives. And I think that’s what’s happening. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Liz Evans, “Counterpoint: Drug Addicts Can’t Recover if they’re Already Dead,” National Post, 
20 April 2011. 
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It’s a ploy. It’s a mechanism for them to have more and more control over 
people’s bodies.  These are not things I like to engage, man. It really makes 
me sick. I’m really more direct service, the small, grassroots type thing. So 
it’s really new to me. 
 
Others within harm reduction’s political wing see themselves as “soldiers in a just war,” as 
NN told the 20th anniversary celebration: 
NN: So while we commemorate 20 years, we should also be celebrating this 
time that you have all been soldiers in this very unpopular but just war. As 
soldiers you are in a war unlike most others. A just war against prejudice, 
against preconceptions, and against a war that pits one group of people 
against another and calls one unworthy. Because we are all worthy. 
 
This is a claim about harm reduction’s past, but also a position that needs to be understood 
in the context of the movement’s contemporary field.  
 
Yet this same trope is turned around dismissively against those who see themselves as 
“harm reduction warriors.” EU was particularly pointed on this topic. 
EU: I was at that [Harm Reduction Coalition] conference in 2008. Ethan 
Nadelman [of the Drug Policy Alliance] gave a talk. It’s like the coziest, 
funnest conference imaginable because there is this sense of common 
persecution and marginalization. And it’s a conference that’s sort of about 
academic work that’s been done on this issue, but all of it motivated by and 
cloaked in this sense of persecution. 
 
EU: I think if you talk to harm reduction folks, they’re much more inclined to 
want to be adversarial and to want to make it more about a sustained pitch 
battle between these opposing ideological camps, which I think is still part of 
the whole harm reduction ethos... I mean it feels sort of like a revolutionary 
gathering without a clear cause. Where there’s tons of energy to fight 
somebody about something, god damn it, because it’s bullshit what’s 
happening, and what has happened, but, um, um, um, uh, where do we take 
our fight, exactly, right now. What’s the efficacy of taking this fight 
anywhere. 
 
EU: Allan Clear who heads the HRC uses phrases like, "We are foot soldiers 
in the Revolution." And so right, we're foot soldiers in the Revolution, who the 
fuck are we fighting at this point? 
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For EU, what he sees as harm reduction’s obsession with its own marginality can only hold 
it back. IH also sees the dispute as one of misguided idealism versus practicality, and comes 
down on the latter. 
IH: And I think there are people who fear that because we have our own little 
marginalized space, and in fact, some people have even articulated this. 
We've been fighting in the trenches doing this for the last twenty years, and 
what if this becomes profitable and Samaritan Village decides they are going 
to compete against us? Well hallelujah, that's great. Are you worried about 
your little organization and your job? Or are you trying to further a larger 
cause? 
 
IH decouples the “little organization”, present day harm reduction’s direct link to it’s 
activist past, from the ability to “further a larger cause.” That harm reduction did in fact 
develop in what can only be called a marginalized space seems beside the point. This is a 
dispute about harm reduction’s future and its goals in this moment of official incorporation.  
 
Institutionalization, then, represents the selective uptake of the harm reduction’s medical 
side—the aspect of harm reduction most helpful for cost-cutting purposes, and the side that 
does not challenge the broader political context of the continuation of the war on drugs. 
This process does not resolve any of harm reduction’s inner conflicts, on the contrary, it 
intensifies them. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
After twenty years of struggle and incremental victories, harm reduction is poised to take 
its biggest leap yet, into Medicaid and fully into the mainstream of health and social care in 
New York State. This presents harm reduction service providers with many opportunities. 
As an approach to public health, harm reduction has always sought the widest possible 
audience. Becoming part of Medicaid managed care networks allows them to tap into a 
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regular source of funding, thus ensuring their organizational survival, and the continued 
availability of syringe exchange and other harm reduction services as HIV grant funding 
dries up. Harm reduction’s absorption into Medicaid is also happening on a deeper level, 
with the service delivery model pioneered by SEPs being used as an example for other high-
risk, high-cost populations. Most harm reduction service providers I spoke to were eager to 
embrace the challenge on becoming Medicaid reimbursable. There was a palpable feeling of 
vindication among some who had fought hard for this kind of acceptance. 
 
And yet, as harm reduction merges ever closer with mainstream systems of health and 
social service delivery, it also risks losing that which has made it so successful. The 
flexibility inherent in grant funding allowed SEPs, in a sense, to write their own rules, with 
the complicity and encouragement of AIDS Institute employees who identify as activists 
within the harm reduction movement. Being insider-outsiders enabled SEPs to link in to 
just enough of the state project to gain legitimacy and keep their doors open but not be 
overrun with the requirements of administering a highly centralized, bureaucratic 
institution like Medicaid. Some in the field are worried that as harm reduction gets further 
and further away from its origins as a grassroots, user-led movement, it is compromising 
not only its political convictions but its ability to succeed. 
 
The classic theory of social movement institutionalization, derived from Weber and Michels, 
and subsequently codified and criticized in the modern social movements literature, sees 
institutionalization as a process of goal displacement.22 When the founding generation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Some works discussing institutionalization of social movements include Sidney Tarrow, Power in 
Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, “Stepsisters: Feminist Movement Activism in 
Different Institutional Spaces,” pp 195-216 in David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., The Social 
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charismatic leadership is reduced to bureaucratic routinization, the original social and 
political objectives are replaced by the overriding goal of organizational maintenance. Social 
movements become interest groups, political parties, membership organizations or other 
routinized political organizations. 
 
Interestingly, both sides in this debate see the other as coopted. In the standard story about 
cooptation, institutionalization represents the triumph of organizational maintenance over 
purity. Yet in this case, both the opponents and the supporters of institutionalization make 
that charge. Those who want to keep harm reduction “scrappy and authentic” are accused 
of wanting to maintain their small-scale, intimate organizations—just as those who want 
full integration with Medicaid are accused of betraying the original oppositional ethos in 
exchange for more funding. This speaks to the multiple, irreducible and clashing ideals 
within harm reduction as a movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: The Transformation of Social Policy 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The present work is a case study of the institutionalization of a social movement as 
it seeks to alter dramatically the conduct of public health policy. It uses an analysis 
of harm reduction in New York City as the basis for understanding progressive 
movements for policy change in the contemporary era. Harm reduction has indeed 
become mainstream public health policy and practice in New York. It also 
investigates the new directions in which harm reduction is now evolving, such as 
the use of naloxone, and the new scales in which harm reduction is becoming more 
widely embraced, via Medicaid and beyond. It examines the process by which harm 
reduction has managed to “get out of the ghetto” and become increasingly 
integrated into New York’s public health establishment. 
 
Harm reduction has undergone three stages of institutionalization. It began as an 
outsider movement, a wave of activist mobilization in favor of syringe exchange as a 
response to the HIV/AIDS crisis of the early 1990s. At the time, this practice was 
illegal and drug use not sanctioned. This phase was followed by a long period of 
partial institutionalization, characterized by grant funding, organizational 
autonomy, and limited state support. Finally, with harm reduction’s integration 
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into Medicaid, the groups spawned by the movement have assumed a mainstream 
position within the health system. 
 
Institutionalization is the process by which outsiders become insiders – and insiders 
themselves take on the values and orientations of the outsiders. Harm reduction at 
the grassroots level has contributed to wider changes in the design and delivery of 
public health in New York State. Through institutionalization, the harm reduction 
movement was able to realize the goals that it articulated in the outsider days of 
the 1980s: making the state responsive to the health needs of drug users. While 
some activists remain skeptical of what they see as the harm reduction movement’s 
having been coopted as the policy establishment adopted their practices, the process 
has created new relationships between marginalized communities and the state, 
and led to new forms of social and political inclusion for drug users. The harm 
reduction approach, pioneered by drug users and public health activists, is now 
being applied to the health system more broadly. 
 
This final chapter draws some conclusions from this case study. It first outlines the 
development of this project from its starting assumptions to its empirical findings. 
Second, it describes how this contributes to the political science literature on social 
movement institutionalization. Finally, it details a number of future research 
questions stemming from this project and offer some concluding observations. 
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II. Project summary and findings 
 
This research drew on forty in-depth interviews and eighteen months of participant-
observation in the harm reduction field in New York City. The project sought to 
understand how harm reduction had developed from a marginal outsider position 
into mainstream health policy and practice in New York. The more general goal was 
to understand if and to what extent and how marginalized groups can succeed in 
shaping social policy in contemporary political conditions. 
 
As detailed in chapter two, many scholars and activists see the contemporary era as 
one in which neoliberalism has narrowed the set of political possibilities. The 
specialist literature on harm reduction is strongly inflected with the narrative that 
neoliberalism and privatization obstruct progressive policymaking. Especially for 
harm reduction’s Foucault-influenced critics, social policy in general and harm 
reduction in particular have been reshaped by an efficiency-seeking, market-based 
state regime that defangs any positive or progressive potential. In this story, most 
contemporary policies either fail to benefit the poor and the marginalized or actively 
harm them. 
 
And yet harm reduction in New York is a definite case of progressive policy in 
action. Against what seems to be the main thrust of contemporary social welfare 
policy, it has involved the expansion of the state, the improvement of health 
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outcomes in a vulnerable group, and the introduction of measures that run counter 
to the context of the war on drugs and American inequality. 
 
The original mystery, then, was how this pro-poor policy grew and became 
institutionalized during an era that also saw cutbacks in social housing; aggressive 
policing practices like stop-and-frisk; the growth of homelessness; neighborhood 
development policies that promoted gentrification in many central areas; 
skyrocketing levels of economic inequality; and other developments and policies 
that can be considered harmful to the interests of poor and working-class New 
Yorkers. 
 
The project began with a number of assumptions. It assumed that harm reduction 
in New York would provide a classic example of protest movements confronting the 
state, in the manner of AIDS activism or other oppositional, contentious public 
health movements. It therefore assumed that activists and service providers, on the 
one hand, would have a tense relationship with the state, on the other—why else 
would it have taken eleven years from the start of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
harm reduction mobilization to establish the waiver system for syringe exchange? 
 
Stemming from this first assumption, this project also assumed that harm 
reduction organizations would display high levels of solidarity and cooperation . It 
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assumed that they would cooperate for unified policy change, using alliances like 
the Intravenous Drug User Health Alliance (IDUHA) to pursue movement goals. 
 
This project also assumed that New York’s harm reduction movement and policy 
would be similar to harm reduction activism in Vancouver, Amsterdam, Zurich, 
Berlin, and elsewhere. In these places, the movement relies on close ties between 
users and public health researchers and is strongly focused on promoting and 
expanding safer injection sites (SIFs). As New York does not yet have a SIF, this 
project assumed that SIFs would also be the ultimate goal of harm reduction in New 
York. 
 
But my findings countered a number of these assumptions. There are two major 
causal stories here. On the one hand, drug policy has changed in response to levels 
of mobilization of the harm reduction movement; the connections between activists 
and the state; and the ability of activists inside and outside the state to capitalize 
upon the current political opportunity structure. On the other hand, changing forms 
of drug policy themselves cause changes in the relationships between users and the 
state; broader changes in social policy; and drug user health itself, which has 
become an objective of government policy in new ways, and has markedly improved, 
as seen for example in lower levels of overdose death and decreased rates of HIV 
transmission. 
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This study finds that harm reduction has largely succeeded in achieving its stated 
goals. The overall goals of harm reduction in New York have been, first, to get the 
public health system to adopt practices that reduce the harm of drug use. Second, it 
has sought to influence social policy in a more general way, to diffuse the idea 
behind harm reduction. My data suggest that harm reduction in New York is in the 
process of accomplishing both of these goals. 
 
These goals also differ from those of harm reduction movements in other cities, 
where the movement has also not undergone the same institutionalization 
sequence. While at least one SEP did build a model SIF in New York City, that is 
not the movement’s main direction. Instead, it has sought to integrate harm 
reduction services as a basic approach to the broader delivery of health services. 
Today, leaders of New York’s harm reduction field are less focused on opening safer 
injection sites than on finding their places within Medicaid reform. Many harm 
reduction activists in New York see this as a triumph, not a capitulation.   
 
Peer-delivered naloxone is a typical New York harm reduction strategy. Activists 
both inside and outside the state championed the introduction of naloxone, which 
received bipartisan political support, unlike syringe exchange. Peer-delivered 
naloxone relies on the social networks cultivated by syringe exchange organizations 
during the period of partial institutionalization. Public health officials and activists 
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have utilized these networks to develop the naloxone program, expanding the reach 
of the state ever deeper into the social lives and bodily practices of drug users.  
 
Harm reduction is becoming mainstream in New York City. The harm reduction 
philosophy is shaping mainstream health strategies, even when they do not directly 
involve drug users. The claim that harm reduction is, in the words of one informant, 
“getting out of the ghetto,” has a number of meanings. It means that harm 
reduction is no longer found only in marginalized neighborhoods. It means that 
harm reduction services like syringe access and peer-delivered naloxone are now 
available in more venues and to more populations. It means statewide health and 
social service agencies have picked up harm reduction’s low threshold model of 
service delivery. And it means that harm reduction’s non-abstinence philosophy has 
found its way into the mainstream of a reconfigured health infrastructure. In all 
these ways, harm reduction’s trajectory illustrates how politics becomes policy, and 
what happens to a disruptive political project and policy paradigm when it migrates 
from the margin to the center. 
 
This study finds that the institutionalization of harm reduction has not meant that 
it has been coopted in the sense of the movement’s conservative side triumphing 
over its radical side. In this case, institutionalization coexists with, and even 
strengthens, identification with the social movement. It is not that harm reduction 
is not becoming less radical in its rhetoric and its tactics. In many ways, it is. But 
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from the beginning, harm reduction in New York sought to shape the state and 
become integrated into it, to get the state to cater to a population that it was 
ignoring, and to become part of the health system.  It has succeeded in all these 
goals. 
 
The dominant theme is neither cooptation via goal substitution nor a continuation 
of contentious politics, but rather partial and fuller forms of institutionalization. 
The public health bureaucracy and harm reduction activists had much deeper and 
longer-standing ties than first appeared. Activists shifted fluidly between social 
service organizations and the state. People working within and outside the state 
shared the “activist” identity. Often, people who work in state agencies saw 
themselves as activists, while people working in syringe exchanges saw themselves 
as social service providers, not movement activists. There were certainly moments 
of tension between harm reduction activists and public officials, but for the most 
part, they saw themselves as working together towards the same goals.  
 
As with many social movements, the harm reduction movement experienced a 
tension between value rationality and instrumental rationality. Harm reduction 
was promoted both as an ethical project to promote the dignity and autonomy of 
drug users and as a practical, cost- and life-saving policy innovation. For every 
“harm reduction warrior” appealing to rights, a bureaucrat points to cost savings.  
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This case study shows that the movement succeeded in New York not because 
advocates or bureaucrats prevailed, but because they continue to work together in 
tension with each other. The value-rational, politicized dimension of harm reduction 
motivated both activists within marginalized communities and public health 
professionals. And its instrumental-rational, practical side is undoubtedly one of the 
reasons that reformist public health bureaucrats adopted it. This duality has left 
some activists frustrated and community-based harm reduction organizations 
experiencing tension with city and state governments. But the fact that harm 
reduction has managed to maintain both of these dimensions has evidently been 
important for its success. 
 
By recognizing that we cannot reduce harm reduction either to its radical or 
practical goals, we can see how it unsettles the standard neoliberal critique of social 
policy. Such critics have accuse harm reduction of favoring the marketization of 
drug users both in the political-economic and biopolitical senses of the term. Harm 
reduction does “roll-out” new forms of social control, in the sense that the state now 
sanctions syringe exchange. Naloxone undoubtedly simultaneously extends and 
obscures the reach of the state. Like syringe exchange, it relies on a willing and 
responsible health care consumer, prepared to assume responsibility for their self 
care. 
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But none of this means that the primary function of harm reduction is to increase or 
transform social control, nor that we should evaluate it on this dimension to the 
exclusion of all others. As this study has shown, harm reduction activists struggled 
to transform social policy for more than thirty years. Rather than saying this 
struggle was compromised because it used some neoliberal tools to succeed, we 
should treat it instead as an instance where a policy reform movement cannily 
exploited the stresses and strains within changing welfare and health systems. 
James Ferguson was right that “to say that certain political initiatives and 
programs borrow from the neoliberal bag of tricks doesn’t mean that these political 
projects are in league with the ideological project of neoliberalism.”1 
 
Harm reduction is not in league with the ideological project of the “Bloomberg way”2 
or some other shorthand for the forces of neoliberalism in New York. Harm 
reduction has succeeded not despite “neoliberal” policy trends, but by exploiting 
them, including pushes toward decentralization, responsibilization, evidence-
basedness, policy exceptionalism, and the instrumentalization of social networks. 
Ultimately, this capacity to exploit the “political opportunity structure” 3  of 
neoliberalism explains the mystery of this successful pro-poor policy in an era of 
welfare state retrenchment and other anti-poor developments. Rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James Ferguson, “The Uses of Neoliberalism,” Antipode 41.S1 (2009): 174. 
2 Julian Brash, Bloomberg’s New York: Class and Governance in the Luxury City (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 2011). 
3 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3rd ed. (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011); David S. Meyer and Debra Minkoff, “Conceptualizing 
Political Opportunity,” Social Forces 82.4 (2004): 1457-1492. 
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dismissing it for these reasons, we should recognize that a social movement 
successfully democratized one area of policy. 
 
III. Contemporary dynamics of institutionalization and policy change 
 
The dynamics uncovered in this study suggest ways in which we can improve the 
political science literature on social movement institutionalization. To oversimplify 
the matter, social movements can change policy via institutionalization. This study 
details the nuances of the process by which this took place in New York . It 
demonstrates, contra the dominant critique of the neoliberalization of social policy, 
that the institutionalization of social movement insurgencies can yield 
substantively important policy changes today. 
 
Following from the work of Charles Tilly and others, social movement scholars, 
especially those drawing on resource mobilization theory, had traditionally defined 
social movements as outside of the state.4 From this perspective, the specter of 
cooptation looms over the integration of movements into the state. Piven and 
Cloward, for example, argue that the state brings movement elites within its 
structures in order to neutralize the challenging demand they are placing on the 
system.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: McGraw Hill, 1978); Sidney 
Tarrow, op. cit. 
5 Francis Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: How They Succeed and Why They 
Fail (New York: Random House, 1977). 
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Subsequent scholars, however, argued that the distinction between movements and 
the state is not so simple. Smith and Lipsky described how the state contracts out 
various functions to non-profit groups.6 Santoro and McGuire develop the idea of 
“institutional activists,” arguing that activists inside the state are crucial for policy 
change.7 Lambright and O’Gorman’s concept of the “advocacy agency” makes a 
similar point.8 Meyer and his coauthors define institutionalization as “the ways in 
which movement actors are… included in the policy process as legitimate actors.”9 
Another recent articulation of this relationship comes from social movement scholar 
Lee Ann Banaszak, who describes how social movements operate both “inside and 
outside the state.”10 She defines what she calls the “state-movement intersection” as 
those “self-identified members of the movement who hold recognizable positions 
within the state.”11  Banaszak argues that this intersection presents a crucial 
opportunity for movement actors to influence public policy, and that it can be seen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of 
Contracting (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009 [1993]). 
7 Wayne A. Santoro and Gail M. McGuire, “Social Movement Insiders: The Impact of Institutional 
Activists on Affirmative Action and Comparable Worth Policies,” Social Problems 44.1 (1997): 503-
519. 
8 W. Henry Lambright and Mark J. O'Gorman, “New York State's Response to AIDS: Evolution of an 
Advocacy Agency,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2.2 (1992): 175-198. 
9 David S. Meyer, “Social Movements and Public Policy: Eggs, Chicken, and Theory,” pp xi-xxxvi in 
David S. Meyer, Valerie Jenness and Helen Ingram, eds., Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, 
Public Policy, and Democracy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005): xx. See also 
David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a 
New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Traci M. Sawyers and David S. Meyer, 
“Missed Opportunities: Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy,” Social Problems 46.2 (1999): 
187-206. 
10 Lee Ann Banaszak, The Women's Movement Inside and Outside the State (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
11 Lee Ann Banaszak, “Inside and Outside the State: Movement Insider Status, Tactics, and Public 
Policy Achievements,” pp 121-148 in David S. Meyer, Valerie Jenness and Helen Ingram, eds., 
Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005): 126. 
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to vary along a continuum, from complete legal exclusion, to being outside 
government but not excluded, to being inside government but marginalized, to more 
complete inclusion.12 
 
The present study contributes three new points to this literature. First, it develops 
a model of institutionalization —summarized in the table in chapter one—that adds 
significant depth to this picture of institutionalization. Using Banaszak’s terms, the 
harm reduction movement has moved from nearly complete legal exclusion to 
something more like complete inclusion. But this move required and in turn 
promoted a deep transformation in the funding sources, scope of action, 
organizational form and political orientation of harm reduction organizations. This 
study demonstrates that the state-movement intersection is a dynamic strategic 
location that changes social movement organizations themselves as well as the 
state. 
 
Secondly, this study illustrates the political efficacy of “partial institutionalization.” 
As is detailed in chapter three, providing harm reduction services like syringe 
exchange to drug users during the height of hysteria of the HIV/AIDS crisis was 
challenging for groups trying to change policy. Giving needles to drug users in order 
that they might continue using drugs was unpopular and foreign. Nevertheless, the 
failure of the city’s initial responses to the AIDS crisis led them to become openly 
supportive of syringe exchange. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Banaszak, “Inside and Outside the State,” ibid.: 128. 
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They succeeded in this move through a form of partial institutionalization, the 
granting of waivers from the rules preventing syringe exchange. Significantly, this 
allowed syringe exchange to take place without changing the larger legal 
framework. The state could support harm reduction while under political cover. The 
CBOs provided a public service through private, but informally state-sanctioned 
means, allowing the state to foster something that was highly effective but 
politically unpopular. The partial institutionalion gave activists the time and space 
to consolidate their programs, build an evidence base to support their policy change 
efforts, and yet maintain the outsider, oppositional identity that was crucial to their 
legitimacy within the communities they served. 
 
Partial institutionalization allowed the harm reduction movement to bide its time 
while it developed a politically viable program. It was not an incomplete form of full 
institutionalization, but rather a specific and dynamic strategy in its own right. It 
was politically and substantively functional both for harm reduction activists and 
for the state. Partial institutionalization allowed innovation to happen by 
encouraging organizational autonomy for syringe exchanges and political cover for 
embattled government agencies. Grassroots demanded change and the bureaucracy 
responded in a way that only partial institutionalization made possible.  
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Finally, this dissertation connects the larger study of how social movements seeking 
policy reform contribute to the changing nature of the state. The literature on 
institutionalization should be brought into sharper dialogue with the literature on 
neoliberalism precisely on this point. The institutionalization of policy reform 
movements will differ depending on the specific political opportunity structure of a 
given aspect of the state. The overgeneralized model of institutionalization 
developed by Meyer, Banaszak’ and others wrongly shifts our focus away from 
concrete changes in state form. It assumes that social movements institutionalize 
into a basically static state. But we need to build the changing nature of specific, 
concreate parts of the state into this theory. Since the 1970s, states have indeed 
undergone the process of neoliberal market restructuring detailed in chapter two. 
The literature on neoliberalism sees this almost universally as restricting the field 
of possibility for progressive policy change. But this case study makes it abundantly 
clear that this transformation also opens up new moments of progressive 
institutional change. 
 
IV. Directions for future research 
 
This study raises important questions for future research and affirms the value of 
qualitative and ethnographic studies of the policy process. 
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One major question concerns the future of harm reduction itself. My field research 
ended just as harm reduction organizations were being integrated into Medicaid. 
Further study needs to track the continuation of this reform process. How will harm 
reduction change as it becomes part of the larger logic of the new public health 
system and less specifically connected to drug use? How will it combine with the 
other changes in social welfare and drug punishment policies  in New York State? 
Can it help to make drug policy less punitive, or will it merge with punitive 
techniques in ways that some of its most radical critics fear? Will the state sanction 
other longstanding harm reduction goals such as the opening of a safer injection 
facility, or will further bureaucratization marginalize the harm reduction 
movement? And now that harm reduction is diffusing on the state level, will it jump 
another scale to the national level?  
 
Secondly, we need to compare the New York case in international perspective. 
Vancouver, Canada remains the iconic example of North American harm reduction. 
But it has taken a very different form in New York, seen most clearly in its 
connection to a privatized health system. Does the New York Model of harm 
reduction differ from other models in the United States, such those in Chicago or 
San Francisco? And if so, what role does the New York and U.S. experience play in 
transnational policy circuits? A close examination of the specificities of harm 
reduction in New York would also shed light on the ways national and 
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transnational policy movements tailor their approach to policy change in different 
settings.  
 
Above all, this study suggests that harm reduction has been institutionalized but 
not coopted in New York. Future research could develop this contrast between 
cooptation and institutionalization in greater depth and in other policy venues, 
because the negative connotations associated with cooptation might prevent 
movements for policy change from finding creative ways to engage in becoming 
embraced by official programs. Cooptation may fundamentally be a strategy by 
which bureaucratic opponents neutralize movements for policy change. This study 
demonstrates, however, that it can also be a strategy by which movements achieve 
their goals. The harm reduction example suggests that movements can retain their 
movement identity while public policy practices embrace their desired changes. 
Research into other movements should test this hypothesis. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The ultimate significance of harm reduction in New York, and more broadly in the 
U.S., is that a group of people who have been categorically excluded from political 
society form new, more positive relations with the state. The addiction researcher 
Gabor Maté argues that prior trauma is invariably at the core of addiction.13 In an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Gabor Maté, In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts: Close Encounters with Addiction (Toronto, ON: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). 
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unequal society, trauma is distributed unequally, as are the habits and harms of 
addiction. And for the past one hundred years, American drug policy has been 
geared towards further punishing the traumatized.  
 
Twenty-three years after local public health authorities authorized syringe 
exchange as an emergency response to the HIV/AIDS crisis, we have made 
incredible strides in our efforts at prevention and treatment, such that people living 
with AIDS today can enjoy fuller, healthier lives. But the consequences of the larger 
pattern of addictions are as harmful as ever. We now face unprecedented levels of 
drug use, both of the prescribed and illegal varieties. This high level of addiction 
has enormous consequences for the lives of individuals from all communities which 
are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore and deny. Harm reduction policies offer 
us a saner, more just, more humane way of helping people with their struggles.  
 
The harm reduction project is fundamentally humane in providing a way for a 
disenfranchised group to make claims for the state resources and services they need 
to continue living. And it creates an avenue for them to become active participants 
in the policy process. This political inclusion in turn allows them to develop a new 
view of their relation to the state. As one drug user told researchers, through 
participating in harm reduction, “you begin to get a different feeling about yourself. 
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To become part of something for who I am and not for who I am not.”14 Scholars, 
activists and policymakers alike need to recognize this sentiment as politically and 
ethically valuable. Harm reduction, then, is proof that a more just and inclusive 
world is possible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Thomas Kerr et al., “Harm Reduction by a ‘User-Run’ Organization: A Case Study of the 
Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU),” International Journal of Drug Policy 17.2 (2006): 
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